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Missions at Madras

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

I

THESE last years, the Christian Churches have been learning to think of themselves as a World Community as seldom before in Christian history. This trend was clearly disclosed in the Oxford and Edinburgh Conferences of 1937. It was disclosed in them; it was not created by them. For it is increasingly recognized that Oxford and Edinburgh were even more significant in what they revealed than in what they accomplished. They revealed that over the last score of years among Christian leaders of every land and every principal body (save the Church of Rome), there have been emerging, almost imperceptibly, a deepening awareness of the underlying unity of the Christian Churches as a world movement, and a determination that that unity shall be given more tangible and effective expression.

With one important aspect of the new situation, Oxford and Edinburgh made no attempt to deal. If Christians are increasingly conscious of themselves as a single World Community, what is the meaning of this mounting consciousness for the world-wide "foreign" missionary undertakings of the Churches of the West? At Oxford and Edinburgh, the "Younger Churches" of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Pacific Islands were barely represented. Their distinctive viewpoints and problems were seldom under consideration; they were never at the focus of attention. No effort was made to declare the implications of Oxford and Edinburgh for their faith and life, or to define the role of the Younger Churches in the emerging World Community. This great task was deliberately reserved for another world gathering of Christians—the enlarged meeting of the International Missionary Council called for Madras, India, at Christmastide, 1938.

These facts furnished a part of the perspective for the Madras Conference. But only a part. Almost more important in urging its importance and forming its atmosphere were certain concrete issues which press urgently upon the life of the Younger Churches and call for the wisest Christian statesmanship. In a dozen countries on almost every continent—in Japan, India,

Turkey, South Africa, Latin America—virile movements of self-conscious nationalism dominate attention, win ardent support, and in some instances demand and receive absolute allegiance over every other devotion, buttressing their claims by religious or quasi-religious sanctions. What should be the response of Christians in these lands, almost always a tiny minority within the national life, to such claims? In other nations equally far-flung—in China, the Philippines, Mexico, certain Latin-American republics—Communism attracts the social ardor of youth and serves them as a religion. What attitude should the little Christian communities take up toward Communism, either as a philosophy or as a movement of practical reform? On these questions, the Oxford Conference had spoken, but mainly in theoretical terms and with the European and American situations principally in view. What concrete guidance could the World Church offer to youthful Christian bodies whose very existence is challenged and threatened by the powerful new “pagan faiths”? Again, two of the oldest and strongest of the Younger Churches find their nations locked in a brutal conflict which has stirred the indignation of mankind as has no aggression of modern times. What, if anything, could a world gathering of Christians say to the Sino-Japanese War, when its word might stir repercussions imperiling the safety of tens of thousands of fellow Christians in those lands? For Madras, these were no speculative queries but life-and-death decisions of the most immediate and insistent urgency.

Still more important, however, in justifying the calling of the Conference and determining its agenda were whole nests of problems, less spectacular than the pressing issues of the hour, but of far greater moment for the ongoing Christian Evangel throughout the world, matters of basic principle and practice—the inner life and organization of the Younger Churches, their economic independence and self-support, the enlistment and training of their leadership; the relations of Younger and Older Churches, the place of missionaries and of mission support, the propagation of sectarian divisions; the relative importance of education, of medicine, of social service, of direct evangelism in the mission of the Church; the impact of Christian ethics upon industrial, racial, international life, the attitude of Christian faith to non-Christian religions, and of individual Christians toward adherents of those religions; the relation of the individual Christian and the Church, of the denomination and the Church Universal, of the national community and the World Community of Christ. What new discoveries and developments has the past decade brought forth which should guide the world-wide advance of

the Christian Community as it steps forward into the tasks of the years just ahead? All these questions, and many more, pressed for reconsideration. For Madras stood in the currents of two great series of Christian world gatherings, indeed at their confluence—not only in succession to Stockholm and Lausanne, Oxford and Edinburgh (1937), but also in the sequence of the great missionary conferences of Edinburgh (1910), and Jerusalem (1928). It was the position of the Madras Conference, at the meeting-point of two great streams of ecumenical thought and life, which decreed its greatest significance.

II

Four hundred and seventy men and women gathered on the lovely campus of the Madras Christian College at Tambaran on the evening of December twelfth. They were drawn out of every continent, from over sixty nations, speaking more than a hundred tongues. Three hundred and seventy-seven came as officially appointed delegates of their respective national Church councils or committees. Forty more were co-opted because of special knowledge or competence. The remainder represented student movements, fraternal world Christian bodies, the religious press, etcetera. In their totality, they constituted beyond all comparison the most widely representative body of Christians which has ever assembled. *Probably, they were the most widely representative gathering of men and women which has ever met in conference under any auspices.*

The cosmopolitan character of the assemblage was graphically symbolized in the wealth of national costumes which would tempt an imaginative pen to vivid word portraiture—the delicate kimonos of the Japanese, the gorgeous sari of the Indian women, the extraordinary headdress of the Burmese, the stark white robes of certain of Mr. Gandhi's followers. Only the chaste and exquisite costume of the Koreans was absent. Their names appeared in the official roster, but footnoted with the explanation, “prevented by circumstances from attending.” Under the renewed and ruthless persecution of their Japanese masters, it is unwise for any Korean to participate in an international gathering. With this sad exception, almost every people on the face of the earth was represented.

The structure of the program clearly revealed its intention. This was to be primarily a working consultation to develop concrete and practical plans for the Church's world Mission. The conference time-table of eighteen days broke easily into two main periods of roughly a week each for intensive

study by sectional groups of the specific problems proposed for inquiry, followed by three days of plenary sessions for consideration of findings by the entire body. An initial day of "retreat," the Sundays concluding each week of intensive study, and a closing session, together with daily periods of united worship, served to surround the work-sessions with the atmosphere and perspective of the Larger Vision, safeguarding them against mere preoccupation with detailed plans. But there has seldom been a conference of comparable importance where "inspirational" features of a conventional kind played so minor a role, where formal addresses so little swayed its work and findings. Inspiration aplenty there was for every delegate. But it flowed unforced from sheer confrontation with the facts of the Christian Mission in the world, rather than from prearranged exhortations. This was a council of officially commissioned representatives and experts, charged with devising a strategy for a great ongoing enterprise of life and work. Its members gave themselves unstintingly to their assignments. From common labor in those tasks they drew new vision, strengthened conviction, heightened and deepened faith.

III

In an undertaking of such dimensions and complexity, it was inevitable that there should be inadequacies and even mistakes. Various delegates will fasten upon one or another feature where the Conference seemed to them to fall short of its highest possibilities. Most of these criticisms or misgivings appear to gather around either of two points—the inspirational quality of the Conference, and its silence on certain important issues.

1. Delegates who had attended the Oxford Conference of 1937 could not fail to note the contrast which Madras presented in two respects. Intellectually, the proceedings at Madras fell markedly below those at Oxford. This was not the weakness which might be supposed. Oxford had been notable for the galaxy of foremost Christian scholars in attendance and for the dominance which their thought exercised over its discussions. In considerable measure, the role of the rank-and-file membership was to listen, to admire and to assent. Inevitably, the findings of Oxford spoke the language of the classroom, and carry corresponding authority. At Madras, the relative paucity of dominating intellects gave the Conference one of its strongest features—its truly democratic character. The voice of almost every one of the nearly five hundred members counted decisively at some point. And their voices echoed the viewpoints of the great body of the churches whose repre-

sentatives they were. In consequence, their findings spring straight from the living conviction of the Church-of-Christ-in-action and speak directly to that Church's immediate problems; thereby, they carry their own authority.

The second contrast between Madras and Oxford cannot be so heartily welcomed. Not only intellectually but also spiritually, the Madras meeting did not attain Oxford's high level. This was unexpected; it is not easily excused. By common consent, the great achievements at Oxford had been made possible in large measure by the remarkable series of worship services, carefully conceived and superbly led, held twice daily and on each Sunday in Saint Mary's Cathedral. At Madras, the corporate worship failed to unite, to purify, to uphold the Conference in comparable measure. Again, few of the addresses rose above the average in either enlightening or kindling power. In part, this was due to less favorable conditions for worship. In part, it seemed to suggest some deficiency in spiritual imagination in the Conference's planning. To conceive so comprehensive and complicated a program and then to pilot it through to significant conclusions in little more than a fortnight demanded superlative generalship and administration; these gifts were forthcoming in quite extraordinary measure. But one missed spiritual vision and strategy of equal effectiveness.

This must be put down as a weakness. But even this shortcoming was not without decided compensation. Many delegates remarked that the appeal of the Conference was always to the intellect and will rather than to the emotions. Unlike so many large Christian gatherings, it did not lift its members upon a swift current of surcharged inspiration for its duration and then drop them abruptly to the commonplace at its end; here was the secret of its perfect health and normality. And, as already noted, it was not lacking in inspiration. But inspiration came less from measures planned to sustain a high elevation than from the inherent spirituality of the members and their whole-souled devotion to their task; that, too, was all to the good. Nonetheless, some among them felt cheated of the "lift" which was their rightful expectation in so great and so significant an assemblage.

2. By those who were not present, the Madras Conference will be most severely criticized for its failure to condemn explicitly flagrant instances of national wrongdoing in the contemporary world—Japan's aggression in China, persecution of the Jews, the betrayal of Czechoslovakia, the war in Spain. This silence was a disappointment to many delegates also. But it was due not to cowardice but to considered conviction.

For one thing, it was the necessary condition for the inclusiveness and unity of the Conference. Members of several delegations, notably the German and the Japanese, came to Tambaram knowing full well that, if the Conference implicated them in statements even inferentially derogatory of their governments, they could not return to their own lands or could return only to arrest and imprisonment. Their fellow delegates came to understand the only conditions on which their attendance was possible, were determined to have their collaboration even on these terms, and loyally accepted and respected the limitations implicit in the presence of colleagues from dictator states.

But there was a far weightier and more influential consideration—counseling reticence. Any condemnation of the national policy of Germany or Japan or Italy by a great world Christian convention would not merely have endangered the freedom and possibly the lives of Christian subjects of those governments. Almost certainly it would have provoked retaliation in the form of cruel persecution upon Christians of minority peoples at the mercy of the whims of those governments—upon defenseless Christians in Korea, in Manchuria, in "occupied" China, in Czechoslovakia. That price, to be paid not by Conference delegates but by fellow Christians who were not present and who had no slightest part in the evils condemned, the Conference was unwilling to exact.

The decision to remain silent was taken, however, deliberately and with full calculation of consequences. On the last day, in connection with its own report on "The Church and the International Order" and confronting its inability to declare the Christian judgment upon specific national sins, the Conference adopted a special resolution, stating its position with unmistakable clarity:

"Throughout our session, we have been vividly conscious of the areas in the world where aggression or persecution prevails today. And we are not unaware of the widespread expectation that this representative world gathering of Christians should seek to voice the overwhelming Christian opinion in these matters.

"We are penitently conscious that in the past all our nations have sinned and that we are all involved in the system which has resulted in the present aggression and persecution. Our own gathering has been to us a convincing promise of a world fellowship in Christ which transcends all divisions of nation and race, and thus condemns the strife and conflict which so largely dominate the peoples of the world today.

"We are even more vividly conscious of the sufferings of our fellow Christians in these areas who strive to be loyal to their consecration to Christ and of the still greater dangers which constantly threaten them. While several of our reports express

our convictions regarding international conflict and its causes, we are unwilling that words of ours which cost us nothing should aggravate the problems and hazards of our fellow Christians. Therefore, after careful and prayerful consideration, we have deliberately refrained from any further pronouncement which might injure them. But we express to them and to all of whatever faith who suffer under aggression or persecution our profound sympathy in their difficulties. And we call upon Christians everywhere to pray for them, to bring them practical aid, and to redouble effort to remove the basic causes of their suffering."

Anyone who knows our American penchant for pronouncements, especially sweeping denunciations which cost us nothing beyond paper and postage, will readily forecast the derision with which this determined silence will be greeted in certain circles. Before intelligent and responsible Christians lend countenance to such criticisms, they would do well to gain a thorough understanding of precisely what the desired pronouncement by the Conference would have meant, not for them but for those who would have suffered from it. Madras may be charged with unwillingness to proclaim the Christian condemnation of these evils. It cannot be charged with ill-considered or irresponsible speech.

IV

The positive value of the Madras Conference can be appraised only in terms of its actual influence upon the life and work of the Christian Mission in the world. The accomplishments by which it would wish mainly to be judged are its recommendations—a score of documents dealing with very concrete and detailed matters and suggesting glamour only to those who know their vital importance for Christ's Cause; and the success of these proposals in actually modifying Christian practice in threescore lands and thousands of centers of work. This influence only the judgment of the future can measure.

In the immediate perspective of today, can we discern indisputable elements of significance? Let me suggest six:

1. In the International Missionary Council meeting at Madras, *the Universal Church of Christ found concrete expression as never before in history.* If we recognize that the Church is truly universal only as it embraces living communities of Christians among every race and in every nation, then at Madras that Universal Church was embodied in any adequate sense for the *first time*.

It had been foreseen in the Edinburgh missionary conference of 1910,

but only by the eye of faith. It had been anticipated in the Jerusalem conference of 1928, but there leadership was still predominantly Western and missionary. At Madras, the world-wide Church of Christ was actually and fully present in the persons of its own members.

This universal character was happily symbolized in the membership; Christians of East and West, of Older and Younger Churches participated in roughly equal numbers. But it was much more than symbolized. It was actualized in the life and work of the Conference.

We speak of Oxford and Edinburgh in 1937 as "ecumenical conferences." And so they were, in the sense that all the main branches of Christ's Church, save Rome, officially participated. But these conferences were overwhelmingly European and American alike in membership and in viewpoint. Voices from the great young Churches of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Pacific Isles numbered barely a dozen among four hundred, and were almost silenced in the bedlam of Western accents. In the deeper and truer sense of a gathering of Christ's followers out of every race and land, Madras was far more "ecumenical." Indeed, it was the first truly ecumenical conference of Christendom.

This fact did not have to be argued or forcibly created; it was self-evident. No one alert to the historic development of the Christian Movement could miss it, and its immeasurable significance. For what was so compellingly actualized at the Conference was symbolic. Madras was the Christian Movement in miniature; and that Movement is now a Universal Church.

2. Within this ecumenical setting, the world-wide evangelistic task of the Churches was realized anew and in quite new terms. *The Christian Mission was seen and accepted as the universal responsibility of all Christians without regard to place or heritage.* Here, likewise, Edinburgh and Jerusalem, Stockholm and Lausanne, Oxford and Edinburgh had been prophetic. But the Madras Conference went far beyond them. What had been for them prophecy was at Madras actualization. The familiar divisions which have dogged the missionary cause increasingly and have tended to erect weakening barriers—between West and East, between Older and Younger Churches, between "sending" and "receiving" countries, between missions and churches—were, in fact, completely overpassed. The important distinctions which they represent were in no sense denied or neglected. But, as indications of superior and inferior ability, of greater or less authority, they were seen to have become completely obsolete. Here, men and women from Europe and

Asia, from Africa and the Americas conferred not merely with full equality of numbers and vote, but with absolute equality of inherent influence. They spoke, not primarily as representatives of particular areas or viewpoints, but as Christians bound in a single all-compelling Cause and sharing together whatever of value might have come to them as individuals or as churches. And they knew themselves most fully one in their common responsibility for the advance of that Cause in every area of the world and of the world's life. What this realization will mean for the empowering of Christ's Mission only the future can disclose.

3. Even more impressive, and more significant for the future of the Christian enterprise throughout the world, was the *leadership* given by the representatives of the *Younger Churches*. By happy design, formal leadership in the Conference—chairmanships and secretaryships of sections, platform addresses, conduct of public worship, committee responsibilities—fell, like the Conference's membership, to delegates from Old and New Churches in about equal numbers. But, by an inner logic which could not be prearranged, the actual influence upon the decisions and accomplishments of the Conference was so evenly distributed that no one could say which counted for more—the voices of the West or of the East. Christians from the Younger Churches pulled their full weight and, in the estimate of some, more than their full weight in the common tasks.

One striking illustration of this fact deserves special mention. It was widely remarked among the Western members that the strongest single delegation at Madras, man for man, was not the British or the American, but that from China. When one recalls the desperate crisis of that nation and its churches, the separation of free and "occupied" China, the extreme difficulty with which its ablest leaders could be spared from the national emergency, this is the more remarkable tribute to the power and vision of Christianity in China. By implication, it brings impressive witness to the strength of leadership throughout the Younger Churches.

4. Madras was notable not only for the leadership of the Younger Churches, but no less for the *leadership of younger men and women*. Of the thirty-odd delegates who served as chairmen and secretaries of the sections which carried the major work of the Conference, the average age was 48. It is doubtful whether there has ever been a gathering of Christians of comparable weight and importance, certainly in modern times, where the voice of the oncoming leadership of the Church mingled so fully and influentially with

the wisdom of experience and maturity. Here, likewise, there was no sense of the familiar antithesis between youth and age, between the "prewar" and "postwar" generations. This fact is also rich with promise for the health and strength of the Church in the days ahead when its direction comes to pass from the hands of the veteran leadership which has guided it through the past half century of vigorous expansion and then troublous postwar crisis.

5. To the outsider, it will not be easy to disclose the immediate and practical contributions of Madras. They are largely embedded in *certain of the sectional reports* where the eye of the outsider will hardly penetrate. And, as already suggested, it is by their worth that the Conference would wish its work to be appraised. Inevitably, the sixteen reports are of uneven strength and value. But some of them stake out the lines of advance for the entire Christian Mission into the distant future. Significantly, these are chiefly reports which deal, not with underlying issues of faith and philosophy, but with very concrete and detailed matters of practical program. To cite a single illustration, the report on "The Indigenous Ministry of the Church, both Ordained and Lay," is, I think, one of the soundest, most statesmanlike and most important documents given to the Life of the Church in recent years. Here, in less than a dozen pages, are set forth a philosophy of the Christian ministry, an analysis of the problems of its training, and a comprehensive scheme for more adequate preparation which point the way far beyond the present practice of the Church anywhere in the world. If its recommendations, even in part, win incorporation within the actual programs of churches and missions, the leadership of the Younger Churches will be lifted immeasurably above any previous competence and effectiveness. We may go further. If its proposals become practice, theological education within the Younger Churches, granted the disparity in resources available, will stand far in advance of prevailing standards within the Older Churches of the West.

6. Not merely in programs and techniques is Madras pointing the way forward. Far more important, though less easily defined, it succeeded in capturing and reflecting the *regnant temper of advance for the whole of Christ's Cause in the world*. That temper pervades the findings as it permeated the discussions which gave them birth. It must be discovered not in any formal exposition but in the presuppositions which undergird all that is said. At least four notes mark that temper.

a. *The centrality of the Church.* "The Church" had been proposed as the focal theme for the Conference. This choice was determined by the

steadily mounting attention to "the Church" in Christian circles throughout the world—attention which found clear expression at both Oxford and Edinburgh. But the choice was also prophetic. Clearly "the Church" was the major concern and confidence of the vast majority of those who came to Tambaram. The result, in the eyes of some, was an emphasis upon the Church somewhat disproportionate to other basic Christian themes such as the kingdom of God. In the larger perspective, the emphasis may be slightly out of focus. But it is needed to restore the Church to a true recognition. And it reveals clearly where, in fact, the Christian Cause in its length and breadth is determined to place central reliance today. Facing the confusions, frustration and chaos of contemporary history, the confidence of Christians upon which they are prepared to stake everything focuses in the ongoing corporate Christian Movement—the living Church of Christ in the world.

b. *The adequacy and necessity of the Christian Gospel.* Here the contrast to discussions of a decade ago which preceded and followed Jerusalem is striking. The note of uncertainty, of apology, of defensive has passed. There is forthright and utterly sincere confession of the failures and apostasies of *the Churches*. But of the absolute worth and authority of *Christ's Gospel*, and of the essentiality of the Christian Movement as its bearer, there was among the delegates at Tambaram not even a subconscious query. Their conviction was uniformly positive, confident, responsible, evangelical.

So, regarding the relation of Christian faith to non-Christian religions, there was no attempt at elaborate comparisons. The values within other religions, and especially in the lives of their saints, are gratefully acknowledged. But "all must be tested before Christ. And this is true as well within as outside the Christian Church. He is the Way, the Truth, the Life for all; He alone is adequate for the world's need."

c. *Evangelism.* Inevitably, this strong and clearheaded grip upon the relevance and adequacy of the Gospel impels to a new impetus in its proclamation, by life no less than by word. Here, again, there is no hesitant uncertainty. There is no retreat before the old word, "evangelism," though its meaning is enlarged and enriched by the fuller vision of the significance of the Christian Mission. "Christianity comes to the world both as a Message and as a Movement." The summons to evangelism is not a frenzied exhortation to half-convinced adherents, but rather a firm resolution to greater faithfulness in what is, for every true Christian, a responsibility precedent to all others. For to confront our world with honest eyes and then to

know the facts of the Christian Movement in that world is to be claimed by that Movement to unstinting devotion in bearing its reality to all men and all human problems.

d. *The necessity of Christian unity.* This is the thread which weaves its way through every document of the Conference like an inescapable motif. Unity is, in the first place, a practical essential for an effective Mission. We are told that the present tragic deficiencies in leadership cannot be met except through united training. It is urged that there can be no adequate program of Christian literature, so important for advance, except through unified planning and publication. The whole vast enterprise of Christian education cries for strengthening through unification. No self-respecting response to the unfinished evangelistic task is possible without co-operation. For the enlistment, training and deployment of missionaries, for the economic stability of the Younger Churches, for effective impact upon pressing social problems, for a strategy in any way worthy of the Church's opportunity and responsibility, and for a dozen other vital purposes, immediate and radical co-ordination of Christian resources is the indispensable prerequisite.

But, for the younger Churches of Christ, unity is more than a practical essential; it is a spiritual obligation. Whatever the views of the older and entrenched churches of the West, the mind of the Younger Churches is clear, positive and wellnigh unanimous. Appropriately, the last report of the Conference which claimed its attention at the very end concerns "Co-operation and Unity." Even more appropriately, that report concludes with a statement, not by the whole Conference nor even by the whole of this Section (quite possibly the statement could not have won their full approval), but by the members from the Younger Churches. In part, that statement declares:

"Disunion is both a stumbling block to the faithful and a mockery to those without. . . . The representatives of the Younger Churches in this Section, one and all, gave expression to the passionate longing that exists in all countries for visible union of the Churches. . . . Visible and organic Union must be our goal. . . . We therefore appeal with all the fervor we possess, to the Missionary Societies and Boards and the responsible authorities of the older Churches, to take this matter seriously to heart, to labor with the Churches in the Mission Field to achieve this Union, to support and encourage us in all our efforts to put an end to the scandalous effects of our divisions, and to lead us in the path of Union—the Union for which our Lord prayed, through which the world would indeed believe in the Divine Mission of the Son, our Lord Jesus Christ."

Here is the clear and authentic voice of the advance forces of Christ's Mission.

V

So much for the findings of the Conference and their significance. One turns from Madras toward home and its tasks with one overwhelming impression—*the power and promise of the Christian Movement in the world.*

The present writer came to this great missionary gathering straight from six months of continuous travel among the churches of the East where the actualities of missionary work were daily under observation. The realities of the Christian Mission are far grander than any discussion of them. The Gospel of Christ is infinitely grander than either. Here, within our hands today, under our charge and responsibility, we Christians hold the greatest power for truth, for health, for reconciliation, for good, for holiness this planet has ever witnessed. There is nothing else which can so much as be compared with it. Its powerful advance, with incalculable services to mankind, waits upon our realization of that fact, and then our worthy response.

And what of its future? It was often remarked at Madras that notes of pessimism regarding both the state of the world and the health of the Church were sounded almost wholly by delegates from Europe and America; the voices of the East spoke characteristically with optimism. Their faces are toward the future with eager expectation and confidence. The message of the Older Churches proclaimed forecasts of doom but that of the Younger Churches declarations of faith. One returns to the actualities of the Christian Cause in Europe and America with grave apprehension for the future. But, in those lands where the Church is newly planted and where it is still a tiny tree, it evidences growth and unconquerable vitality. It is possible that the center of vigor and outreach for Christ's Cause is actually shifting from the Older Churches to the New. And that, in the truer perspective of the future, the recent meeting at Madras may be discovered to mark that momentous transition. Today, again, the Star of Hope shines for the whole of Christendom out of the East.

The Present-Day Task of Theology

EMIL BRUNNER

THE task of theology is essentially the same in all ages. God has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ once for all. As there is but one God, so there is also but one mediator between God and man, Himself man, Christ Jesus who gave Himself a ransom for all. And there is none other salvation, for neither is there "any other name under heaven given among men whereby we must be saved," and "He is the same yesterday and today and forever."

It is this historic fact which has taken place in history once and for all which makes a clear line of demarcation between the Christian faith and all the religions and philosophies of history. The eternal Word of God, who is the eternal Son of God, has become flesh in Jesus Christ; that is why He is the turning point of all history, and, being really the turning point, there can be no other one. Christianity and Christian faith stand by this fact: that the salvation of all the world has been wrought and need not be completed. "It is finished"; this is His own last word. God as revealed in Jesus Christ is in earnest about what He does. If He becomes man and if He redeems the world, He does it thoroughly; it suffices for all manhood, nay, for all the world, and His work is completed.

That does not mean, as some people seem to think, that God is not a living God who works in our time as well as in those past days. But what He does *now* is not the same as what He *has* done in Jesus Christ. What He does since the day of Pentecost is that through His Holy Spirit He brings men to this Cross, to this His own Son, as to the place where the fountain of life has been once for all opened, so that everyone who drinks of it is filled with that new life which is in kind eternal life. But it is the manner of God to do His saving work through the agency of man, so that the new life may at once reveal its true character, namely, that it enkindles new life wherever it appears. As God in Christ shares with us His own eternal life, making us partakers of heavenly things, so He wants us to share His gifts with our fellow men. This is, in a nutshell, the Christian idea of the Church. *Communion with Him* in Christ through the Holy Spirit, this is the ground and gift of the Church; *sharing this communion with others* and spreading it out to all

mankind, that is the consequential task of the Church. The Church is a missionary Church, or it is not a church. And as there is one Christ, one Cross, one salvation, so there is also one message and task of the Church throughout all the ages.

Jesus Christ is called the life of the world. He is also called the light of the world. In Him we live the real life and in Him we see the real truth. But there is yet another name which is given Him, His first name in the Gospel of John: He is the Word. Now, whatever associations this term may include, as the New Testament scholars of our day bring them to light, the main content of it is just this simple one: that in Jesus Christ God speaks to us in the final way. The secret of personality, of thought and will and plan must be spoken if it is to be communicated to others. God, the supreme or absolute personality, in comparison with which our own human personality is but a weak counterfeit, and that of sinful persons and a sinful humanity but a poor caricature, shows His absolutely personal character just in revealing Himself in the Word. God is Spirit and He wants to converse with us, the created spirits, in a spiritual manner, not by magic or mystical processes, but by that means which is the special means of spirit, namely, the Word. That is why we, His Church, can know Him and answer His call in faith, which again is the most spiritual and the most personal act that can take place in human life. And that is why the Church can preach, that is, pass His word on to others that they may know and submit themselves in faith. So the preaching and teaching of the Church becomes the vessel through which God communicates His own Word which is His own life and light. To preach and teach God's Word as faithfully as possible to the world which does not know God's secret of redemption, that it may know it and live by it; this, therefore, is the main task of the Church at any time.

But what about theology? It is not an easy thing to define the relation between theology and the preaching of the Church or the faith of the individual Christian. It is at once a relation of identity and nonidentity. It is true to say that even in the simplest prayer which a mother speaks at the bedside of her child there is embedded a theology, however simple. Simple as it may be, if it is a real Christian prayer, it contains in itself the essentials of all Christian theology. Maybe this simple mother knows more of what in John's Gospel is called the Word of God than all the theologians of her time, even though she may not know a great deal of the Scriptures. She has the essentials of all theology in her Christian faith. On the other hand, if we speak of

theology, we mean something of which a simple mother probably has never heard and which she would certainly not understand. What then is this theology for, why should it be needed? To give you a somewhat expert answer to this question, I should need more than the space available here—and it is certainly not this you are looking for. May it therefore suffice to say: theology is an intellectual elaboration of the knowledge of God and His Word which is inherent in the simple faith of the Christian mother, but on the basis of the whole of the Scriptures and the thinking of the Church.

But then, why should we need this intellectual elaboration? Indeed this question may be asked and must be asked. If one thinks of all the unpleasant connotations which for no small reasons the word "theologian" has for most, even very Christian, people in our time; if we think of all the noisy quarrels and all the bitter enmities which throughout the whole of church history have accompanied the work of theology, one might often wish that there was no such a thing as theology. And certainly very many of the harsh words which our Lord spoke to the scribes would apply to us theologians as well.

I must confess that very often in my prayers I have asked God: Why must it be that whenever God has given grace and brought new life and light into the Church by a new fresh understanding of the Word of God, almost immediately there follows heated theological debate and a bitter fight, as the thunder follows the lightning? What a wonderful thing it would be if we could just go on preaching the glad tidings to all the world, saving souls through the message of Jesus Christ and building up communion and true brotherhood among men in the power of the Holy Spirit. Well do I understand those who become disgusted with us theologians and, in consequence, with our work.

But each time I receive the same answer: shame on thee. Go ahead and do thy work, but do it in the right spirit, knowing what manner of spirit thou art of. And then God gave me a new joy of being nothing else but just a theologian, and a new insight into the necessary service theology has to render to the Church as well as to humanity. It is of these that I want to talk to you.

The Word of God in Jesus Christ being the greatest gift of God to mankind, the old Latin word applies to it: corruptio optimi pessima. It is not theologians alone who understand the Word of God, who falsify the gospel message, who are led astray by human substitutes for the gospel truth. To try to falsify God's own Word in order to make it more common sense, more suitable to our own reason or to our own conceptions of a happy life, is a sin

inherent in human nature, in the nature of the fallen man. It is one of the main effects of original sin. The story of how God's Word was falsified, mis-treated, misinterpreted will fill a considerable part of any truthful church history. Now the Church cannot suffer this without doing something about it. The Church has to keep watch that the water of divine life be not contaminated. Nay more: the Church must strive, more than for anything else, to grow in a better understanding of the Word than has hitherto been reached. The processes of cleansing and of growth, as in the human body so in the Church, are closely linked up with each other. So theology may become the great filter bed and the great powerhouse of the City of God on earth, the Church. It was not without much theological work, to say the least, that the great clearing of the Church which we call the Reformation was brought about. It was not without tremendous theological exertions that in the early Church the substance of the Christian message and the body of the Church was saved from the perdition which threatened it in the teachings of the Arians and of the Pelagians. It was not without assiduous theological thought that Jonathan Edwards, the greatest of all Princeton theologians, this most venerable and lovable American, was able to bring new life to the parishes of New England.

But there is another side of theology which never ought to be disregarded, and of which we shall have to say more when we are dealing with the present situation as such. If there were no theology the evangelization of the educated part of a given society would probably never be reached by the gospel truth.

God has created man as the thinking creature, and thought is the greatest natural endowment of creation. God wants us to think, even if we could lead a happy life without doing so. Thought is the best part of our natural dignity as man. And none of the things He has created are unused by Him as means for His great eternal purpose. For this reason theological thought may become, as it certainly has often been, one of the foremost means to glorify God and to win thoughtful pagans for Christ. This is a side of theology which from the beginning has been especially dear to me. I, myself, would probably never have become a Christian without the help of theological thinkers and my own theological thought. Therefore, I know, because I have experienced it, that theology can be and must be one of the means of evangelism.

What a tremendous work of evangelization Pascal has done by his *Pensees*, surpassed perhaps only by the effect Augustine's thought has exerted

among the thinking people of all ages. This function of theology then should not be overlooked, least of all in our time.

This brings us to the second part and also the second thesis of our discussion. If, at first, we said, theology has—just as the Church has—the same task in all ages, we now say, not contradicting but completing the first thesis: theology has to do its work in every age anew. Why and how—this we may now try to explain. In order to do that we have to go back to what we said first about the Word of God. If the Word of God were a given system of doctrines, then, and then only, could the work of theology be done at a certain time once and for all. Then the Church could point to a certain number of doctrines and proclaim them as the infallible dogma, the inappealable tribunal of all the preaching and teaching of the Church. But the Word of God is no such thing. The Word of God is, as the Gospel of John teaches us, Christ Himself. The Word of God is God in His self-revelation. Because God's final and all-sufficient revelation is the historic person of Jesus of Nazareth, the Messiah, the Christ, the Son of God, Jesus Christ Himself is the Word of God. The final revelation of the personal God is Himself a person, the God-man. This is the central fact which distinguishes the Christian concept of revelation from any other. Not divine oracles, not words, not a book, but God Himself revealed in the flesh, in a man of our kind, born from woman and born under the law—this historic person who is the eternal Son and the risen living Lord—this is God's final word to men because it is God's final self-presentation to men.

To this Christ Jesus the apostles testify, in their preaching, teaching and writing. But gifted as they were by the Holy Spirit they were not inerrant, neither did they claim to be. Therefore we find in their writings no reference whatever as to the inerrant character of their testimony. What we do find is that they try, again and again, to express the supreme mystery of Christ. Very different indeed is the mode of their expression—what different words and concepts did Matthew use from those of Paul, or again Paul from those of John! In fact, they knew that the mystery itself escapes anything like a final expression. Identical is only the One they mean, the center to which they point; but different are their ways of pointing to this center. How could it be otherwise? God's own Word is too great to be expressed in one single concept or image. God Himself has ordered it so that the New Testament does not give us a fixed and explicit uniform dogma about Christ but a great variety of firsthand testimonies, each necessary for us to see the Christ.

Certainly, even in this diversity we acknowledge and reverence the divine inspiration and the authority of His Spirit. But we do so, with the apostles themselves, in due distance from the One about whom this witness is, the One who in the primary sense is the Word of God. Only in a secondary, indirect sense are the writings of the apostles the Word of God. This is what the apostles themselves thought about their writings and what can be found in many places in the New Testament. Were it different, the apostles would have taken more care to construct a formula which once and for all and beyond any doubt would then have been the final dogma. There is, however, no such thing to be found in Scripture, and beyond that, therefore, we should not go. Because we would not come higher—what an arrogance to come higher than the apostles!—but we would fall below, as the Church later on has actually done. To think of the Word of God in the first place as a sum total of doctrines or words, as divine oracles, is not at all a Christian conception, but a conception known in many non-Christian religions. The classical example is Mohammedanism, with its Koran. The doctrine of verbal inspiration, understood that way, is not Biblical and Christian, but, as the late Doctor Mackintosh put it, it is sub-Christian. The Christian, the Biblical concept of the Word of God, is that Christ Himself, the God-man, a person, is the primary, the final and ultimate revelation and therefore the Word of God.

This then is the reason why theology has to do its work in every age anew. Of course, there came about, as you all know, a different view of things, very early in the Church. Roman Catholicism was begun when the New Testament writings were declared as the inerrant Word of God, in all details. Then this doctrine came in. Along with it—in fact, as you now understand from what has been said, as the necessary consequence of it—came the infallible dogma and the infallible Church. They are expressions of the same legalistic, unevangelical understanding of the revelation in Christ. Wherever a system of doctrines is put up as the infallible, unappealable basis of a Church, there the Roman Catholic legalism is at work, that spirit against which Luther as the first so vehemently fought. There is probably no man in the whole history of the Church who could be called with so much right as Luther the great Bible teacher or Bible man. But you know how sharply he distinguished between the Word of God, Jesus Christ, and the Biblical writings, as the first-hand testimony about Him in the Bible. How freely, therefore, he pointed out the human and fallible element in certain Biblical writings. Was he less reverent of the Scriptures than the later orthodox teachers who renewed the

Catholic doctrine of verbal inspiration? Just the contrary, he was more reverent, because he took the apostles at their own word.

Now, if this is so, if Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son, is the incarnate Word of God, theology can never be final, because God alone, Christ alone, is final. The Church is called upon to express its faith in Jesus Christ, in His divine person, and in His saving grace as well as she can, and to make the attempt again and again according to the new lights which God may grant. Certainly the Church and her theologians cannot and should not do that without clinging to the firsthand testimony, that of the apostles. Because it is only in this testimony that we can grasp the historical man. It is in the Scriptures alone that God gives us His Son, through the Holy Spirit. There is a word of Luther to the effect that if we had enough Holy Spirit we could write a new testament as well as the apostles. I do not think that this bold word of Luther can stand the proof. There is no Christ for us apart from the New Testament, in fact apart from the whole of the Bible. For the Old Testament also is necessary in order to hear the word of God spoken to us in Jesus Christ, Jesus the Messiah. What he wants to emphasize, however, is truly Biblical and Christian: that Christians do not have *primary* or *ultimate* relation to the book as such but to the Christ Himself. Our access to Him, however, is through the book, through the witness of the eyewitnesses who are also those to whom by special grace God has given to know Him best. There can, therefore, be no true theology, but Biblical theology, theology based on the testimony of the apostles and prophets about the One who is the Word of God. It is understood that such a theology is also a truly churchly theology which thankfully and reverently passes on the expressions of faith of the Church as a whole, enshrined in its creeds.

This then is the principal reason why theology has to do its work anew in every age. No theology is ever final, and the limitations of every age call for the corrections of the next. There is, however, another more secondary but very important reason, closely connected with this first. God created man, and sinful man is the same Adam in all ages. The essence of natural man is identical throughout the times. But that does not mean that in every respect man is the same. As you know, this is not so. There is some difference between the men who first settled in this country and the ones who are populating the city of New York today. To put it in drastic fashion: not only we, but also the devil is progressive. He uses different weapons in different times; he also knows what rearmament is. If we have to fight the devil—as we

certainly have to, in preaching Christ—then we, in our time, must preach Christ in another way from that of centuries gone by. Or, to take it from a milder side: man always had difficulties in understanding God's Word. There are hindrances in his way—ultimately all coming from sin—which have to be put aside, and these hindrances are different at different times. Therefore the great preachers did not preach the same way in different centuries. Now it is the task of theology to teach the Church how to preach. I do not think of homiletics now, the more formal aspect of preaching. I speak of content. Ultimately the content is the same, Jesus Christ, the eternal word incarnate. But the approach to this content must be very different in different times because the man whom you want to captivate for Christ is not in the same place today as he was yesterday. You have got to follow him in his movement in order to recapture him for his Lord whom he has evaded.

Therefore we have to ask in our age: where does the man of today stand and how, in consequence, has the gospel message to be presented to him? Not in order to make it agreeable to him, but in order to hit him with the word of divine judgment and to comfort him with the saving word of grace. This question of approach is of much more importance than a theology which still fosters the ideal of timelessness is prepared to admit. And so, as theologians we have to make a study of modern man: you may call it a chapter of applied demonology, or hamartiology, or simply anthropology. A bad preacher he is who does not know his time. So is a theologian.

The characteristics of the modern world are many—and many of them important enough for careful study. But we may summarize them for time's sake in two: secularism and paganism.

Much has been said about secularism since in Jerusalem, 1928, the word became a slogan. The word may be good or not; what we mean is a fact with which every live Christian who has a burning heart for the kingdom of God, is acquainted. If you take an average modern novel you would hardly think that man ever had thoughts about such things as heaven and hell, being saved or lost, God, eternity, divine judgment. It is as if the dimension of the divine were extinct. Of course it is not, it can never be, but it is so hidden and unconscious, that the absence of all religious thought—I say expressly religious, not Christian—gives this civilization, art, law, science, habits, its specific feature. I think it is fair to say that never has there been in world history an age in which there was so much practical and theoretical mass atheism, forgetfulness of God and eternal life, absence of divine standards of right and

wrong in public and in private life, so much uncertainty as to the ultimate meaning of life as in our age. In France, it is said, ninety per cent of the school and college teachers are professing atheists. And if you think of the average educated man in this country the finding would be in the same direction.

What then has the Church and theology to do in view of such a situation? Before I answer this question let us see the other side, modern paganism. It seems as if mankind could not long live by sheer atheism and irreligion. But Christianity is not the only alternative. Recent years have surprised us by the rise of a new phenomenon: new pagan religions have sprung up, the divinization of state, race and society, the divinization of man, of reason, of nature. Now this is nothing else but the essence of the old pagan religions in a new form. For what else is paganism in old or new times but the divinization of the world and of man? Man cannot, for long, be without an absolute, without something which he reverences as divine. If it is not the true God, the Creator, the holy Lord made known to us in Jesus Christ, then it is something else which he thinks and secretly wants to be his God, a man-made God, a man-made religion. There are perhaps just as many today who want and claim to be religious but who are just as far away from Christianity as atheists or secularists. Some years ago there appeared in Germany a book containing the religious confessions of some thirty of the best known German speaking poets and novelists. Most of them emphatically claimed to be religious; almost none of them, however, made anything like a Christian profession of faith. Mysticism of some kind, nature religion, state religion, or what not—but hardly any testimony bearing on God's revelation in Jesus Christ. Now, I think, there is not much difference with regard to the Church's task, whether it is confronted with this paganism or with secularism. Our judgment in either case must be: they are alienated from the saving Truth.

We have still one more feature to consider, in order to give a true picture of our situation; this one no less dark than the two others: the situation within the Christian Church itself. Why are there so many despisers of the gospel truth? The first answer is that the churches have stood for this truth in a very unconvincing and unimpressive manner. The Church herself has in a large measure lost the very thing she stands for. If the day of judgment will have come, will it then not be the Church, organized Christianity, on which the heaviest part of judgment will be placed? How is it that the Church has lost the very thing she stands for?

Again, I see two main features somehow akin to secularism and paganism in which the predicament of the Church presents itself. First, the secularization of the church message in a rationalist or naturalist theology. There are many preachers, Sunday school and theological teachers who do not preach and teach the gospel, but some philosophical or mystical or moralistic substitute for it. They do not know really what the Bible means, they do not understand Jesus Christ as the saving word of God's grace. There is another feature, better known to the people outside the Church than to those inside, and more dangerous to speak out about inside the Church than is the complaint about modernism. It is this, that many of those who stand for the authority of the divine Word and for the message of the saving grace in Jesus Christ, have done so in a manner that did not really help the world to see Christ's light, but rather to darken it. They have given it a literalist legalistic interpretation; they interpreted God's revelation through His word in such a way that an either-or was construed between scientific knowledge and Christian faith; they mistook the ancient forms of expression which the writers of the Bible had to use because they had no others, for the authoritative word of God Himself, and idolized the letter, in spite of Paul's warnings that the letter killeth and the Spirit of God alone makes alive. Without knowing and without intending it they ridiculed Biblical faith and theology, making it unacceptable for educated people, not because of the real stumbling block, which is the atoning Cross of Christ, but because of a man-made doctrine of the inerrancy of the Bible letters.

But even more serious than this is another element. The Christian Church, that is, the people who professed their Christian faith in public, did not give the world an example of that way of living and loving, that zeal for God's cause that would have induced those outside the Church to listen to their message. Every missionary knows that he cannot expect more attention to his message than the extent to which he is able to win personal confidence by his way of living. If this may be called the axiom of all missionary and evangelistic work, then we must say that the Church taken in the large has been anti-missionary in its practice. This is the deepest and most important reason why the world at present is what it is. And here is the point where everyone of us has to beat his own breast and confess: *mea culpa*. The Church has to be converted first, before she can convert the world.

If this analysis of the situation is correct, as I think it is, the conclusion as to the present task of theology is simple. Theological thought and instruc-

tion has to be of such a kind as to help and not to hinder the Church in doing what she has to do. I shall give only a few hints. In the first place: theology has to make a fresh endeavor to interpret to our time what the word of God in Jesus Christ means, knowing that no previous theology, however good it was for its own time, has done the job we ourselves have to do in and for our time. We have to fight the idea that a certain type or kind of work of theology, however great its merits were, is the standard theology for all times to come. Tradition is a very fine and necessary thing in theology as well as in the Church. But traditionalism is the death of all true Biblical or reformed theology. To declare any human creed or theology as final and binding for the ages to come is the denial of the very principle of Reformation theology.

Second, we must have a theology which in its own character is a work of evangelization, which commands the respect of the thinking people of our generation and which does not make it impossible for scientifically educated men and women to become Christians, placing an either-or between scientific knowledge and Christian doctrine. This thing can be done, but it can be done only if we get rid of a barren and unchristian literalism and legalism in interpreting the Bible. We must get rid of the fear that thereby we might lose sight of the central truths and facts of revelation and redemption in Christ. Just the reverse is true: that legalism and literalism make a real understanding of Christ impossible.

Third, we must have a theology which is capable of awakening in the future ministers of the Word a missionary evangelistic zeal in showing them that it is not primarily doctrines but the living Christ, Jesus Christ, who died for the sins of the world and who is risen from the dead for the sanctification of the world, that Christian faith is concerned with. Theology has to show the way to the fountain of life, of that life which cannot become ours without transforming us into new creatures.

Fourth, the measure and criterion of good theology is whether or not it leads to a real prayer life. For prayer is faith in action. If after having heard theological lectures you want to discuss theology before all, I have strong doubts whether it is the right kind. But if after having heard theological lectures you feel urged to thank God and pray, to repent and to get new joy in being with your God—then I have no doubt that it is the right kind. May God have mercy upon us and give us this kind of theology!

The Colloquy

EDWARD SHILLITO

IN the colloquy God speaks to man, and man makes his answer. It is a "Thou—I" relationship. It is therefore to be distinguished from meditation or soliloquy. It is the characteristic language of prayer. "Prayer," said Saint Gregory, "is colloquy with God." But the colloquy is not often reported. When it is, it is not hard to distinguish the real from the counterfeit; to know when the writer is the "I" in living fellowship with the "Thou," or only entering into the part. Deep calls unto deep; and when the authentic cry is real, there is a quick response. No clock-time has anything to do with this literature. After a long silence at any moment the old voices may be heard again; the old conversation is resumed. For those who seek to understand the history of the Christian soul it is important to consider the colloquy.

An English dramatist tells, in the preface to his play, *Guilty Souls*, how he began to read the Confessions of Saint Augustine. In the train going from Paddington he opened this book, which he had bought in the bookstall. He came to the twenty-seventh chapter of the Tenth Book where it is written "too late loved I Thee, O Thou Beauty of ancient days yet ever new! too late loved I Thee." "The empty carriage," he writes, "spun before my eyes. A terrible void, wherein fluttered a joy so intense and precarious that I feared it would vanish even as I felt it seemed to open in my breast. My senses ached, and my head grew dizzy." He read on till he came to the words "give what Thou enjoynest and enjoin what Thou wilt." The emotion could not last, but the poet dates a new stage in his life from that hour. This poet would not claim to stand where Saint Augustine stood; but there was something within him, which answered to that cry of the soul, to that "letter which the redeemed soul wrote to his Redeemer." There is always an answer waiting to this voice.

No one can foretell when this ancient strain will be heard again. No one can invite a writer to utter such cries in print. We hear the sounds, but we cannot tell whence they come. The colloquy is not as a rule the cry of a tranquil soul in a quiet and ordered life. It is wrung from stormy, volcanic, desperate men; such men know each other wherever they live and in whatever age.

Some things can be said at once of them. They are at one in their rejection of the mysticism, which looks upon prayer as the sinking of the soul into the abyss of being, as

“The dewdrop slips into the shining sea.”

They are not “Lost in the Deity.” For them there is something that answers to conflict in this relationship with God. They know what it means for the men of violence to take the kingdom by storm; they know too what it means to be stricken to the ground. They are reverent, but they do not use the decorous language of courtiers. Their lot is not of their own choosing; nor is it one which is to be coveted. But in all the dealings of man with God these souls have a place of their own, and their reward is with Him. It is not the friends of Job, but Job himself who is approved by the Lord God, Job the speaker of wild and defiant words, who nevertheless will not cease to trust God though He slay him. This is the strain which is found most commonly in the colloquy.

These speakers have not found the spiritual life a tranquil scene. They stand over against God. They fear Him but they will not lie to Him; they cannot bear subterfuges, or deceit of any kind; they will have the whole thing out with their God. It is “I” who speaks, not to IT or to HIM but to the living and mighty “Thou.”

There are three books recently translated, in which this strain, which might be called the “Strain of Job,” has been interpreted. *A Modern Job Speaks to God* is a translation from the German of a book by Peter Lippert of the Society of Jesus.¹ He will be recognized by students of theology as one of the profound and fearless writers, who within the Catholic Church are dealing with the line of battle as it is today, and not fighting in discarded trenches. The undisguised and merciless warfare against the Christian faith is for them a call to enter in humility and with courage into the deepest mysteries of their faith. They have listened; they have tried to understand, what is the case against God. The author does not write in his own person. Job as he sees him is Everyman who finds himself in a world like this and dares to tell out without shrinking his fears and doubts, and the exceeding great comfort he finds. Yet the book, though not an autobiographical confession, belongs to the spiritual works which are colloquies; and it speaks much for the insight of this German Jesuit that he can make himself the interpreter of

¹ Sheed & Ward.

such a Job. The Job who speaks is a real man, uttering his real thoughts before God.

Like so many of this generation he cannot escape from God. It is the strange lot of our contemporaries that in an age in which there have been so many in the Church who think that they can attract the "outsider" by dissembling their faith in God and dwelling upon the ethical principles of their faith, those who are outside are more and more absorbed with the thought of God; they are against Him or for Him, but not indifferent to Him.

The speaker, the modern Job, is troubled by the world in which he has to play his part. Sometimes he is lifted up and allowed to peer into the mysterious universe, "just as one takes up a child in one's arms and lets it look over a hedge into a strange garden." But he is not prepared in the light of such things to deny the dark facts of this earthly scene within which he must live. It is too small a world; "we are like a large family in an almshouse." But there are the stars, more than enough stars; "we do live in an extensive palace, but all its great halls and chambers are locked to us. We must be satisfied with a corner somewhere. . . . Of what use to us is the tremendous palace?" In this world, sometimes too small, sometimes too large, God is indeed present. "Thou art here," but He retreats from the soul that runs after Him; and if one of us desires to go away from Him, He hurries after him on his track.

All that modern science has discovered is in the mind of this modern Job. His colloquy is one prolonged confession of the soul, baffled by such things, driven to despair but never forsaken.

"I know Thee not, but my soul is driven towards Thee. Thou art an abyss to me, but I must leap into it with a trembling heart." He speaks to this Silent, Unknown One, his Destiny, his Night. He does not know Him, but he does not know himself. At the last he cries "Amen!" to everything God is, to that which makes him tremble and weep; to all His counsels, His works, His withdrawals, His creations. Let them all be fulfilled!

But when heart and flesh fail he remembers that God has said "Thou" to him. His love must be; and "therefore I myself must be." "The coming of Thy love has quenched everything in me, and at the same time created everything anew. I have no longer anything to say, and yet I am a word that resounds increasingly. . . . Thy word."

To the same spiritual province belongs that most moving records,

*The Diary of a Country Priest.*² Here too a modern man speaks; he too moves in that same mysterious scene in which the "I" comes to life only in its relation to the "Thou," who draws near in the Crucified. He defends prayer as a colloquy.

"If prayer were really what they suppose, a kind of chatter, the dialogue of a madman with his shadow, or even less—a vain and superstitious sort of petition to be given the good things of this world, how could innumerable people find until their dying day, I won't even say such great 'comfort'—since they put no faith in the solace of the senses—but sheer, robust, vigorous abundant joy in prayer? Oh, of course—suggestion, say the scientists. . . . What miracle enables these semi-lunatics, these prisoners of their own dreams, these sleepwalkers, apparently to enter more deeply each day into the pain of others? An odd sort of dream, an unusual opiate!"

* * * * *

In the end the writer surrenders all to God; or rather he lets God take. "Because though I may not know how to give, You know how to take. . . . Yet I would have wished to be, once, just once, magnificently generous to You."

It is a story of the many human beings who enter the life of this country priest, but the master theme is not in his relations with them; but in his life with God, and this does not take an even course; it is agitated, broken, exalted, cast down, but it never ceases to be the one central region. It is always "I" who speaks to "You."

It is from the translation of Martin Buber's little book this phrase "I and Thou"³ is taken. This work has had for years a profound influence upon theologians in Europe. They have not necessarily accepted all the views of Buber, but he has helped to turn their minds in this direction. "The *I* of the primary word *I*—*Thou* is a different *I* from that of the primary word *I*—*It*." It is possible to catch a little of the wisdom in this book from such words as these:

"Spirit in its human manifestation is a response of man to his *Thou*. Man speaks with many tongues, tongues of language, of art, of action; but the spirit is one, the response to the *Thou* which appears and addresses him out of the mystery. . . . Spirit is not in the *I*, but between *I* and *Thou*. It is not like the blood that circulates in you, but like the air in which you breathe. Man lives in the spirit, if he is able to respond to his *Thou*."

² Georges Bernanos.

³ T. & T. Clark: translated by Ronald Gregor Smith.

All that is involved in this for the Christian believer Doctor Brunner sets forth in his essay in *The Christian Understanding of Man*.⁴

"Legalism makes man's relation to God and to his neighbour impersonal. Only in Jesus Christ do we perceive the Divine '*'Thou'*'—the '*'Thou'* of our fellow-man; only in Jesus Christ, through the fact that the Word of the Origin which we have lost returns to us as the Word in which God's love is personally present—is the original personal relation, existence in the love of God, restored through faith."

It cannot be claimed that such colloquy is limited to the strong, violent, volcanic beings who know the secret of conflict in prayer; others may take other ways but this is the only way that these can take, they must speak "I" to "Thou."

These modern books show that there is no change in the spirit of man; he can still understand and still enter into the surprises and adventures, the gloom and the rapture of the saints.

It is not taken for granted by modern man that prayer must now become something different, as though all the soul can do now is to let itself be absorbed in the Infinite. Nor is it forbidden to the soul to use candor in its language addressed to God; remonstrance, the bitter outcry of the soul, the language of a Job or Jeremiah, must still have its recognized place in the spiritual life. The perfect prayer was once said to be

"O Thou Infinite, Amen!"

but there are no signs that this has become the only befitting speech of the soul to God. There is a much more personal dealing than this permitted to souls and indeed demanded of some. The ancient colloquy can still be heard.

But where have we heard it before?

It is caught in the story of Jacob. When we sing Charles Wesley's noble hymn, we do not think it is concerned with old forgotten things.

"With Thee all night I mean to stay
And wrestle till the break of day."

We may not discover what precisely the story meant to the first narrator. But many a humble soul lives in that country. Clearly here is the beginning of a colloquy, set forth in no abstract words, but in naked simplicity. There has come a pause in the life of Jacob who lives in the two kingdoms of Nature and Grace. It is now meant "that he should be troubled, wrestled with,

* Oxford Books on *Church, Community and State*.

shaken to the very deeps of his nature, flung into a vague, deep, dark conflict with powers but indistinctly seen." Before he can be at peace with God, in the assurance that His Nature and His Name is love, he must wrestle with the Angel of the Covenant.

Of all the prophets, Jeremiah is the one who most often used the colloquy. In his words it is the cry in many tones of a prophet doomed against his own preference to witness against national folly and apostasy, and to pronounce doom on his own people. By his own natural choice he would have wandered by green pastures and still waters. But he is not allowed to desert his post. A God holds him and will not let him go, though sometimes he is like an eagle beating against the bars of its cage. But for Jeremiah, however hard pressed, the relation to God is not one with IT or HIM but with "Thou."

To his God he speaks:

"O Jehovah, thou hast beguiled me
And I let myself be beguiled;
Too strong for me art thou,
And thou hast won the victory."⁵

"His religious experience," as Sir George Adam Smith says, "was largely a struggle with the Divine Will, and it left him not adoring but amazed and perplexed." He is likened to Jacob and he too enquires the Name, which is the Nature of That with which he struggles. On him morning broke "with a firmer impression of a Will: not his own," and in his speech there is a "horrified breathlessness."

That was not the only action upon this sensitive spirit; but it was his appointed lot to suffer because of this relation into which he had been admitted. But it was not a mark of separation from God but of nearness to Him, that he should be a man of sorrows. Jehovah said, "Verily I will strengthen thee for good."

The same strain is heard in the book of Job. Job speaks out all that is in his soul; his friends will not understand, but he will not be silent.

"I will not refrain my mouth; I will speak in the anguish of my spirit; I will complain in the bitterness of my soul.
Am I a sea, or a whale, that thou settest a watch over me?
When I say, My bed shall comfort me, my couch shall ease my complaint:
Then thou scarest me with dreams, and terrifiest me with visions:
Let me alone: for my days are vanity."

⁵ McFadyen's translation.

This is a cry out of the depths. Here is another with a wistful surprise in it. If only man might live again!

"All the days of my appointed time will I wait, till my change come.
Thou shalt call, and I will answer thee."

The tide of battle ebbs and flows; and there is no discharge. Yet at the end there is peace, but it is the peace of a soul humbled before that "Thou."

"I had heard of thee with the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee.
Wherefore I abhor myself in dust and ashes."

God is above him and yet within reach of him; hidden and revealed; seen and unseen; but always his one desire.

The colloquy is heard in the Psalms. They are sometimes called mystical; but in one use of the word they are not mystical at all. If by that word we mean that in the songs of Israel the soul is absorbed in God, that is not true. The "I" is always over against the "Thou." The human voice speaks and is answered. The "I" is in the depths and cries out to the God with whom is forgiveness. This "I" has nothing in heaven or earth to desire but that "Thou." However certain we may be that these Praises of Israel became the songs of a people, it is almost unthinkable that many of them were not the speech of the individual soul, such an "I."

We cannot often overhear the colloquy in the New Testament. We know it is there in the Gospels, and in the apostolic writings. We know it is implied in Saint Paul's "I live and yet not I"; and there is no story of conflict in the spiritual life more moving than that which lies behind the seventh chapter of Romans. That was not between Paul and "Him"!

We hear it in Saint Augustine; his confessions were a "vast epistle addressed to God—a letter which was answered before it was written." In that book what "confessions" means can be found in the Scripture. "I confess Thy glory, and bear witness to Thy power." There are evidences everywhere that this soul had wrestled with God; but the letter is written after the morning broke. No one can ever suspect Saint Augustine, though he was a master of rhetoric, of being merely rhetorical here. His can only be the unmistakable speech of "I" to "Thou."

For the colloquy in Bunyan we must look to the "Grace Abounding." Yet this Puritan, in common with others, was sparing in his report of the direct speech which he used in his dealings with his Lord. Those who will read Principal Micklem's beautiful anthology from Puritan authors, *Personal*

Religion, will take note of the difference between the Puritan and the Catholic reports of what was at heart the same dealings of "I" with "Thou." The Puritan confesses the dealings of God with his soul; but he does not readily report the conversation for others to read.

It might be shown how Pascal, a contemporary of Bunyan, entered into the same personal covenant and had the same personal dealings, not with the God of the philosophers, but with the "God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob." For him too, God was not It or He, but "Thou."

The old voices are long silent; mankind, we think, has ceased to listen for them; they are chronicled, analyzed, even admired, but they belong to an old world. Then suddenly, without warning, they are heard again as they are today. The voice of the Lord is caught by some mighty and desperate soul, and the quiet is ended. The former cries ring out afresh; the conflicts, which ended in a truce centuries ago, are taken up by fierce warriors. No one who deals with the Godward side of human life can ever be sure what is going to happen next. Questions are not closed in this realm. This is true of the strain of religious experience which has been discussed in this paper.

At any time there may arise those who have reason to believe that the soul can and must deal directly with God. To them He is not the Abyss of Being into which the soul sinks; He is not the One, who can be expressed in the language of Pantheism, even though it is called Christian Pantheism. He comes first of all not to give peace, but a sword; He stands over against them, and is addressed by them in personal words.

The words in which they give expression to their mind are not the decorous and sober language of the sanctuary. They need more than the perfect balance of the Collects in the Book of Common Prayer. Cries of anguish, shouts of rejoicing are blended. These thinkers seem to rail, and even to draw near to blasphemy, they wrestle with the Angel till the breaking of the day.

We must beware of thinking these are the only voices to be heard; or that this is the only experience which is a true answer to the Eternal God. But certainly no one can hope to understand the dealings of God with men, if he does not overhear the colloquies, in which a man speaks to God face to face. No man can enter into the riches of the covenant unless he can say of his God, "Nevertheless I am still with Thee." But what that will involve for him is in the hands of God.

The Biblical Doctrine of the Holy Spirit

HARVIE BRANSCOMB

CHRISTIAN theology has always retained as one of its essential elements the concept of the Holy Spirit. This has been due plainly to the influence of the Bible, in both parts of which the concept has a prominent place. A review of the main ideas associated with the concept in Biblical literature should reveal, therefore, not only the significance and meaning of the idea in the classic period of Christian beginnings, but also supply certain insights in any discussion of contemporary theology.

The Old Testament doctrine has its roots in primitive beliefs: (1) That the spirit (breath) is the animating principle. (2) That God has a spirit which is His principle of being. (3) That the latter, like man's breath, could be sent forth. Thus God formed man out of the earth and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and he became a living creature. Thus the early doctrine was not that God is a spirit, but rather that God has a spirit.

The powers or effects of the Spirit were derived from the concept of the divinity. In primitive thought the concept of divinity is in large part the explanation of events and powers that go beyond normal apprehension. The Spirit of God consequently makes one capable of marvelous actions. The Spirit comes on Samson and he rends a lion with his bare hands (Judges 14. 6) or snaps the ropes with which he is bound (Judges 15. 14). It enabled David to do mighty deeds. Abnormal experiences and states were attributed to it. It came on Saul "and he prophesied mightily" (1 Samuel 10. 10, cf. 19. 23f.). Ezekiel speaks of the Spirit as the source of his revelations. It also explains outstanding abilities, and was thought of as an endowment of all great leaders: the Spirit enabled Othniel to judge Israel (Judges 3. 10) and it rested on Moses and the seventy elders (Numbers 11. 17).

These conceptions of the working of a divine or Holy Spirit are elevated by the great prophets of the eighth, seventh, and sixth centuries B. C., the changes being corollaries of their developing thought of Yahweh's being, character, and relation to Israel. Three specific advances are to be noted: (1) The Spirit of Yahweh is viewed more especially as a moral energy; a spirit of grace and supplication (Zechariah 12. 10), of justice (Isaiah 28. 6, cf. 30. 1). The words of Ezekiel's prophecy illustrate this advance: "I will

put my spirit within you and cause you to walk in my statutes" (Ezekiel 36. 27, cf. 11. 19). (2) The action of the Spirit is thought of more frequently as continuous rather than intermittent (Ezekiel 30. 27). (3) It is associated especially with the belief in the nation as God's chosen people. The Spirit had aided the nation in the past (Isaiah 63. 10-14), and would restore it in the future (Isaiah 32. 15). These three thoughts coalesce with the earlier notion of the endowment of great national leaders with the Spirit in the prophecies of the Messiah to come. The Spirit of Yahweh will rest on "the shoot out of the stock of Jesse," "the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge, and of the fear of Yahweh" (Isaiah 11. 2, cf. Isaiah 42. 1).

One specific aspect of this thought calls for comment. The action of the Spirit is thought of chiefly as operative in man. In the earlier doctrine the Spirit is almost never related to the physical universe, but rather to man and his nature. This is perhaps due to the Hebrew lack of interest in cosmological speculation. In the later literature a beginning of this interest is seen: "In his spirit God hath garnished the heavens" (Job 34. 13-15). "When thou sendest forth thy spirit they [the creatures small and great] are created" (Psalm 104. 30). The Spirit broods upon the waters and brings order out of the primordial chaos (Genesis 1. 2). But this tendency was not fully developed. When the Hebrew mind began to struggle with these problems, it was already in touch with Greek thought in which a different solution had been developed. The doctrine of the Spirit as the creative and ordering principle of the world was merged in the doctrine of the Logos.

The drift of Jewish thought in the later Old Testament period (the Greek) was fairly clear, though it did not consistently work out its doctrinal formulation. There was a belief that the times were parlous ones and that no leaders comparable to the earlier ones were present. Thus we have the repeated rabbinic dictum: "There is a man present who is worthy that the Holy Spirit should rest upon him, but the generation is not worthy." Along with this was the national hope of a day when the Spirit would "be poured out on all flesh" (Joel 2. 28), and of a leader who would be anointed with the Spirit. At the same time the individualizing of Jewish religion, for all its national hope, continued to develop: "The pious man has no stain on his heart for the Spirit of God rests on him" (Test. Benj. IV). Note also Psalm 51. 11, "Cast me not away from thy presence and take not thy holy spirit from me." The fluctuations of thought between the concepts of the Spirit

as an intermittent force and as an abiding power is not a real contradiction, but only a phase of the varying conception of how God related Himself to men.

So far as we can tell, the thought of the Spirit does not seem to have been primary with Jesus. "If I by the Spirit of God cast out demons . . ." (Matthew 12. 28) would be in line with earlier thought, but the Lucan parallel reads differently (11. 20). The saying about blaspheming the Holy Spirit varies in wording and is obscure. The records supply little else, except the descriptions of the baptism and birth of Jesus, in which the Church declared that He was fully endowed with the Spirit. In the primitive Church, however, belief in the Holy Spirit as the cause of the events which were transpiring was both early and strong. Its roots were several: (1) There was the belief that the Messiah had come and the New Age was at hand. (2) According to prophecy, the Spirit would be bestowed on all men in this New Day. (3) Their own experiences of an ecstatic character, of heightened abilities, and of religious grace pointed to some such special divine power.

Certain ambiguities in the Old Testament doctrine reappear: (1) The Spirit is sometimes thought of as a personal agency—Philip is caught away by it (Acts 8. 39); it speaks to Peter (11. 12); Ananias lies to it (5. 3). Conversely, it is conceived impersonally as a divine force or energy which is "poured out" and which "fills" those who are endowed with it (2. 4, etc.). (2) It is a permanent possession in which all Christians partake, but also it comes suddenly over them (13. 9, 11. 28, etcetera). A new uncertainty—when does the Holy Spirit descend upon Christians?—was resolved by the belief that it was at the time of baptism.

The gifts which the Spirit was regarded as bestowing were various: glossolalia, eloquence, discernment of the unseen world, prophecy, guidance of the work of the Church, healings. Such disclosure of rare gifts is one of the best attested phenomenon of religious awakenings. Two results of this belief are very apparent. (1) There was a strong conviction of fresh truth being revealed by God. Every Christian was a possible prophet. The Church was freed from scribal and scriptural authority. "Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." (2) Interest in organization was reduced to a minimum, since direction and guidance were believed to come from within.

Paul's view. The Pauline letters show a fine emphasis on the thought of the Spirit as a permanent and abiding possession of the Christian. This is in fact the primary feature of the new life—it possesses, or rather, is created by the Spirit within. This divine power becomes the new regulative principle,

taking the place of the rule of the flesh (Romans 8. 5, Galatians 5. 16) or the rule of law (Romans 8. 1f.). The Spirit had various gifts, and in Paul's list one sees the lingering influence of older views which attributed unusual phenomena of behavior to this source, along with a further development of the later view of the Spirit as an abiding moral energy. Among the Spirit's gifts are glossolalia, wisdom, knowledge, prophecy, the performance of miracles, but greatest of all, faith, hope, and love (1 Corinthians 12-13).

Paul was not clear as to the distinction between the Spirit of God and the risen Christ. These two seem at times to be the same. Compare the thought of Galatians 2. 20 with Galatians 5. 16, 22f., and Romans 8. 5 with 8. 10. In 2 Corinthians 3. 17 and 1 Corinthians 15. 45 the two seem to be expressly identified. How permanently this identification was effected in Paul's mind is difficult to say, but he was forced toward it by his belief in the mystic indwelling Christ, along with his acceptance and development of the concept of the Holy Spirit.

The Fourth Gospel. The writer's creative idea is the Logos doctrine. The Spirit comes after Christ's death and dwells in the heart of the believer to guide him into all truth. Its coming was dependent on Christ's going away. It continues His work, for what it reveals is the same truth which Christ had taught (14. 26, 15. 26, 16. 14). This truth it continues to develop. John thus seemed to think of the work of the Spirit as interpreting the meaning of Jesus' parables, sayings, etc. Thus he holds to the idea of a revelation made once for all by Jesus, yet forever renewing itself and applying itself to the needs of men.

The Fourth Evangelist makes a clear effort to keep the conception of the Spirit and of the risen Christ from merging into one. The Spirit is another Comforter (14. 16), "which the Father will send in my name" (14. 26). The Comforter "shall take of mine and shall declare it unto you" (16. 14). Yet nearly everything that is said of the coming of the Spirit is also said of Christ's abiding presence. It is clear that the two concepts overlap in his mind. The function of revealing truth, however, is clearly reserved for the Spirit.

In the Apocalypse the idea of the revelation of the future by means of vision and trance reminds one that the primitive beliefs have not died out (2. 7, 14. 13). Ignatius' statement that while preaching to the Philadelphians he suddenly cried out a message under the impulsion of the Spirit, harks back also to the Old Testament views.

The conception of the Holy Spirit as it appears in the New Testament is thus derived from Judaism. It expressed the Christian belief in a divine power working in the world and especially in the Church. The early Church did not speculate on the relation of the Spirit to God or to Christ. The uncertainty or indefiniteness on the latter point continued for some time. Hermas says that God made the "holy preexistent Spirit, which created all creation, to dwell in flesh" (Sim. V, 6, 5). Justin is similarly confused. As time passed, Christ, under the influence of the prevailing philosophy, was thought of more and more as Logos and Creator. The Spirit becomes the revealer of truth and the indwelling religious power, though in the latter respect many mystics have followed the thought of Paul.

The Biblical belief in the Holy Spirit thus affirmed a faith in the communication of powers and insights which man did not and could not achieve by his own means, that is to say, a belief in revelation. In the long religious history which the Bible records one can trace a gradual disentangling of the idea of this revelation or endowment from its semi-magical origins. This disentangling is not even complete in the New Testament period, and who would say that it has been completed in our day, or for that matter ever will be? But the story which begins with Samson's being enabled by the divine Spirit to rend a lion with his bare hands, ends with the conviction that it is through the action of the Spirit of God that ordinary men and women had attained the graces and insights of "love, joy, peace, long suffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, and self-control" (Galatians 5. 22). These things, said the Christian thought, are not the natural product of this world, but come into it with saving grace from God.

Thus the doctrine of the Holy Spirit was a means by which the early Church, using an ancient formulation of thought, affirmed its belief in revelation. Its God was neither completely transcendent nor completely immanent. It had no Aramaic or Greek equivalents for the terms pantheism and deism, nor was it concerned with the intellectual problems which they formulate. But it was concerned with the religious and moral implications of both. It denied that God was removed from or indifferent to the world's pain and sin, but also that He is to be identified with the natural order. To take a phrase used above it would be true to say that the early Church was not so much concerned with affirming that God is a spirit, as that He sends His Spirit into our hearts "by which we cry, Abba, Father" (Romans 8. 15 and Galatians 4. 6).

The Liberal Returns to the Church

JUSTIN WROE NIXON

I

THE conviction of the importance of the Church is growing in the thoughts of liberal-minded clergymen in this country. The evidences of this fact are numerous. Liberal churchmen were ardent in their support of the great ecumenical conferences of 1937. A. J. Muste's tribute to the Church upon his acceptance of a call to the Labor Temple in New York represents the revival of church-consciousness in the minds of many liberal pastors who have put a large part of their lives into humanitarian movements outside the Church. When the Antiochean Syrian Orthodox Church was received into the Federal Council at its recent meeting in Buffalo, the welcome extended to the Orthodox by the liberals of the Council was unfeigned. Twenty-five years ago no branch of the Eastern Orthodox Church would have thought of applying for membership in the Council, and, more important, the liberals would not have been comfortable if it had.

Why liberals of the generation to which the writer belongs failed to appreciate the importance of the Church is not difficult to understand. They grew up in a world which outside the Church was full of fascinating inventions and new ideas. Science was dominated by the spirit of enquiry, business by the mood of expansion, politics under the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson by the urge of reform. In contrast the atmosphere of the Church often seemed stuffy. The Church insisted on tradition and dogma; the liberal wanted to get his truth directly from the Bible and experience with the tools of scholarship. The Church clung to denominationalism; the liberal wanted to proceed with the task common to all the denominations. Where the spirit of the age had penetrated the Church, as in the social gospel, the going seemed slow and difficult. The young liberal minister discovered that he was preaching to kindly people who did not want to be wrought up over "causes." Often there appeared to be nothing for him to do but to push on by himself, finding what fellowship he could in little groups of the like-minded outside as well as inside the Church. He became pretty

much an individualist in an ecclesiastical world which seemed stolid and inert.

But a change has come, and when the reasons for it are examined it will be seen that a genuine readjustment of attitude is under way. Foremost among these reasons is the drift of the age toward collectivism. The issues of our time are so complex that the individual no longer has confidence in his own ability to decide them aright. He knows that he is the prey of propagandists and that even where he has the facts the ramifications of these issues run out so far that he cannot follow them. The vastness and the portentous nature of our problems fill him with a sense of helplessness. No wonder he seeks a wisdom and power greater than his own. For the religious man this is likely to mean a new interest in the Church. The Church has been here a long time. It has survived many disasters. It is probable that the Church knows something it would be good for him to know. So the liberal now listens to the Church and, perhaps, for the first time in his life, with humility.

The very scholarship, moreover, upon which he relied to make himself independent of the Church now reveals his inescapable dependence upon it. By the tools of scholarship many of us thought we were going to be able to isolate the figure of the historical Jesus from all ecclesiastical accretions and thus secure a pure and certain source of timeless truth. In that quest we are apparently not going to succeed. All our New Testament documents were conditioned by the faith of the Church. The effort to reconstruct the Jesus of history out of the Christ of faith is a highly speculative one and probably will so remain. Of this effort Professor Frederick C. Grant says "it is now next to impossible to 'strip off all accretions' and have anything left. The gospel tradition during the oral period was so thoroughly fluid that the original element and the accretions are now all but inseparable." R. H. Lightfoot in the final paragraph of his *History and Interpretation of the Gospels* reaches a similar conclusion. "It seems then," he says, "that the form of the earthly no less than of the heavenly Christ is for the most part hidden from us. For all the inestimable value of the Gospels they yield us little more than a whisper of His voice; we trace in them but the outskirts of His ways. Only when we see Him hereafter in His fullness shall we know Him also as He was on earth." What we have in the Gospels, accordingly, is not a photograph of the historical Jesus but a portrait of Jesus drawn by the faith of the early Church. It is that faith itself that now constitutes the central problem of New Testament study—the faith by which some men saw in Jesus the manifestation of

forces which came from beyond history, so that when they painted His portrait they invested it with features which were superhistorical. Thus the liberal scholar in quest of the historical Jesus cannot escape dealing now with the mystery of the Church.

Another factor in producing church-mindedness is the sociological emphasis on the function of the group in the development of personality. Cooley's dictum, "self and society are twinborn," seems to be the verdict of social science. Without the cultural inheritance transmitted by the group, without its discipline and training, the individual would hardly be human. Liberal Jews as well as Christians appreciate what this emphasis means for religion. Ludwig Lewisohn, for instance, in his *Mid-Channel*, tells us that his friends among the Gentile critics and writers of New York, no matter how apparently indifferent to Christianity, had the inestimable advantage of possessing a spiritual inheritance from which they could revolt. He himself having abandoned Judaism and remaining alien to Christianity felt the lack of what they had, in spite of themselves. One is reminded of an ancient Jew, Jesus of Nazareth, who revolted from a great religious tradition, but by means of the resources with which that tradition had supplied Him. To the liberal this emphasis upon the tradition-bearing group as the matrix of personality "finishes" individualism as a permanent way of life. Individualism seems to be a transitional phenomenon while a group is being reformed or while one is passing from one group to another.

The fact that the new totalitarian religions are church religions also affects liberal thought. Communism, Fascism, and National Socialism nucleate in parties which have creeds, disciplines, sacred rites, saints, hierarchies, life-changing faiths, and supreme objects of devotion—parties which are churches in everything but name. These parties are projecting new ways of life upon the world. The liberal preacher has often spoken of Christianity as a "way of life." In fact this has been one of his favorite phrases. Now he is challenged by new religions which proceed on the assumption that new ways of life must be propagated by selected and cohesive groups. It is rather disconcerting for him to discover that although he may not believe very much in his own church, Communists, Fascists and Nazis believe tremendously in theirs.

Finally the liberal is returning to the Church because of the sheer influence of the motive of sincerity. We are living in an age when changes in institutions profound and painful are being made. Business writhes and groans

under the pressure of government. Government, to the accompaniment of many fears, takes on new functions and shifts old functions from one department to another. The nations threaten one another with appalling catastrophe in order to redraw their boundary lines. The churches, for the most part, stand aside crying "Peace, Peace," bemoaning the evils of coercion and calling for voluntary reforms. All the while they are hampered by their own institutional inertia. If, with their incomparable spiritual resources, the churches cannot reform themselves how may they expect business or the nations to do so? So the liberal returns to the Church as to his spiritual home, but with the consciousness that there also lies his task.

II

What is this task? It is important for the liberal to become aware of it and to define it. For the collectivistic pressures which are in part responsible for his own new church-consciousness have also produced the ecumenical movement in Christianity. Under its centripetal influence, many Christians are in danger of being swept away by a flood of religious gregariousness which leads people to seek unity by the formulae of the greatest common denominators. It is to a Church in which this movement is at once the most promising trend and at the same time one fraught with hazard that the liberal is returning. Perhaps his task in the Church today may be approached most significantly by trying to define his possible contribution to the ecumenical movement.

One of the most prominent features of this movement is its endeavor to revalue the great traditions of the Christian faith. In respect to this endeavor, liberal Christians will plead that the tradition be interpreted in a broad and not in a narrow and exclusive fashion. In plain words the faith of the Church which the liberal values most has been over and over again the faith of the heretics rather than the orthodox. Without the heretics from Jesus down through Origen, Abelard, Wyclif, Huss, Luther, Fox and many others the liberal thinks there would never have been the Church that we know. When Rufus Jones writes about *The Church's Debt to Heretics* the liberal thinks he proves his case. Often the heretic has expressed and interpreted God's extra-ecclesiastical activity in the world. Age after age he has renewed the depleted soil of orthodoxy with living influences of the Spirit.

There is need for this inclusive view of the Christian tradition because there are strong forces within the ecumenical movement which would limit

the true faith even more narrowly within orthodoxy itself. There are voices which convey the impression that the line from Paul down through Augustine, Luther and Kierkegaard to the neo-reformation theology of Central Europe is the only line of authentic Christianity.

Few of us would dispute the fact that that is a line of authentic Christianity. And because it is we have to sit at the feet of Augustine, Luther and Kierkegaard and learn, in spite of their morbid and almost pathological states of mind. We have no right to assume that God is going to choose only well-balanced people as the revealers of His truth. "Which of the prophets was noted for sanity?"

But if there were Augustine and Luther there were also the Alexandrians. If there is the Hebraic strain in Christian thought there is also the Hellenic. A Christianity which holds to the native dignity of man and to the reason of man as an organ of God's self-disclosure cannot be dismissed as "mere humanism." There is a "Christian form of Humanism," as Canon Barry points out, "which sings its way through the New Testament, especially in the Epistle to the Ephesians," a faith that "is able to believe in Man recklessly, despite all that saddens and discourages, because it has seen the vision of God, the eternal source of worth and wonder—lifting us up to become sons of God."

If naturalistic humanism ends in pessimism concerning man, a belief in God as the "Wholly Other" and which denies His immanence in the natural processes of man's life is likely to end in the enthronement of the irrational and a new authoritarianism which cannot be borne. It is one of the tasks of liberal Christians in the ecumenical movement to keep alive the sense of the manifold richness of the Christian tradition which will help to save the movement from such a fate.

Liberals will contend also for a view of the Christian tradition which regards it as unfinished, as growing continuously into something different in important respects from its past. They do not think of Christianity as a capsule filled with truth once for all at a certain point in time and space, but as a seed capable of springing up in the fresh soil of new generations, bearing new views of man's needs and God's resources.

The process by which a religious tradition grows, however, is no painless affair. The great steps forward have come through insights born of difficulty and sacrifice, through crises involving grievous readjustments. One of the most fateful crises in the development of a religion appears when it faces needs

which it is not prepared by its past to meet. Then it must reach out for resources of which it is not yet aware, or it will endure the fate of being thrust aside while men seek elsewhere for the guidance and power they require.

Christianity today faces a situation of this kind, and one of the functions of the liberal is to help his fellows become aware of that fact.

The situation to which we refer may be described in brief as follows.

Human society is constituted of two types of relations. There are the relations of the face-to-face type where individuals meet one another as persons in the full sense, as in the family and the neighborhood. These are the primary relations without which the individual cannot be fully human. Then there are the secondary relations where the contact of individuals is partial, casual, and impersonal, the relations we share through institutions, representatives, and symbols (verbal, pictorial and ceremonial). The interdependent economic and political order which dominates what Graham Wallas calls "the great society" is prevailingly of this type.

Christianity is now facing the fact that it has a philosophy for the individual's primary relations to persons in the inner human world. It has also a philosophy for the individual's relations to the outer world of nature, whose "things" are to be used and whose "fate" is to be endured through trust in nature's God. But it has no adequate philosophy for the middle area of secondary human relations. At one pole of Christian thought are the pacifists, who assume that the varied and partial contacts of large-scale society can be assimilated forthwith to the man-to-person relationship characteristic of primary groups. At the opposite pole are the well-intentioned but unimaginative folk who simply allow their impersonal contacts to be assimilated to the man-to-thing relationship, which leads to callousness and brutality. It is this attitude which Mr. Wells had in mind when he observed how "British liberalism became curiously imperialist at the end of its shipping lines." Still another approach is that of continental Christians, who relegate the problems of this area to "the Orders" (such as the State and the Economic Community) which are conceived as instituted by God and which serve both as a restraint upon sin and a punishment for it. The difficulty with this position is that it enables the beneficiaries of injustice to rationalize the exploitation from which they profit as the inevitable consequence of original sin about which they can do nothing.

Have we not come at this point to one of the causes of the world's present spiritual malaise? For it is this ethically confused area of secondary relations

which through the mechanization of society has expanded enormously during the last generation. It is in this area that the pivotal issues are arising upon which the fate of civilization depends. Here are to be found the problems of unemployment, class and racial conflict. Here are generated the forces which produce the wars which nine-tenths of the people even in the dictator countries do not want. Is not one of the reasons why Communism, Fascism and National Socialism appeared as religions because chronic needs had developed in this area, in respect to which conventional religion could give no guidance? Leaders of the new movements, accordingly, rejected Christianity but sought to evoke religious emotions under new forms because no such re-organization of human relations as they contemplated could be made stable without religious confirmation.

Has Christianity now the capacity to grow out into this area of secondary relations, to guide and empower those who are seeking a higher ethical organization of economic, political and international life? The Church of the Middle Ages had a measure of such capacity, and the current nostalgia for the Middle Ages is due in part to the longing for a Church which feels, as medieval churchmen felt, a responsibility for civilization. The Calvinists of the sixteenth century in Geneva and of the seventeenth century in Britain and America had such a capacity. The so-called "activism" of the American churches is due largely to the persistence of the Calvinistic impulse toward reform, supported by the Calvinistic faith in God's sovereignty over the whole of life.

Today it is the liberals in the Church who must carry much of the responsibility for the development and adaptation of the Christian tradition to meet these new needs. The problems are too involved to be solved by answers which come out of the past. It is upon those people who have been somewhat shaken loose from the past, who believe in the creative activity of God in the extra-ecclesiastical world, and who look for signs of His guidance in the events of our time that the Church must depend for much of the pioneering that must be done. The issues must be approached empirically and then the elements in the Christian tradition most pertinent to the issues may be applied.

What principles of selection is the liberal to use in sifting out the Christian tradition to be applied to these issues? A clue to one of the more important of these principles appears in a recent statement by a Chinese educator, President Liu of Mukden. "In an organic world," he says, "what is good

for the part is good for the whole, but we are living in a mechanical one where something may be good for one part but bad for another." We do live in a mechanical world and there is no escaping from it. An interdependent technological order such as ours must have a mechanical structure of business, government and law to support its organic elements. The responsibility of the Church, carried by its members in every walk of life and by its various organizations, is to see to it that the mechanical structure of our society is made to serve organic needs. This means that at every point mechanical, that is impersonal, processes must be tested by their effects upon persons.¹

A person-centered society, rather than a property-centered, nation-centered, or race-centered society, would seem to constitute the Christian social hope. The liberal Christian will work for the realization of this hope as God's will for human society as he works for the realization of Christlike personality as God's will for the individual. He will regard every concrete though partial advance toward the realization of this hope as in some sense the work of the Holy Spirit. By such a hope he will be guided as he seeks those elements in the Christian tradition which are of most value in stimulating the growth of contemporary Christianity into these new areas of experience. The rediscovery and reinterpretation of the Hebrew prophets during the last generation is one of the results of the selective influence of the social hope which has already become widely influential in both Christianity and Judaism.

We should not be fair to the liberal, however, if we thought of his task in the ecumenical movement or the Church as being confined to the interpretation of the Christian tradition or the issues of Christian ethics. Even as many others, the liberal hungers after God. He feels that there is something wrong in the relationship of much of contemporary Christianity to God. But he also feels that the unreality in our present approach to God is due at least in part to our failure to make obvious human needs our religious concern. Throughout history the needs of men have been the mirror in which they have seen the face of God. The needs have not created God any more than the mirror creates faces. But they have been the means through which God has become real.

¹The strength of pacifism is that it has seen this principle by which the processes of human life must be tested. Its weakness is that it has neglected the mechanical structure of an interdependent human order which inevitably involves coercion at many points to protect both its impersonal operations and the rights of those who operate it. It has confused the plumb line of Christian judgment with the blueprint of Christian action in a mechanically-conditioned society.

There is a fragment of old Jewish tradition to the effect that when the Messiah comes He will be discovered in the neediest place in the ancient world, among the beggars, the sick and the forlorn outside the gates of Rome. If God is to reveal Himself in the modern world where is He likely to become more real than among those who accept the summons to enter areas of moral confusion as an appointment with Him?

Whether Christianity as an organized religion is going to accept that summons, or become through otherworldly and apocalyptic tendencies a religion of escape from these times is a question already present in many minds. "Tell us," says W. Macneile Dixon, recent Gifford lecturer, "whether Christianity stands for living in the present world or against it, for participation or withdrawal, for action or quietism, for taking a share in the shaping of history, in its multifarious and dubious undertakings, a hand in the game, or refusing it. Throughout the history of the Church there has been a halting between two opinions for co-operation and for withdrawal. It appears improbable that the future will permit the compromise."

If Christianity does undertake to furnish guidance and power to those wrestling with the large-scale relationships of modern society it will enter upon a task of great peril. There will be the peril of secularism, as men mistake fragments of the task for final ends; the peril of idolatry, as those who serve humanity become tempted to deify it; the peril of disillusionment, as inevitable compromises lure men on to believe the sovereign of this world is not God but the devil. Perhaps greatest of all will be the peril of despair as the heart grows sick with hope deferred.

But the gains will be worth the perils. When the Christian assumes that his religion is good for the whole of life and that there is no problem anywhere that he cannot take into the presence of God, he begins to develop unity in his outlook. His soul finds anchorage. He knows that in this kind of a world he is committed unto strife, but he struggles in comradeship with Another whose resources are sufficient for the conflict. For the most partial realizations of the social hope that he cherishes, the years tell him he must take longer views. The ways to even minor advances seem trackless and interminable. But the hope itself becomes a mirror in which at rare moments he sees the face of the Eternal. He comes to think of its realization as Unamuno thought of the immortality of the good, as something which deserves to be, even if it never is.

III

We have been thinking of the relations of the liberal Christian to the ecumenical movement. The sense of breath in the Christian tradition; the conviction that it is endowed with the quality of continuous growth; the consciousness that the needs of men in the area of large-scale impersonal relationships now challenge the capacity of Christianity to grow out into this area; the faith that these needs will become the means to a deeper experience of God—these are some of the contributions which the liberal Christian may hope to make to this movement. They indicate important interests to which he will devote himself as his task in the Church.

But at the moment the liberal is not thinking altogether about his contributions. He is also conscious of being on the receiving as well as on the contributing end in his relations with the Church. We have already referred to the mood of humility that has come over him. Others have commented on his modesty at Edinburgh. There is a reason for these attitudes. The reason is that he is discovering simultaneously his own errors and weaknesses, and the richness and depth of the Church's faith. He is discovering that human nature is more complex than he has thought and human history more tragic than he has been able to imagine. He sees ever more clearly that his special concerns in the ethical field must be set in the perspective of the ancient disquietudes of the soul. When he looks at the great variety of philosophies competing in the arena of the modern mind and then turns to the great doctrines of the Church, even the most archaic creeds have a certain majesty about them which makes him at least respectful in their presence. After all, they have worn through a lot of experience on the part of the children of men.

Most of all has his thought been arrested by the Church itself. Occasionally he has tried to define in an abstract way what the Church is. But the more he thinks about it the more inadequate his definitions become. The Church is, of course, the living body of Christian men and women who associate together for public worship and for service to one another and the world. But it is also the saints, the martyrs and the apostles, the cloud of witnesses that enfolds us. It is the great hymns of peace and gladness that we sing to ourselves on hospital beds of pain. It is the New Testament, written by the early Church to preserve precious memories of our Lord and to guide the conduct of the faithful. It is the spires one sees across the landscape testifying to man's belief that he has a soul. It is the newborn child brought to the altar

of the Church for dedication to God. It is the friendships that endure across the years so that when a pastor returns to his first parish after a lapse of decades it seems as if he had never left it. It is the carols of Christmas and the flowers of Easter. It is the long line of men and women who have gone out from friends and kindred to live out their days in service to strangers in foreign lands. It is the mysterious figure of One who stood by the side of His followers in the long ago and who said as He faded from their vision, "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." It is the last low whispers of the dead which are burdened with His name.

All this the Church is, and it doth not yet appear what it shall be. If pressed to define the Church some of us would be tempted to say with a Catholic writer: "The Church is not an institution; it is a civilization." That is not quite true of either Catholicism or Protestantism. But it is nearer the truth than to say that the Church is just one institution among many. The Church is history, it is philosophy, it is a heritage of art and music, it is a standard of morals, it is a conserver of progress, it is redemption and fulfillment for the individual human soul. And now, as the fellowship of Christians widens, it promises to become the living sacrament of the Christian social hope.

This is the Church to which the liberal returns. Is it any wonder that just now he is thinking of what he has to receive as well as to give and that he feels his task in the Church is not only to contribute, but to listen and to learn?

The Church in the City

ROBERT W. SEARLE

PROTESTANTISM is indigenous in our American cities. The first records of our eastern seaboard communities reveal the presence of an influential Church. In the earliest pictorial reproductions the church is the most prominent structure. As America developed and new communities were formed, the Church kept progress with the pioneer. In this sense our American civilization is unique—the foundation of the Church as contemporaneous with the foundation of organized society. It is important that this fact be borne in mind as we look out upon the modern American city. It concerns our fulfillment of responsibility. We cannot plead that anything among us is a relic of a pre-Christian era. The Church has been here always while the city was building. It has been the witness to the growth of good and ill. Therefore, if it can claim credit for the incorporation in community life of much that is constructive it must also take a just measure of blame for its failure to defend the American community to its fullest ability from destructive developments and degrading influences.

Furthermore, we must clearly remember the relationship between democracy and Christianity, particularly Christianity in its Protestant forms. The basic element in democracy is its conception of the intrinsic dignity of the human individual. The State exists for man, not man for the State. That, of course, is a Christ-given concept brought out from near oblivion by the Reformation and carried over from the realm of religion into that of politics. Obviously it has not yet been recognized in economic life. Thomas Mann is insistently pointing out to us that "democracy is the political expression of Christianity." If our American democracy was born in the Reformation, it was nourished in the wooden meetinghouses of New England, the gray stone churches of the Hudson Valley and the red brick churches of Virginia. Protestantism has a fundamental commitment to democracy. Some apparently need to be reminded that it is a relationship of mutual dependence. Even as Christianity must jealously defend democracy on principle, so in turn it can move and breath freely only in those lands where democracy survives the modern totalitarian trend. This trend can take place where on the one hand privilege seeks to prevent the recognition of the obligations that pertain to

"the intrinsic dignity of the individual" and on the other where, because of unresolved internal problems, men lose faith in democracy and give ear to the siren voice of efficiency pleading for dictatorship. The world of today abounds in illustrations. Let Christians take note that all totalitarianism, whether from the right or from the left, recognizes the irreconcilable opposition of the religion of Jesus Christ.

Two things, therefore, demand of the Church today a thorough reconsideration of its strategy. Those who reconsider must be prepared to receive with complete open-mindedness the most drastic proposals for the revision of present plans and policies.

If this is demanded by the necessity for the preservation of the Church and of democracy—there are even more imperative reasons resting upon us.

The goal of the Church in any community is nothing short of the endeavor to make that community in every phase of its life conform to the standards of the kingdom of God. When the Church loses sight of that goal it loses its way, becomes an end in itself, turns introvert, and ceases to command the respect of men. Therefore, the Church is constrained by its gospel to devise a strategy of approach to those areas where the will of God is unrecognized and of attack upon those in which it is denied.

Finally, is not Christianity by genius dynamic, aggressive, outgoing, seeking, searching? On the other hand, is it not by actuality in its present form and program, static, receptive, waiting to be found of men? Does not the word "Church" bring to the common mind the picture of a dignified building standing on a street corner with doors most often closed and with little indication of vitality during those hours when he sees it? Does not the common man think of the Church as expecting him to come to it for a formal service rather than as seeking to minister to his needs? Has not Protestant Christianity largely lost touch with the masses of our cities? And is this not largely because the masses feel that the Church is not concerned with the circumstances which determine their lives? Are we doing enough for the childhood of our cities by thinking merely in terms of religious instruction and not meeting our responsibility in the face of widely prevalent conditions that degrade, deform and vitiate?

For four principal reasons then, we are constrained today to revise the strategy of the Church in the city. We must do so for the protection of the Church, for the preservation of democracy, for the salvation of individuals and for the redemption of society.

So far our approach has been from the viewpoint of the city Church. Let us look at the situation from the viewpoint of the city itself. Consider seven factors practically universal in our American municipal life. From the standpoint of the Church they indicate seven areas of life in which God's will is flagrantly denied. From the standpoint of democracy, they are seven sources of peril. From that of society they are public enemies and for the individual they involve suffering and degradation. Surely anyone who dares to take the name of Christian must face these seven foes.

Let it be said at the outset that these ills are not peculiar to the city, but let it also be said that they are more prevalent there and they are vastly aggravated by the contrasts which exist and by the massed population which expedites the spread of infection.

(In the sections that follow, statistics are taken from New York City with which I am intimately familiar. Readers may obtain the records of their own communities from local authorities. Problems, of course, vary in intensity, but in the main they are prevalent everywhere.)

The first public enemy is *unemployment*. It has been said that the United States has within its boundaries half of the world's employable unemployed. Whether this be exaggeration or not, the fact remains that upwards of ten million of our fellow citizens stand all day in the market place, and their only hope of securing the minimum necessities of life depends upon the response of the community conscience to their plight in the form of direct or work relief. In New York, as of October, 1938, there were 405,189 cases dependent upon relief. Cases in most instances mean families, so that it is conservative to say that at least 1,500,000 individuals or one out of every five residents of the city are dependent upon relief. That means that they are economically disenfranchised. Any minister who has had extensive dealing with the unemployed will realize what this means in the qualitative terms of unhappiness, frustration, broken homes, despairing age, thwarted youth, neurotic childhood. We have built a civilization that answers the question "How much is a man worth?" in terms of dollars and cents. We have been brutal in so many of our insensitive social attitudes. Much has been said, and rightly, of the plight of the man over forty who finds himself cast aside. Too much cannot be said of the young people who are denied the chance to make a beginning at work. In New York, 36% of the young people between the ages of 16 and 25 are unemployed. At least 140,000 have been out of school five years without ever having had the chance for a regular paid job. Think

what that means in terms of morale and of morals, in terms of citizenship and loyalty to the so-called "American Way."

It is significant that we are still at the place where we know how many "extra" hogs there are in the nation, but have no accurate record of the unemployed. In line with this is the tragic and inexcusable fact that while we are in the ninth year of this predicament we have not yet reached the point where there has been convened a conference of the leaders of government, business and labor, to be kept on the job until it had reached some long-range solution of the problem of unemployment. Business is largely assuming that it will be automatically resolved in the "return to prosperity" while government is depending upon this and upon the by-products of social legislation. Let every preacher who reads this make real the problem to himself by outlining the sort of sermons which he would preach to a congregation of the unemployed. Let him take as his text "The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof." America has the brains and the abundance—what shall we say then to justify our democracy and our Christianity to the unemployed?

The second public enemy is the *slum*. Recently the WPA theater produced a drama entitled "One Third of a Nation." That is almost literally true. A distinguished British Housing expert, after a tour of the nation, reported that he was forced to say with considerable reluctance that "the United States has not only the most extensive but the worst slums in the Western world." In New York City the slum is chiefly characterized by the "Old Law Tenement." There are 58,000 of these, enough to line the Hudson River in a solid row from New York to Albany on one side of the river and back again from Albany to New York on the other. These contain almost 500,000 dwelling units—that is, lodgings for half a million families. There has been much talk of public housing and several projects have been completed. People, however, do not realize that at the present rate of slum clearance it will take us nearly 250 years to complete the job. The British program, on the other hand, begun in 1919, will have been completed by 1944 if nothing intervenes. Since we began in New York we have provided for 7,390 single family units; 84,000 new dwelling units are needed a year if we are to meet our housing necessities within twenty years.

The slums mean death by fire—469 in a decade. They mean death by disease. In the most congested areas infant mortality ranges 200% above the city average, and the incidence of tuberculosis 300% above the city average.

Meantime the city hospital facilities are continually overtaxed. Building and building in hospitalization is one of the penalties for failing to build houses. Slums mean crime. Charts of the city marking the substandard areas, when compared with records of the police department, indicate how much crime originates in slums, where poverty concentrates, homes have inadequate space, the streets are the playground, gangs replace clubs, cellar clubs and dance halls taking the place of proper social opportunities for young people.

There is in New York City one police precinct, the 19th, in which is represented more controlled wealth than any other part of the earth's surface. It is the district of the splendid mansions and the luxurious apartments. In that precinct too are the city's richest, strongest churches. A survey of the precinct made but a few years ago revealed the fact that east of Third Avenue there are 40,000 windowless sleeping rooms and that more than 50% of the families are without private sanitary facilities.

Every American city has slums, but not every American bothers to find it out or to discover the tremendous social and human costs which they impose. A western newspaper editor after an unsuccessful venture to rouse the church people to get behind a local slum clearance program wrote an editorial burning with righteous indignation in which he said, "apparently Christian people believe that because Jesus was born in a stable it is perfectly proper for millions of children to be doomed to live in slums." In the name of Christianity and of democracy the Christian conscience must awake and demand an adequate slum clearance program.

Public enemy number three is *crime*. Several attempts have been made to estimate the annual cost of crime in the United States. The figure most commonly quoted is \$13,000,000,000. I will leave it to others to figure out what constructive use might be made with that money. Courtney Riley Cooper, in his book, *Here's to Crime*, indicates that there is within the nation an army of 3,000,000 criminals and that one out of four families in the country will be the victims of a serious crime. Our prisons are full to overflowing. A recent newspaper carried the word that Sing Sing was so overcrowded that some ninety prisoners were forced to sleep in the corridors. The Riker's Island Prison in New York City is as fine a penal institution as exists anywhere. It was opened in 1935 and built to house 2,100 prisoners. At date of writing it has a population of more than 2,800. So it is with all our places

of detention. Without exception they are overcrowded, and a tragically large proportion of the inmates are young men.

We have not yet comprehended the lessons which science has to teach us. If medical science were treating the problems of health as we are treating the problems of crime, we would still be victimized by plague after plague. In the field of disease we have learned the value of prevention. In that of crime we have scarcely tried it. Ninety-nine per cent of our effort is penal and only a few communities are organized for prevention. We have perhaps too glibly assumed that public education would take care of the problem of crime. A glance through any prison will show the error.

The community as organized to deal with crime is thinking in terms of the protection of society. It would accomplish its purpose much more effectively if it thought in terms of the protection of its children and young people. Certainly the Church must be concerned primarily with the awful human waste of crime, with distortion of life that makes a child first delinquent and then a criminal. One has but to study a few criminal case histories to realize that in very many, probably most, instances society itself is the real culprit. Having surrounded a child with deprivation, having tolerated or made profit from degrading influences, it forces him over the line into outlawry and then condemns him for being outlaw. Let it be noted too that in the whole penal system there is scarcely anything of the redemptive note and that once the mark of conviction is on a man, society does not forgive and forget. Rather it condemns him for life, closes the doors to opportunity and sets an indelible mark upon him.

Public enemy number four is *political corruption*. Lord Bryce, in his great evaluation of our country, *The American Commonwealth*, warns us that the danger point in the American structure is that of municipal government. Municipal government in most of our large cities smells to heaven most of the time. It is from the structure of municipal politics that state and national parties have their being, so that the infection spreads outward and upward. It is with municipal government the citizen has his most intimate contacts, and from those contacts arises his attitude toward our organized democracy. For instance, in New York the individual's first contact with judicial authority is with the Magistrates Courts—an archaic, inhuman system, ill-housed, and presided over by judicial officers who are confronted with a case load so great that in most instances justice can be only a travesty.

No city needs to have bad government. I believe no city would have bad

government if its people voted with conscientious regularity. The machine always turns out its adherents but "good people" are in and out voters. New York City has today probably the finest administration in the last one hundred years. It is a reform administration presided over by a tireless, courageous, honest and able mayor. It came into being because six years ago a lot of people who ordinarily don't take the trouble bothered to come out and vote. They came again a year ago. Who are those people? I undertook to find out and from two most creditable sources was informed that the bulk of them were church members. See this! Mayor LaGuardia is a reform mayor. When he came to the choice of his Commissioner of Public Health, he sought out the best man he could find. In New Haven, Connecticut, he found Dr. John Rice. Doctor Rice could not bring him a vote—nevertheless he was appointed. Under his administration the infant mortality rate in New York City has dropped to the lowest of any large city in America. Actually, therefore, because the "good people" bothered to vote, thousands of children are living today who might otherwise be dead. Now—whose fault under God would it have been had the old administration carried on because the "good people" failed to vote, and consequently these thousands of children had not been saved? In nine cases out of ten, political corruption is the result of public indifference.

Public enemy number five is *racial injustice*. We look across the seas in horror at the indignities and the persecutions that are heaped upon minorities—but what of our own minorities? We ask, "Can it happen here?" without searching to see what is happening here. There is a tendency for every group to judge other groups by their worst, while at the same time expecting themselves to be judged by their best. Our American civilization is not immune from this tendency. As a matter of fact, in no country in the world is this tendency carried to greater extremes in the attitudes of major political parties toward each other. But it is of racial minorities that we are concerned, of the treatment of the Jew and the Negro.

It so happens that I am in a position to see much of the anti-Semitic propaganda that is issued in America. Tragically and treacherously, most of it purports to come from Christian sources. The problem of anti-Semitism is not a Jewish problem, it is a Christian problem, and the task of the Church in any community is that of devising a strategy designed to eliminate anti-Semitism from the community. The Jew's part is in the control of those

elements within his race which by their antisocial action bring disrepute upon the whole group.

The most abused minority in America is the Negro. We do well to remind ourselves that the Negro is in America by virtue of wholesale kidnaping and sale at the hands of our white ancestors. Formerly the self-righteous North was accustomed to point the finger of shame at the South—but it must be frankly admitted that the Negro is suffering more in the great cities of the North than he is in any other part of the nation. In the first place, he is segregated and segregation means higher rents (frequently forty to sixty per cent higher). It also means hazardous overcrowding. In the second place, the Negro is discriminated against in the matter of employment. In New York, except in government work, most of the doors of economic opportunity are closed against him in all but servile forms of employment. As a result of these two attitudes, the Negroes' economic plight is tragic beyond all others. At no point is democracy more seriously challenged and at no point is the sincerity of the Christian fellowship more questionable, for these Negroes are our brethren in Jesus Christ. They are Baptist and Methodist, Presbyterian and Episcopalian. We shall scarcely be able to convince the world of the effectiveness of the gospel of brotherhood which we preach as long as we so complacently tolerate the continuance of such basic and crippling injustice toward those who in the providence of God are born with skins of darker hue.

Public enemy number six is *industrial strife*. A minister brought this problem to me one day. His church was the leading one in a small industrial community. Each Sunday morning he faced two men, sitting across the aisle from each other, who had ceased to speak to each other. One of these men was the owner and employer. The other was a workman whom this owner-employer had dismissed from a job which had been faithfully carried on for years because the workman had been the leader in an effort to form a union. His church incidentally had at its national assembly approved the principle of collective bargaining. As a matter of fact those two men sit in every congregation, just as they are present in every American community. Their failure to achieve a peaceful and a democratic relationship not only creates a cleavage in the church and disorder in the community. It threatens the economic well-being of the whole nation. The house of industry divided against itself is no more immune from destruction than any other house. Furthermore, as long as people do not believe in the

extension of democratic principle into all of life they do not believe in democracy. And what about the dignity of the individual? What about the worth of the employee as a man and the worth of an employer as well? Surely this problem can never be resolved by mere government fiat. There is a task of interpretation and of reconciliation which awaits the awakening sense of responsibility on the part of the Church, representative as it is of a gospel of brotherhood and of good will.

Public enemy number seven is *godlessness*. The godless individual can hardly be a dependable supporter of democracy—indeed he can hardly understand it. I take it that the basic conflict of life is between God and the self. Therefore where God is ruled out of life, self is left supreme, and even though men may talk of enlightened self-interest we may not expect them in a moment of crisis to act upon anything except expediency, and expediency killed the Christ. "It is expedient that this one man should die."

We have taken our cities for granted, these cities in which Protestantism was indigenous. As time went on this Protestantism became sectarian, as denomination after denomination entered the community. As a result, there has been no general sense of community responsibility on the part of the divided Protestant community. What was everybody's business was nobody's business; the Church became almost entirely parochial. The principle of the separation of Church and State was allowed by loose thinking to become the separation of religion from the processes of education. As a result, we have been propagating materialism until today we discover in New York, for instance, that fifty per cent of the children are growing up without any religious training whatsoever—Protestant, Roman Catholic or Jewish.

We are confronted then with godlessness outside the Church where millions are frankly pagan, and godlessness inside the Church where the parish or the denomination is allowed to receive the loyalty that belongs to Christ alone. Here is perhaps the basic peril to the Church, to democracy, to society and to the individual.

As we face these seven public enemies four things are obvious.

First, it is evident that a humanistic effort on the part of the Church would be a futility. Worldly prejudices and loyalties have so permeated most congregations through those spiritually unhealthy members whose religion is mere tradition, that the conversion experience which brings man face to face with God in single-hearted loyalty is imperative. Furthermore, we need to be reminded that the power on which we are to depend must flow

into us from God and cannot be self-generated. I am convinced from my wide contact with many church folk, both lay and clerical, that we are coming into a time of the rediscovery of a vital personal religion and consequently of revival and of power.

In the second place, it should be evident that our denominational and parochial dismemberment means futility, frustration and hypocrisy. That our present city scene is what it is, is demonstration enough of the inadequacy of our strategy until now. Most of us feel deeply the vital challenge of our urban condition but we are baffled to know what to do. That bafflement will continue until we achieve an effective measure of solidarity on a community basis. From the human viewpoint we are as ineffective as would be an army that attempted to proceed with each company as an independent unrelated unit. From the divine viewpoint, it must be that God will not let us achieve our objectives as long as we continue willfully to violate the gospel which we preach. We are preaching a religion of brotherhood, but we are refusing to practice brotherhood in religion. Let me say that I do not believe that we who are ministers will lead the Church into union. We are too apt to be the "semicolon boys" of religion, seeing too many obstacles out of proportion to the urgency of the necessity for union. Ultimately we will be swept into unity by the demand of the lay membership.

In the third place, as L. P. Jacks says: "The Church must shine as the Church triumphant and must march as the Church militant before men will say 'religion is here'!" For too long we have been introvert and static, waiting for the community to come to us. Perhaps that is largely because of our parochialism, but whatever the reason, we must now go out and wage the warfare of the Kingdom, but always, be it noted, with the means of love.

Finally, we must restore to its proper place the service obligation of Christian fellowship. Recently I was leading a group of young people and youth leaders through a series of evening conferences. One night I set two blackboards at the front of the room. On one I wrote the word "Minister" and on the other "Member." "Now," I asked, "what is required of a minister by the average church?" Suffice it to say the blackboard was filled, indicating an impossible measure of responsibility heaped on one man. But the second board was even more significant, for on it I put the things that forty better than average church members agreed were required of the church member. It was agreed that "he" was required to go to church, but they added "fifty-fifty" as the proper fulfillment of this obligation. Next they agreed that

"he" should contribute to the support of the church. In the endeavor to estimate the amount on the basis of requirement they had me add the phrase, "anything from a button up." There was long discussion before another item was added. Sunday-school teaching, they said, could not be considered a requirement, for that was left to a faithful few. So also with the holding of office or any other work about the church. Finally they agreed that something should indicate the responsibility of the individual "to be good in his daily life." There they stopped, for the obvious reason that nothing more is required by the average church. A caricaturist describing a church on the basis of this analysis would say that it was a company of people who had banded together in order to hire someone to perform their Christian obligations for them. On the other hand, think what the result would be if every church member were to assume some definite service obligation in the name of Christ, with intelligent guidance and special training for the fulfillment of the function for which he was qualified in his parish church, in some underprivileged neighboring church, in some affiliated institution of the church, or out in some community service to the sick, the underprivileged, or the childlife of the community. If that should happen or even partially happen, can anyone doubt that before very long the general community would be turning toward the church with gratitude and seeking from it contact with a source which could so empower life?

I am convinced that the American city church is today confronted with a great obligation and an overwhelming opportunity—but neither will be met unless we face realistically the necessity of revising our city strategy and going out in an aggressive crusade in love to establish right where we live the kingdom of God.

The Situation and Program of Christianity

A. J. MUSTE

THE chief of the rival and hostile faiths which have in our day arisen on the very soil of Western Christendom are Fascism and Communism. I speak advisedly when I call them religions. We shall not know how to deal with their challenge unless we realize that they are not exclusively nor even primarily political and economic systems, but religions.

To a considerable degree the Church itself is responsible for the situation which has developed, and judgment must begin at the House of God. On the one hand, the Church largely failed to follow out the social implications of its own gospel and became a bulwark of an unchristian status quo in economics and politics. On the other hand, large sections of the Church succumbed to a humanism, optimism and secularism which were definitely out of line with the Christian world view. According to the faith of the prewar era (carried over in the United States into the postwar boom) man sat at the center of the universe and "on top of his world." The sense of sin had become meaningless. Progress was to be automatic and perpetual. Thought moved entirely within the bounds of this world of space and time.

Chronologically this period for the Western world as a whole came to an end with the World War. Logically and psychologically the War was also the inevitable outcome of such a period.

Men then set about making religions for themselves, fashioning or espousing the faiths to which we have already referred, which give postwar man something beyond himself, something to which he may surrender his perplexed and disillusioned individuality. I venture to comment briefly on developments in the Communist and Fascist movements and their significance for the Christian movement today.

Let us consider first the situation in the Communist movement. A realistic appraisal of recent years reveals that the history of the postwar period is far from constituting a clear and conclusive triumph for the working-class movement or a complete validation of Marxism. In Italy, Germany, and

a number of other countries the labor movement was crushed. In other lands it has arrived at an impasse.

The fact that in the United States the labor movement in the past few years has made substantial and steady gains does not seriously affect the argument, for we are only accomplishing what the British working class, for example, accomplished several decades ago. There are no indications that, unless new factors enter, our labor movement will not in due time encounter the same problems and arrive at the same impasse. Indeed confusion is already the outstanding characteristic of the traditional radical parties in this country, the Socialist and Communist.

Let me remark in passing that what has overtaken the Marxist movement is not merely an outward defeat from which a movement possessed of internal cohesion and drive may recover. An inward disintegration and loss of faith is taking place. Thus John Dos Passos a few months ago wrote: "Of the hopes that dazzled the last twenty years that some political movement might tend to the betterment of the human lot, little remains above ground but the tattered slogans of the past. These old slogans still have enough magic in them to make them useful to gang leaders with a knack for organizing and a will to power, but their appeal is now of a pie-in-the-sky order and tends to be enforced with the bayonet, or, in the case of a friend, with the butt end of a rifle. Out of them is brewing a partisan fanaticism that equals in savagery that of the wars of religion."

I do not believe that any important figures in the Socialist and Communist movement really believe any more that Socialism is going to be established in this generation or for that matter in several. "The appeal is now of a pie-in-the-sky order," as Dos Passos observes.

If we ask why secularist Marxism has come to the present pass, the answer must be that it is due in large measure to the fact that its moral and spiritual foundations have been unsound; it has failed to take account of some of the most fundamental and indispensable Christian insights about the world and man.

Its materialism has involved a degraded and degrading conception of man, the human individual. The proletariat, idealized in the abstract, is in the concrete subjected to the dictatorship of an absolutist Party, and in the Party the member is a pawn.

The "system" is unduly exalted at the expense of the individual. "Keep this system, with all our marvelous inventions and progress, just as it is, and

all will be well, we shall progress automatically and forever"—is or was the naïve faith of a materialistic capitalism. "Smash it all and put another system in its place and all our problems will be solved"—is the equally naïve faith of the secularist Marxist. Christianity knows that a "system" is just human beings living in certain relationships and unless something happens in the human being, nothing has happened at all.

The espousal of the doctrine that the end justifies the means has had a devastating effect in the internal life of the movement. You begin by assuming that "anything goes" in dealing with the capitalist, the class-enemy. But to the conservative in the labor movement, the radical seems to play into the hands of the class-enemy and so "anything goes" in dealing with him, and vice versa. Presently anyone who is not in your party and then anyone who is not in your faction of your party is, "objectively considered," an agent of the class-enemy. Thus a debilitating factionalism and deterioration result: in Spain, in the very midst of the struggle against reaction, peasants and workers fight peasants and workers, revolutionists murder revolutionists.

To cite one more illustration, Lenin repeatedly warned the inner circle of the Bolshevik party not to make the mistake which the leaders of the French Revolution made, and get to shooting each other. Feudal landlords would understand no language but force and must be shot; so with certain capitalists, even perhaps misguided workers and peasants—"But don't make the mistake of shooting each other." But that is what has come to pass. Seek to achieve peace and justice and brotherhood by the method of repression and violence and chicanery and dictatorship—and it is repression, violence, chicanery, dictatorship that you get and not the fair goal of which you dreamed.

Now one of the most significant developments of recent months is that a considerable number of very important writers of the Left have realized all this and are asserting that "changing systems" is not enough, that we must have human beings who are creatures of spirit and capable of making moral decisions, and that the means men use inevitably determine the ends they achieve.

Thus Aldous Huxley, until recently one of the most sophisticated, cynical and irreligious of novelists, has become passionately concerned about moral and religious problems and proclaims: "It is in the power of every individual to choose whether he shall deny or affirm the unity of mankind in an ultimate spiritual reality." And Professor Sidney Hook, the foremost student of Marx in the United States, reviewing Huxley's most recent

book, *Ends and Means*, roundly asserts: "With unerring insight, Aldous Huxley has addressed himself to the basic moral problem of our times. . . . Against those who would further the ultimate truth with immediate lies, counterpose to the uncritical worship of a leader an even more uncritical worship of a bigger leader, combat Fascism with the methods of Fascism—all on the ground that the end justifies the means—Huxley replies: 'The end cannot justify the means for the simple and obvious reason that the means employed determine the nature of the end produced.' The true Utopian is not he who criticizes society by the light of his ideals, even if he goes down to defeat; it is the self-styled realist who imagines he can realize his ideals by using methods which are bound to achieve their precise opposite."

One of the foremost theoreticians of the old Austrian Social-Democratic Party, Willi Schlamm, has written a book with the significant title, *The Dictatorship of the Lie*, of which our distinguished American critic, Edmund Wilson, says: "His book is not a political program, nor is it properly a manifesto. It is rather in the nature of a sermon. But it may be what socialism needs at the moment is a few sermons like this of Schlamm. Certainly *The Dictatorship of the Lie* is one of the most bracing and air-clearing documents which have yet come out of the crisis of the Left."

Paraphrasing Schlamm, Wilson continues: "What is really behind all this"—referring to the failure and in a sense the collapse of the secular revolutionary movement—"is the elimination of moral principles from socialism. What are the claims to moral authority of an advanced guard of social regeneration which has shown itself to be devoid of the primary human virtues of kindliness, fair-dealing, and veracity? There is no morality in the 'Dialectic': . . . Nor does our social science of Marxism take us far. In that field our scientific knowledge is in reality still very meager, and the little we have succeeded in acquiring can never do duty for human initiative and human character. We must recognize that society has to be saved, not by the processes of a mystic dialectic, but by the influence of human beings who are self-respecting and morally sound."

Eugene Lyons, in the current "best seller," *Assignment in Utopia*, with great moral fervor contends that "the common denominator in all dictatorships is the decadence of the moral sense in mankind, the attrition of ethical values." He has become convinced that "the immediate task, for those who have the urge to participate consciously in the historic processes of their life-

time"—up to a few months ago that phrase would have been followed inevitably with some remark about achieving the political and economic revolution by any means at hand, but now the task "is to defend the basic concepts of freedom, humaneness, intellectual integrity, respect for life."

We have then on the Left, a record of defeat or at any rate of confusion and bafflement; a growing consciousness that its philosophy and strategy may require revaluation; the sounding of notes which are entirely congenial to the Christian approach to life; a greater readiness in consequence to discuss the relevance of religion to modern problems.

In Fascism, Nazism and similar movements, on the other hand, we have retreat and reaction crude and unashamed in every field. In this religion of the totalitarian State and the Fuehrer who stands in place of God there is no place for the free man, capable of and responsible for moral decisions, nor for a free Church. We shall deceive ourselves and betray our faith and our Lord if we are tempted by fear of Communist "godlessness" or the lure of temporary opportunistic concordats between churches and Fascist rulers into thinking that there can be any modus vivendi in which Fascism and Christianity can come to an understanding. Fascism, if it survives and flourishes, will relentlessly pursue any churches which retain a semblance of Christianity.

Moreover, Fascism in its various forms is a growing movement. In economic crises and in war, every modern state tends toward an absolutism which will not be able to tolerate a free Christian Church. Recall the passage in the section on The Church and War in the Oxford Conference report:

"The Church should remind its members that the principle of the unconditional supremacy of the State or nation, advanced either in time of peace or of war, is incompatible with the Church's faith in Jesus Christ as its only Lord, and is therefore unacceptable as the final word of judgment or action. . . .

"The Church, confessing its faith in redemption through Jesus Christ, sees in every man a 'brother for whom Christ died.' In time of war, as in time of peace, it should pray not only for the nation in which God has placed it, but also for the enemies of that nation. . . . It should proclaim and obey the commandment of the Lord, 'Love your enemies.'" Can any State drawn into war under modern conditions be satisfied with so qualified an enthusiasm for its victory?

The Church finds itself again, therefore, in a "world" which does not regard it with respect and toleration, which denies many of Christianity's

basic convictions and which aims to destroy it. Like the early Church it is face to face with Caesar and Caesarism.

It is natural that under the circumstances a tendency should develop in the Church, more intensely in some sections than in others, which may be briefly and very inadequately characterized as follows. (I am not qualified to write as a professional theologian and invoke the indulgence of the reader for what follows.)

1. The tendency in theology and church life to which I refer reacts against the social optimism of the preceding period.
2. It represents a transfer of interest from outer activities and social action to the inner life of the individual with God.
3. There is a renewed emphasis upon the sin and corruption of individual and society.
4. There is a centering of interest upon eternal life—the “beyond time”—as against preoccupation with any earthly concerns, including even unselfish service of one’s fellows. The kingdom of God cannot be realized on earth. “The meaning of history is beyond history.”
5. The emphasis is on transcendence as against immanence in all the dealings of God with nature, man, society, history.

This tendency seems to me to call attention to aspects of the Christian world view which had been neglected and to constitute a salutary corrective for certain elements in the creed and program of the typical Christian liberals and social gospelers of yesterday and the day before. Probably the Christian should be neither an optimist nor a pessimist, but after the facile optimism of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, a spell of pessimism may be in order. The realism about man and society emphasized by the tendency we are discussing is sound. That sin has become real, a fact to be reckoned with, can serve to deepen the religious life of our age. We need to be reminded that the Church cannot identify itself with any secular economic or political order or system, but must pass the judgment of the gospel upon it. Human self-sufficiency must be rebuked and must learn again that only God can bring in the Kingdom. We who have lived exclusively in time must understand that we live for the eternal. We whose eyes have seen only outward and earthly things must look inward again—and upward to “the Utterly Other,” the Everlasting God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the earth.

Nevertheless, when all this and more has been said that must truthfully be said, then it seems to me that it must also be said that this “neo-supernat-

uralism" or "neo-orthodoxy" which in some of its exponents sounds dangerously like a "neo-obscurantism," has also its dangers to be guarded against. Furthermore, I firmly believe that the "way out" for the Church today is not in renouncing the social gospel but in a more fervent, profound, soundly based and realistic gospel of the Kingdom.

Let me try to be a little more precise, Professor C. H. Dodd in his chapter in *The Kingdom of God and History* (vol. III of The Official Oxford Conference Books) writes: "It is through this process of judgment and redemption, death and resurrection, that history is always re-created from an inner center, that is, out of the experience of those who have 'received the kingdom of God,' and are thereby committed to the labor and conflict through which the Kingdom is revealed.

"When we pray, 'Thy Kingdom come,' we are not praying that at long last history may end with Utopia or the millennium, but that in *this* situation in which we stand the reign of God may be made manifest after the pattern of its revelation in Christ (through 'the fellowship of His sufferings and the power of His resurrection'). The future, which can bring with it nothing to supersede that revelation of the kingdom of God, is not our concern, nor is it in the future that we must seek the perfection of which the temporal order is not capable, but in that other world in which the ultimate meaning of history resides where 'our life is hid with Christ in God.' "

I am fully prepared to agree that there is a sense in which "the meaning of history is beyond history," that there is a "perfection of which the temporal order is not capable," for which we long and in which we shall share by God's grace, that we must beware of the Utopianism which identifies any given economic or political or cultural goal for which we strive with the kingdom of God. But it seems to me that such utterances as I have quoted come perilously close to falling into the danger and consequently under the condemnation which Professor Tillich has so trenchantly described in the words: "It is a logical result of their point of view that those who interpret the kingdom of God in a purely transcendental manner finally come to regard history as a meaningless occupation of man with himself, while the concept of salvation falls away altogether."

Precisely. If history is but the re-enactment for an indefinite number of times of a drama "of judgment and redemption, death and resurrection," which is "re-created"—set going again?—"from an inner center" and "the future" is quite literally "not our concern," just how is this concept to be dis-

tinguished from that concept of history as a series of cycles that return upon themselves, which is utterly foreign to the very essence of Jewish-Christian religion?

If there is a perfection of which the temporal order is not capable, is there not a perfection of which it is capable, which is its essence and goal because it is created by God who finds His works good? Where in the Scriptures or in the Catholic tradition of the Church do we find warrant for limiting the sovereignty and victory of God "in history" as well as "beyond history"? For limiting Him to "fragmentary actualization" of victory over demonic forces?

Does not the tendency which we are discussing fail to give full weight to the "historical character" of the Jewish-Christian revelation? To the Christian doctrine that God is, as Pascal cries out in that document dated Monday, November 23, in the year of grace 1654, which he wore in an amulet about his neck, "God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and savants. . . . God of Jesus Christ, my God and your God?" The God whose appearance means that slaves are to be led out of bondage by Moses and the poor are to have the gospel preached to them by Jesus of Nazareth. It was in this "history" and as a carpenter of Nazareth who lived in a given land at a given period and functioned as a historic personage that the Eternal Son of God was incarnated. "The Word became flesh." It seems to me that when we relinquish the hope that His Kingdom will come, His will be done, on earth as it is in heaven, when we do not see in the Incarnation the promise of a profound and in its own order final meaning and consummation for the historical labor of thought, of culture, of justice and brotherhood in which this "flesh," this humanity in which Christ is incarnate, is engaged, we simply place ourselves outside the Jewish-Christian tradition and faith.

If you challenge me to define in concrete terms, economic, political, cultural, what the Reign of Christ would mean, then I answer that I too must perform discourse in symbols. Of the day, the hour, the manner of the Coming knoweth no man. When the Kingdom has come, that will be The Revolution indeed. Much less than the men of the thirteenth century could imagine what a twentieth-century capitalistic civilization would be like, can we imagine what the Kingdom is like. But the concept of The Revolution, Christianity will abandon at peril to itself and humanity. Do we think His Coming can be stopped? I think that here Professor Lyman, to quote once

more from vol. III of the Official Oxford Conference Books, has come nearest to the truth: "History thus has a direction determined by the eternal values of God's nature and by His active willing toward their realization, and it has a goal in the community of love which is the body of Christ. This goal of the community of love is itself transcendent-immanent. It cannot be completely realized in history, since God and the meaning of His love transcend history, and hence it implies an eternal life which is beyond the bounds of this earthly existence. But no other limits can be placed to its realization in history. There are no concrete evils or forms of sin from which the love of God cannot redeem men through the realizing in history of a community of love."

So much for a halting and provisional attempt at theological criticism. I venture now a criticism from another angle. A very important test of any doctrine is the character of the moral decision which it demands. The present-day emphasis on transcendence, the warning against "Utopianism," etcetera, are frequently associated with certain attitudes toward the love-ethic of the Sermon on the Mount and other passages in the New Testament and in later Christian tradition, which may be very dangerous indeed. Very frequently today, for example, they are used to rationalize rejection of the pacifist implications of the gospel. If love-perfectionism is made the basis of a *claim* by individuals or groups, it can only be as a result of a very shallow judgment they pass upon themselves, and the moral result is Pharisaism. But is there any warrant in the Christian ethic for holding that individuals and society may present to themselves any *demand* except that of love? If we may condone in others or ourselves living by some other standard than that of the gospel, what is that standard? In the hands of others than the men I have quoted this line of reasoning may lead to a thoroughly reactionary position. The world "lies under sin," a man may in his personal and family life observe the commandment of love but in his public life he cannot be expected to do so, and thus in practice the claim of a political authority, which is very far from Christian, to political obedience comes to constitute the dominant factor in life. As Nils Ehrenström has well said: "Thus the relationship between the kingdom of Christ and the political sphere was regarded as a tension of static parallelism and not as a tension of dynamic transformation." How shall that "tension of dynamic transformation" be maintained, without which life relapses to the animal level, unless the impossible demand of the gospel is laid upon men? "Pray for the

peace of Babylon, your great enemy," cries King Zedekiah in Franz Werfel's novel, *Hearken Unto the Voice*. "Shall a man pray for the peace of his slayer who sets the sword to his breast?" Jeremiah replies: "I realize what I have done." Zedekiah cries: "And you do not shudder with horror at—at—the impossible?" Jeremiah bowed his head. "The Lord demands of them and of us...."

This leads to a third observation. In certain of its phases the "neosupernaturalism" is in grave danger of contributing to the defeatism and despair which is one of the gravest evils of our age. I have already referred to this defeatist mood in the Marxist movement. "Do you believe that another European war will end in a social revolution? I no longer speak or think in terms of social revolution in connection with these questions." Thus spoke recently one of the leaders of the French Socialist movement. But might not some of our discussions in the church be summed up in much the same way: "Do you believe that the kingdom of God, the Christian social revolution, is at hand? I no longer speak or think in such terms. It would reflect an inadmissible liberalism and utopianism."

The prophetic message in times of crisis such as the present has indeed always been one of judgment, of denunciation of all human self-sufficiency. But it has been equally a message about the sufficiency of God and the imminence of his appearance and Kingdom. "The Everlasting God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the earth, fainteth not, neither is weary." Too many of us are weary. The Church must recover its faith and hope in the manifestation of God for the redemption of mankind, as well as of men, if it is to be true to its heritage.

The Church which is unable to do that is utterly unable to speak to the condition of modern man. The Church today cannot even for a brief period assume the indifference to the task of civilization which the early Church may have held. This civilization of ours the Church itself helped to create. Leaving it in the lurch, consigning it to despair, will involve a conscious retreat and surrender of trust on the part of the Church. The Church of today cannot make itself believe that "the world" will "come to an end" presently anyway. We know that whatever setbacks may occur, humanity must either sink into a neo-barbarism in which brute force and animalism reign, or it must continue the task of trying to build a world-civilization, a sane economic order, a democratic and international polity, a warless world. These writers of the Left to whom I referred some moments ago dreamed of such a world. They

and multitudes of plain people have toiled mightily and made incalculable sacrifices for the realization of that dream. Whence except from the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments and from the Christian tradition did they get that dream? It was Utopian to believe that man could realize it in his own strength and that it could be realized by the world's way of the sword instead of the way of the Suffering Servant of Jehovah. But it is not the voice of the God who brought Israel "out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage" and who through Jesus proclaimed "the acceptable year of the Lord" which tells those who scan the dark horizons of our day for a sign of promise that the dream itself of the beloved community on earth is "Utopian."

We come now to our concluding question. Professor Richard Niebuhr in a very suggestive memorandum submitted to a commission preparing for the World Missionary Conference has remarked: "The social significance of Christianity's hope for and belief in redemption . . . lies in the recognition that redemption is a process for which not only individuals but also society can hope. . . . It can affirm that it is not the will of God that any nation should perish. . . ." Then he adds: "How this message can come alive, as its ultimately hopeless counterparts, the communist and nationalist messages of deliverance have come alive, is beyond my power to state."

It is the duty of each of us, however unequal we may be to the task, to pray and think how the Christian message of social redemption can "come alive" in our day, for we have to live and act and make moral decisions. In all humility I sketch therefore what seem to me to be the main lines of Christian strategy today.

1. The Church must be the Church. It is not a reform society or a revolutionary party. It must deal in religion. It must bring God to men and must mediate the redeeming love of God in Christ to them. We have to be concerned again with "inwardness," with what happens in the soul of man, with prayer. The Church will be worthless unless its inner life is thus deepened. Unless we have such a Church, our age is indeed doomed. In the last analysis the Church of the redeemed is the only true and effective redeeming agency. The trumpet must sound again "from the hid battlements of Eternity" and when we look up we must be able to say: "His name I know and what his trumpet saith."

2. The Church has a great theological labor to perform. It must be able to meet modern man on the intellectual plane. To do this it must have,

it seems to me, a positive and not a negative attitude toward science and toward all the labor of the human intellect to understand its world. Any retreat to obscurantism or to ecclesiastical authority imposed from without on the human mind, any attempt to build on a crass dualism of reason and revelation, nature and spirit, earth and heaven will prove, I am convinced, a very temporary refuge and will presently leave the Church and the world in a sorrier state than ever. We need the readiness to appropriate all that is usable in current thought and the determination to translate the everlasting gospel into the language and thought forms of the age which it seems to me characterized the Fathers of the early Church.

3. The Church must recognize that "the world"—the economic order based on materialism, acquisitiveness and strife—is not Christian. It must refuse to bless this world, to identify itself with it. It must recognize that this order is in process of disintegration. It will have to count upon that fact in its bearing upon its own income and institutional problems. But of course the important point is that it must not allow itself to be a moral and spiritual bulwark of an economic order which cannot meet Christian tests and which is unable to maintain itself.

4. As we have already indicated, the modern State, except where new spiritual forces may be introduced, is likely in critical periods, and especially in war, to become totalitarian and to demand of the Church and Christians an allegiance which they cannot give without renouncing their spiritual freedom and their allegiance to the one Lord, Jesus Christ. The Church must prepare to adjust itself, therefore, to a situation where it may again be for a time a minority spiritual fellowship faced by a hostile and persecuting State.

5. The one possibility of escape from this fate and of achieving something like a "Christian revolution" in our day is for the Church, or decisive sections thereof, in Western countries, completely to withdraw all support from war and the war system. This is the positive strategy for making the social redemption which Christianity offers to mankind "come alive" in our day.

To quote Oxford on the differences of opinion as to the Christian attitude toward war, the Church "cannot rest in permanent acquiescence in the continuance" of these differences. "The Church must insist that the perplexity itself is a sign of the sin in which its members are implicated." I see no escape for the Church from the conclusion that war is "sin, being a denial of the nature of God as love, of the redemptive way of the Cross, and of the

community of the Holy Spirit" and that "the Church will become a creative, regenerative, and reconciling instrument for the healing of the nations only as it renounces war absolutely."

All the great Christian nations are so deeply involved in the armament race and in the attempt to perpetuate or to advance imperialist interests, that the Christian people of each nation can only say to their own government: "Take first the beam out of thine own eye." We are no longer offered the possibility of small military establishments and relatively moderate wars. Everywhere the policy is to arm to the teeth and war under modern conditions is necessarily a hideous atrocity.

In dealing with the general problem of the social order we must choose —either some form of Fascism which means enslavement of the human spirit and war; or the ultimately hopeless attempt to achieve a better social order by violence, dictatorship, repression—and we may as well face that fact that in the modern world there is no such thing as a benevolent dictatorship, or a gentlemanly Cheka, any more than there is a nice little war. The only other possibility is that the Church show the way to bringing in a better order by the way of the Cross. And if the Church cannot provide an alternative to unlimited violence, what relevance has it to the modern situation?

But the only way practically to implement the way of the Cross is by complete withdrawal of support from the war method, war preparations, war itself. If that were done on a sufficiently large scale in any country, that nation would immediately be compelled to consent to changes in the imperialist status quo, the only way in which international tension can really be eased. Within that nation the greatest single obstacle to desired social changes would be removed: the money for armament comes out of the social services, houses cannot be built because battleships come first, war brings regimentation and indefinitely sets back all liberal and progressive causes. It seems to me very significant that though he rejects what he calls pacifism of the "absolutist" type, Emil Brunner of Zurich agrees that war "has lost every particle of ethical justification" and that if a nation were to disarm such action "would not be a sign of political folly but of political wisdom."

To undermine the military machine of an imperialist nation and render it incapable of resorting to war would undoubtedly have revolutionary effects, but a revolution so achieved would not begin with a new dictatorship, revolutionary tribunal and army, with "impure means" bound to thwart and corrupt its end. This would be a moral, a "Christian" revolution.

Can we, dare we, kneel before "the Lamb that is in the midst of the Throne" and say that this cannot be? Let me quote Professor Tillich once more: "We must ask, whether a people or a group which originally is not the Church, could renounce power by a common decision and thus become the Church. This possibility is not to be rejected fundamentally. But such a decision must not come into existence with the help of the state power. A people can become the Church only if in an unexpected historical moment it is seized as a whole by the transcendental idea and for its sake renounces power. Such an event would be one of the great turning points of human history; it would perhaps create 'mankind.' "

6. To this end we must, finally, toil and pray without ceasing for the extension and the intensification of that ecumenical movement of which Oxford, for example, was a symbol. Let the Church, in this sense, be the Church, a fellowship which does not recognize bounds of nation, race, or class, united not by man's inspiration but by the love of God. Let such a Church in all lands, in peace and in war, lift hands of prayer to "the One God, the Father, from whom all comes and for whom we exist and to the One Lord, Jesus Christ," and of us and of our age it may yet be said: "These are they that have come out of the great tribulation. . . . The Lamb that is in the midst of the Throne shall guide them unto fountains of the waters of life."

Hungarian Protestantism

HENRY SLOANE COFFIN

THE Hungarian nation has just been celebrating the nine hundredth anniversary of the introduction of Christianity among its people under its king, later canonized as Saint Stephen. While the Roman Catholic Church has naturally made much of the event, and has celebrated it by holding a colorful pageant in Budapest last summer, Protestants, and particularly English-speaking Protestants, are largely ignorant of the contribution of the churches which were the outcome of the Reformation among the Magyars.

Luther's early attacks upon the abuses of the Medieval Church found a swift echo in Buda, where the court preacher, Cordatus, with the favor of the young Queen Mary, began to preach the principles of the Reformation. The papal nuncio compelled his dismissal, and he fled to Wittenberg. Stern measures against adherents of the new doctrines were at once taken. There were burnings of proscribed books and drastic punishments for those who circulated them.

Then came the fateful battle of Mohacs in 1526, when King Louis the Second and the flower of Hungary's military forces were decisively beaten by the Turks, and the nation lay prostrate. A sobered people were turned to religion and made to reflect on what their Christian religion really was in the face of this threat from conquering representatives of an opposing faith. Proponents of Protestant Christianity sprang up in many places throughout the land. Some of them were nobles who became protectors and benefactors of the preachers and adherents of the newly recovered Gospel. In perhaps no other country were the gentry so immediately responsive to the Reformation and so valiant on its behalf. Others were monks and priests who threw off their ecclesiastical obedience to be propagandists of the evangelical faith, organizers and pastors of its congregations, teachers in schools, and authors of a new religious literature.

Among these Matthias Biró, usually called Dévay from his birthplace in Dévay in Transylvania, is hailed as the pioneer Hungarian reformer. A zealous monk, educated at the University of Cracow, he espoused the recovered Gospel, went to Wittenberg for further study, and returned to preach

at Buda. He had a harassed career, was repeatedly imprisoned and interrogated by ecclesiastical authorities, was several times in danger of execution and constantly harried from place to place. He was a persuasive preacher, and a careful thinker who phrased the evangelical doctrine in fifty-two articles, and later set forth the Reformed faith in the first book ever printed in the Hungarian language. At first a pupil and close friend of Luther and Melanchthon, he later became an adherent of the Swiss Reformation, and prepared the way for the dominant influence of Calvin in Hungarian Protestantism.

A second was Michael Sztárai, who had a versatile pen. He translated the Psalms into vernacular verse and, like Luther, started the Reformed faith singing its way into the hearts of plain folk. He also resembled the great German Reformer in character; he was impetuous and aggressive, a fiery preacher, who kindled enthusiastic devotion to his cause. As a writer, he broke a fresh path in the production of plays, which held up to ridicule ecclesiastical abuses and made vivid to audiences, few of whom could read, the Christian life according to Lutheran standards.

A third was Stephen Kiss, learned professor, minister and author, sometimes spoken of as the Melanchthon of the Hungarian Reformation. He was a rare combination of profound scholarship and practical ability. He organized many congregations, governed them with the talent of a skillful administrator, and wrote theological treatises which went through several editions, were read in other lands as well as his own, and continued to exercise an influence for years after his death.

A fourth is Peter Tuhasz, commonly known by the Greek equivalent of his name—Melius. Scholar and eloquent preacher, he had a statesman's talent for organization, and devised the unusual system by which the Hungarian Protestant Churches are governed, with bishops elected for life, assuring a centralized leadership and providing a single official representative for the Church in the chief centers of population. This genuinely primitive episcopate, so similar to that of the early Church, had the approval of the leaders at Geneva, and has never separated the Reformed Church of Hungary from her sister Presbyterian Churches. At this time when there are tentative advances toward reunion of Anglican and Presbyterian Churches, it is interesting to remember that one Presbyterian Church has possessed this episcopate for three and a half centuries.

During the formative period of the Reformation in Hungary the politi-

cal control of the various sections of the nation shifted with kaleidoscopic swiftness. These changes produced conditions less or more favorable to the Protestant groups, and lifted into prominence certain outstanding laymen in official positions. The chief opponent of the Reformation, Archbishop Pázmány, is credited with the taunt that, while the Church of Rome rests upon one Peter, the Hungarian Protestant Church rested on two—Peter Perényi and Peter Petrovics, potent noblemen who played large rôles in public affairs, and were willing to suffer, as well as to labor and struggle, for their convictions.

To Perényi, the pre-eminent figure in the mid-century in Transylvania, is attributed the inspiration and passage of a notable law at the Diet of Torda in 1557, which decreed freedom of conscience and attempted to forbid disputants to show disrespect or employ violence toward those with whom they differed. Parenthetically one may suggest that this prohibition against dis honoring the opinions of others must have been about the most difficult Prohibition Act to enforce; but the law towers aloft in the middle of the sixteenth century as the first act for religious liberty in Europe, and one of the chief glories of Hungarian Protestantism.

Peter Petrovics is remembered as the protector of the reformers Radán and especially Kálmañeschi, under whom, with the steadfast assistance of Lord Török, Debreczin, the foremost city of the Hungarian Lowland, became the citadel of the Reformed faith, as it remains today one of its chief centers. Kálmañeschi was an erudite Humanist, who heartily embraced the views of Calvin on Church doctrine and discipline. He was the great Hungarian Puritan, and made that interpretation of Christianity so prevalent throughout the land that it became spoken of as "the Hungarian religion," in contrast with both Roman Catholicism, which remained dominant in Austria, and Lutheranism, which continued to hold sway among the Saxons of Transylvania. The rapidity with which the Calvinistic faith swept over the Magyar people in the middle decades of the sixteenth century made it a truly national movement. It did much to create a new sense of Magyar solidarity. It organized the first national school system. We lack accurate figures, but there is copious evidence that the Reformed faith had at that time the loyal allegiance of the majority of the population of Magyar stock.

Then followed in Hungary that inward conflict which was disastrous to the Reformation in many lands. A bitter controversy broke out between Lutherans and Calvinists, which divided the Protestant forces, took the

energies of their leaders from their proper tasks of propagating the Gospel and building up the Church, and wasted them in constant, and, to the modern mind, unprofitable and relatively unimportant, disputations. It was suicidal to separate the so recently organized churches. To add to the confusion an anti-trinitarian movement began, headed in the first instance by an Italian physician at the court, Blandrata, but subsequently espoused and carried on by ministers who had been among the most effective leaders of the Reformed Church, notably Francis David. This Unitarian group gained a number of adherents, particularly about the court and among the nobles and intelligentsia. It evoked several vigorous defenses of the evangelical faith from stalwart leaders of the Reformed Church, whose protagonists were Professor Károlyi and Bishop Melius. But the breach became a permanent one, like that between Lutheran and Calvinist, and to this day the Protestant population of Hungary is divided into three camps—the Reformed Church, heir of the Calvinistic Reformation, the Lutheran Church, and a small but vital Unitarian Church in Transylvania.

The Protestants were not long left to indulge in the luxury of fraternal debate. The Counter Reformation got under way and the Jesuit Order became its spear-head. Political power passed into the hands of zealous proponents of Roman Catholicism and very able men became leaders in that Church in Hungary. Laws for religious liberty were repealed or disregarded; fines, imprisonment, exile, were meted out to ministers and other leaders of the Protestant Churches. The princes of that epoch held a totalitarian theory of the State, and it seemed to them impossible to tolerate differences in so vital a concern as religious belief. In the clash of what we should today call conflicting ideologies wars broke out—the fierce wars of religion. On the part of the Protestants, who were either the minority or the outlawed group, they were wars for religious freedom.

In the first of these civil strifes, Stephen Boskay was the Protestant champion, and his position is expressed in his saying: "The liberty of our faith, conscience and old laws is to be prized above gold." Under him the reaction was halted for a decade or longer; but after his death the persecution broke out with fresh vigor. The pontiff of that epoch is said to have remarked, in sending a cardinal's hat to a vigorous leader of his forces: "Better that Hungary perish than to have religious liberty." Nor was tolerance all on one side, for whenever the Protestants possessed the power they insisted upon the banishment of the Jesuit Order.

Desperately pressed, the Protestants invoked the leadership of Gabriel Bethlen, prince of Transylvania, and a second war was begun, with the slogan, "With and for God in a free nation." Bethlen stands out, not only as a skillful military commander, whom the nation elected king of Hungary, because of his prowess; but as a tolerant and intelligent ruler. He was himself a devout adherent of the Reformed faith, and is said to have read through the Bible twenty-six times. In his territory, along with the members of the Reformed Church, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Unitarians, Anabaptists and the Jews were guaranteed in their religious liberties, and he respected the missionary and literary zeal of the Jesuit Fathers—a quite extraordinary breadth for the early decades of the seventeenth century. Unhappily he died before he was fifty, and it is reported of him, as evidence of his devoutness, that when he could no longer speak, he wrote down and handed to those at his bedside the words of Saint Paul: "If God be for us, who can be against us?" and answered the apostle's question: "Nobody; certainly nobody."

But with Bethlen out of the way the Counter Reformation began its work anew with even greater severity and thoroughness, and once more the Protestants of Hungary appealed to the reigning prince of Transylvania, George Rákóczy the First. He proved a worthy successor to Bethlen, in ideals, in devoutness and in military and administrative talent. By 1645 a peace was reached, which declared among other things that everyone was free to follow his convictions in religion without hindrance, so that Protestants as well as Roman Catholics might have church buildings with bells and might set aside cemeteries for their own dead; that peasants were not to be coerced by their lords in matters of faith, and that Protestant ministers were not to be banished. Under him Hungarian Protestantism, tried in the ordeal of persecution, reached the apex of its political power. The translation of the Bible, in which various of the earlier reformers had had a part, and which in its entirety was published by Professor Károlyi in 1590, was revised and printed in an edition of ten thousand copies. It was an important period in the development of the Magyar language and literature.

With the death of the first Rákóczy, Protestantism lost its political power and has never really regained it. The House of Hapsburg became the dominant force and the Magyars were increasingly under the sway of Austria. A terrible epoch for Hungarian Protestants set in and came to its cruel culmination in the last three decades of the seventeenth century. Few churches in Christendom have endured a more rigorous attempt to crush them out of

existence. The customary procedure was to accuse the pastors and teachers of a conspiracy against the government. They would be cited before the courts, and offered the alternatives of exile, the abandonment of their faith, or death. How widely the net was spread appears when in 1674 seven hundred clergymen at one time were arrested and the sentence of death passed upon them, with the only chance of escape being recantation or voluntary exile, which meant their giving up those over whom they had been placed as pastors. To the glory of the Hungarian character few indeed recanted.

The tragic element in this story can be made plain by the fate of ninety-four ministers and teachers who appeared before the court of Pozsony. When they refused to sign a recantation of their faith or an abandonment of their people, they were imprisoned in six forts, fed on dry bread, given rotten straw for beds, and subjected to many indignities for eight consecutive months. Three died, three escaped, twenty-one broke under the strain and accepted exile, and sixty-two remained steadfast. After another year of harsh imprisonment, forty-two of them were started on foot, under guard, the long *via dolorosa* to Naples to be sold as galley-slaves. These were men of scholarship and culture, many of them elderly, and only thirty prisoners reached Naples alive. There they were sold, and chained two by two they were placed on the benches of the galleys. Six succumbed and died. The plight of these slaves wrung the hearts of Protestants everywhere, and after much diplomatic intervention, the Dutch Admiral Ruyter reached Naples and was allowed to take the survivors on his vessel.

Other batches of prisoners underwent similar experiences. For twenty years a systematic effort went on to deprive the Reformed Churches of Hungary of their leaders. That the Church survived at all is proof of the heroic fidelity of its rank and file, and high testimony to the courage and endurance and faith in God of which the Magyar soul is capable. Who knows how much the previous centuries of Christian training, as well as the recovered Gospel of the Reformation had contributed to the spiritual development of a devout section in the nation and made possible its victorious encounter with such a fiery trial of its devotion to God?

The grim decades gave place at the opening of the eighteenth century to a brief interval of hope. There was an outburst of Hungarian nationalism under the Roman Catholic Francis Rákóczy the Second, who was elected "prince of the Hungarians confederating for the liberty of the country." He took an oath that he would recognize the three Churches, Roman Catholic,

Reformed and Lutheran, and maintain all three. An agreement was made that the church building in any village should be the possession of the congregation which had the majority of the inhabitants. A medal was coined on which three figures were depicted lighting fire upon an altar—symbol of religious harmony fanned by the spirit of freedom.

But an attempt to throw off the yoke of the Hapsburgs failed, the power of Rákóczi waned, and for seventy years, which one Protestant writer calls “the Babylonish captivity,” Protestants were subjected to hampering disabilities under the Austrian monarchs Charles the Third and Maria Theresa. No man could take public office without an oath to the Virgin and the Saints, so debarring Protestants from public affairs. Pastors were severely restrained in their activities. Protestants were reduced to an inferior civil status. Their churches under such conditions could not flourish; but they kept on with an admirable persistence.

With the Age of the Enlightenment some of the disabilities were removed or relaxed, and the evangelical churches were recognized as having a constitutional right to exist. The nineteenth century witnessed the spread of liberal thought, and in the middle of the century Roman Catholic laymen as well as Protestant leaders united in enacting a statute guaranteeing religious freedom and equality.

Almost immediately the struggle for Hungarian Independence under the leadership of Louis Kossuth, a Lutheran, broke out. Its failure brought repressive measures on the part of Austria. Under the Emperor Francis Joseph, Protestant autonomy was threatened, and the government attempted to interfere in the synods of the Reformed Church. At Debreczin we hear the voice of primitive Christianity in the utterance of a fearless pastor: “The Austrian dynasty has not received any right from God or from men by which it may intermeddle in the government of the Reformed Church.” In 1860, when a royal commissioner tried to close a meeting of the synod, Count Tisza, later premier, a true successor of the nobles who so courageously espoused the Reformation, replied to him on behalf of the Church: “Above all we owe obedience to the King of kings, therefore we cannot dissolve without abandoning our conviction.” A Roman Catholic aristocrat, Baron Antony Baldacsy, was so impressed with the stand of the Protestant Churches for freedom, and their contribution to the cultural life of the nation, that at his death he left them his entire estate, becoming their largest benefactor, second only to the Transylvanian princes of the seventeenth century.

The present majority of the Hungarian people is Roman Catholic, but this other third of the nation, within and without the present boundaries of the Hungarian State, whose heritage from Saint Stephen comes through the tradition of the Reformation, needs to be remembered. Happily the relations between the Lutheran and the Reformed groups are cordial and co-operative. This Protestant section of the Church of Christ in Hungary has not only pages of heroic history to offer to the world-wide Church of today and tomorrow, but a living contribution in faithful congregations, in schools and colleges with enviable scholarly standards, in an able and learned ministry, and in several millions of men and women loyal to the Gospel and with a fineness and force of conscience worthy of their noble spiritual ancestry.

The Clergyman in the Sickroom

RUSSELL L. DICKS

THE clergyman's first principle in work with the sick is the same as that of the physician: to do no harm. If he can enter the sickroom and leave it without doing harm there is more than an outside chance that he may do some good. Some clergymen are surprised and shocked at the suggestion that they might hurt a sick person by calling upon him. "The idea!" they say; their whole purpose is to be of help, why else would they go to the sickroom? Not for an instant do I doubt their good will, any more than I doubt the good will of many physicians and nurses whose trails I have crossed in the sickroom, whose ministrations were crude, thoughtless, and inconsiderate. As to what actual physical harm is done by outraging a sensitive mind I do not know, but it is generally conceded by medical men that a patient should be happy and emotionally at ease if health is to be recovered in the shortest possible time. Anything done in the sickroom that disturbs the poise of the patient and causes him annoyance and emotional discomfort, may be called harm.

The principle of *do no harm* of the clergyman, physician, and nurse, is based upon the belief and observation that in a great majority of instances, if those who enter the sickroom can avoid doing harm, and can keep the patient from harming himself unintentionally through activity and needless worry, then he will get well. In other words, there are forces at work for the recovery of the patient which the physician calls *nature*; the practice of medicine is the aiding of nature. The clergyman calls these forces *God*. The wise clergyman, like the wise physician, knows that God is already at work in the sickroom before he arrives, but he also knows that God works through human knowledge, effort, hands, good will, and prayer.

The clergyman's purpose in the sickroom is the same as the physician's, in that he is there to aid God in His work in behalf of the sufferer, but his point of emphasis is somewhat different, just as his training and methods are different. The physician's purpose is to aid his patient's recovery of health; the clergyman likewise is interested in the recovery of health and he does all that he can to aid that recovery incidentally, because he also believes it is God's will that man shall live to a ripe old age. But his main interest is in the spiritual growth of the patient, and he believes that that growth

neither depends upon nor is limited to the physical health and condition of the patient; hence his ministry to the dying. A physician said to his young assistant, when he reported a successful night-long struggle with an aged patient who had been at the point of death, "Well, you saved his life. What of it?" That physician had stepped beyond the role of doctor of the body to become doctor of the soul. He questioned the value of mere physical existence. The clergyman does that continually; he is saved from pessimism in view of the sordid limits of much living only through the undying hope which rests within him. He has seen the eternal patience of God at work, just as has the physician standing beside a body which has been corrupted and abused to the detriment of itself and human society, a body struggling to regain health, a mind struggling to regain consciousness—why? Surely God is in this place, surely it is God's will that man shall return to health even after he has been at the point of death.

Actually, it is difficult to say just what the clergyman will do in the sickroom, for each person is an individual and each must be treated as such. This is less true of the Catholic clergy who work with a formula and whose people know what to expect when the priest comes to the sickroom, but even the priest sometimes goes beyond his formula.

The clergyman calls upon three general groups of persons when they are sick and his method varies considerably from one to the other; first, those who send for him as a clergyman; second, his own parishioners; third, those who have neither asked for a clergyman nor are his own parishioners.

Those patients who ask for a clergyman when they are ill are acutely aware of their religious needs and in that awareness and through the objective act of requesting a clergyman are well on the way toward doing something about it. Many more would make such a request were it not for *human pride*.

Protestant patients who ask for a clergyman are usually under the stress of physical pain, fear, loneliness, a feeling of guilt; or it may be they are concerned about their families. I received a call from one young man who had become acutely ill while on a holiday. He was suffering severe pain when I saw him. He said, "I'm a long ways from home, pretty sick, thought I'd like to see a minister. Say a prayer for me and help my fiancee and mother any way you can." That boy was more articulate than most are, he wasn't afraid, his religion meant something to him and he wanted the comfort which it could give. One evening the request of a woman patient for a clergyman was passed on to me. When I arrived in her room she said, "I'm having a

serious operation in the morning. My courage is pretty low. I want you to say a prayer for me." Another day I was calling upon one patient when a man in the next room discovered a clergyman was there and requested that I stop to see him. After some difficulty in starting he told me his story and how he was worried by some of the things he had been doing. In the end he made what was equal to a confession.

Patients who are under stress and who ask for a clergyman usually have something on their minds. They may not make a confession, being untrained in articulating their sins and limitations, yet they often struggle to do so. They do want reassurance, the nearest a Protestant gets to receiving absolution, and they want a prayer said for them, which is the Protestant blessing.

The clergyman who calls upon his own parishioners when they are ill faces both a difficult and an easy task. It is easy in that he knows his people, their interests, habits, families, friends, jobs, likes and dislikes, and something of their temperaments. And they know him. He can enter their sickrooms without disturbing them and without necessitating their emotional adjustment to a stranger. His task is difficult for several reasons. (1) He knows *too many* things and people in common with the patient. Both patient and minister find too many odds and ends of topics for conversation. It is too easy for the patient to avoid talking about the things he would, deep within him, like to talk about. (2) He has listened to the minister preach, listened to the ideas toward which the minister strives and toward which he would have his people strive. In illness the sufferer knows all too well how far he has missed the ideal of which his minister has spoken. This prevents him from speaking frankly. (3) The patient has sat in the pew and watched the minister in the pulpit, high and lifted up. To have the clergyman call upon him is to be flattered; he desires that the minister shall think well of him, and to continue in the minister's good will. He fears that if he speaks of himself as he is he will lose that good will, so he does not speak. (4) The patient may be afraid his minister will not hold his confidence in secret. So he turns to his physician for spiritual guidance—a task which many physicians prefer to avoid, for medical schools as yet have not included preparation for that task in their curriculums. The total result is that the average clergyman who calls upon his own parishioners when they are sick works blindly, held at arm's length, by his own ability as a conversationalist, the patient's regard, flattery, and distrust of him. He is looked upon as a visitor, he acts like a visitor, and is a visitor. *To visit* in the sickroom is not the main task of the clergyman.

For the past five years I have been calling upon patients in general hospitals who did not send for me and to whom I had no introduction except as I introduced myself. Approximately fifty per cent of the patients in the average general hospital have no active church connection, although almost all have had at some time or another. My reception was essentially the same by those who were not church members and by those who were. The religious needs do not vary greatly between members and non-members, but the latter are often more difficult to get at. Religion and religious training should by rights prepare people to handle personal crises, such as illness and death. In many instances it does, in many it does not. Just why it succeeds with some and fails with others, if it is religious training that makes the difference, I am unprepared to say.

The method I follow in work with persons I do not know and who have given no indication of wanting a clergyman to call is quite simple. I introduce myself by giving my name, say that I am a minister and add some such comment as, "I heard you were a newcomer in the hospital so thought I'd drop by and say 'hello.'" From then on it is the patient's interview. I have explained who I am and removed any thought that I am there because someone thought the patient was seriously ill, and what is more, attention is centered upon the patient as a point of interest rather than upon myself. If we are both alert, which is important, and if the patient's stress is acute and near the surface, we quickly arrive at it. If it is not acute and not near the surface, it may take a long time to come to it, and then we may pass over it without my recognizing it. Because I am there of my own accord and not at the patient's or the physician's request I dare not probe. I have no right to be other than an interested and passive passer-by unless I see an acute need *and* desire on the part of the patient that I be otherwise. In a sense I have no right to be there at all, but through the experience of having been a patient myself, the knowledge of how inarticulate people are in regard to their religious needs, and by the decree of my ordination as a follower of One who went to the sick, then I *must* go to the sickroom. But even as Jesus waited and was limited by the faith of those He went to, so is the clergyman limited.

What happens under such circumstances? Sooner or later, many things. Patients make confessions, seek reassurance, ask for prayer, request things to read, idle time is passed, good will toward self, fellow man, and God is gained, general well being is enhanced.

Tennant's Critique of Religious Experience

PETER A. BERTOCCI

THIS essay attempts no original contribution to the philosophy of religion. Its purpose will be realized if it can free from misunderstanding one of the keenest critiques of the evidential value of religious experience—a critique never more needed than in the present day when the primacy of feeling is again being advocated in many quarters. Indeed, seldom in contemporary theological literature does one find more cautious theoretical procedure, more painstaking and acute delineation of the problems involved in religious belief, and more pregnant insights, free from dogmatism and irrelevance, than in the work of F. R. Tennant. It is, therefore, all the more desirable to lift his critique of religious experience into such relief that this aspect of his work may be subjected to a more understanding evaluation both by exponents and critics of Tennant's views.

For one cannot escape the conclusion, after oral discussion and an examination of the literature, that, in his critique of religious experience, Tennant is often misinterpreted even by his admirers.¹ It is Tennant's conclusions from his examination of the evidential value of religious experience which have disappointed many, who, jubilant at Tennant's vindication of the reasonableness of theism, and confident in the strength of the positive teleological argument which he constructed to support theism, have been not a little puzzled and even ruffled by his refusal to admit that religious experience is a primary source of evidence for the existence of God. In the excitement, few seem to have pursued a careful study of what Tennant did allow concerning religious experience. Instead, his critique of religious experience has been torn from the context of his total philosophy and represented as completely hostile to any of the values of that experience.² A painstaking study might have revealed, however, that Tennant has not denied that there is *rapport*

¹ For this reason, this exposition has been submitted to Tennant himself and is fortunate to have obtained his approval as a statement of his convictions.

² Even as understanding a critic as G. F. Thomas, for example, implies that Tennant draws the "extreme conclusion" that "religious experience is of no value in establishing religious knowledge." *The Nature of Religious Experience, Essays in honor of D. C. Macintosh*. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1937, pp. 50, 51.

between God and man in religious experience, but rather found it necessary to inquire wherein lay its value for *philosophy*, for an intelligible and coherent understanding of the world, and for the description of God. There are few people who can love and yet criticize the implications of their love with a view to understanding exactly what love as such contributes to their experience; there seem to be correspondingly few who, having had the religious experience of love and commitment to God, can test the *cognitive value* of the experience *per se*.

Hence, it is necessary to indicate at the outset, even before reviewing Tennant's actual analysis, that Tennant is challenging *conclusions* which he believes have been drawn too hastily from religious experience by the mystics, on the one hand, and by such thinkers as Schleiermacher, Rudolf Otto, and John Oman. His main interest has been to propose issues which his opponents must meet if they would fairly insist that religious experience in and of itself gives *knowledge* of God's existence and nature. He does not deny the value of religious experience from the viewpoint of emotional conviction and inspiration; nor does he assert categorically that *no knowledge* about God can be derived from it. But he is concerned to point out, with the ultimate view of founding theism upon unimpeachable evidence, that conclusions drawn from religious experience frequently overlook the epistemological importance of the fact that such experience is interpretative.³ In other words, Tennant has never denied that religious experience may be communion with God (how strange that would be in a man who had spent his early years as a pastor in intimate contact with the problems of his flock!); but he has criticized a certain view of it eventuating in a specific type of theology.

A. The view Tennant opposes maintains that there can be a science of theology, as self-contained as any other science, whose independence derives from the fact that a unique datum is given in religious experience which is irreducible to any of the data provided by the other sciences. This datum is an ultimate as sense-impression and reveals in immediate experience a supersensible, spiritual environment. Such a position has, for instance, been quite recently presented by H. H. Farmer in *The World and God* and reviewed by Tennant.⁴ According to Mr. Farmer, religious experience involves direct, noninferential apprehension, "living awareness" of a personal

³ As Dean A. C. Knudson has so well said, "All experience is interpreted experience. . . . Interpretation inheres in the very nature of religious experience, as it does in a different way in that of articulate experience in general." *The Validity of Religious Experience*. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1937, p. 28.

⁴ *Mind*, Vol. 45, 1936, pp. 241-246.

reality, distinct from ideal objects or abstract validities. If such a contention can be rendered a reasonable probability, it does indeed serve to give theology a place apart, relatively indifferent to the discoveries made in other sciences, and confident of the reality revealed by its systematized data.

In striking contrast Tennant indicates his own position: "I have represented that the unique data, so-called, of religious experience are not the pure data, for which they have been taken—that is, are not pure in the qualified sense in which data that are *recepta* ever can be pure—but are data overlaid with explicated, interpretative ideas."⁵ The presence of these interpretative ideas is minimized or camouflaged by applying the word "immediate" or referring to the intuitional "flash" seemingly present in religious experience. Tennant insists that those accepting Farmer's views should realize that a "living awareness" may well be an outcome of a "synthesis issuing in synopsis, or involuntary fusion of 'awareness' in a sort of intuitional flash." "There is no doubt that immediacy, in the temporal sense of rapidity of intake, attaches to such intuition; but that, of course, does not guarantee the truth of the synoptic judgment, since it may rest on faulty presuppositions or be a synthesis of unverified or erroneous opinions."⁶ Nor does Tennant deny that such immediacy frequently carries with it a deep conviction as to the reality of the objective content of that experience. But he does demand that we take account of the distinction between the two kinds of certainty, namely, a state of mind—personal convincedness, which may have important consequences—and an objective characteristic of some propositions, which alone is relevant to the question of validity. "Convincedness, however, is a matter of personal biography," says Tennant, "while philosophies are concerned with public truth; and sanguine convincedness as to *credenda* is compatible—as in the case of Bishop Butler—with recognition that, in respect of logical grounding, they are but probable."⁷

Tennant's first word of caution, therefore, is a reminder that the theologian keep distinct the psychological motivation-value of an experience and its epistemological status. A similar related caution will occupy us later, but this fallacy of *specious immediacy*,⁸ as it might be called, cannot be over-emphasized in view of the common disregard of it in recent religious thought. The self-evidence of such religious intuition, the genetic and analytic psy-

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

⁸ Tennant, *Philosophy of the Sciences*. Cambridge: University Press, 1932, p. 174.

chologist reminds us, is due to a confusion of psychological and epistemological immediacy. The latter is a characteristic of very few types of cognition, and guarantees indubitableness, while propositions having the former kind of immediacy are always doubtful, since any interpretation of the psychologically immediate datum may be incorrect. How frequently we find that the meaning of the emotional expression on a friend's face, which we are sure we *read off* in immediate comprehension, is a misinterpretation and therefore a meaning which we found in his facial expression only because we had surreptitiously put it there! Such "immediate" knowledge is not immediate, but unconsciously mediated, interpreted, according to the apperceptive mass of the individual and the psychological set of the moment. That which seems to be self-evident has the self-evidence of the habitual and familiar, not of the immediately (epistemological and cognitive) given. To this extent, therefore, Tennant cannot be gainsaid. The "immediacy" of religious experience is no guarantee of its truth.

B. But the crux of the problem lies in the question as to whether there is present in religious experience a datum, unique and irreducible, the immediate cognition of which reveals the nature of God. Tennant is quite ready to grant that there is no *a priori* impossibility of this, but, once more, he demands a careful consideration of this contention. His own examination leaves him skeptical about maintaining that in religious experience, which is effect, there is a special *cognition* of a (noumenal) cause which renders the experience possible. Though recognizing the peculiarity of the *response*, Tennant, nevertheless, is doubtful about concluding that a similar peculiarity exists on the stimulus (cause) side. For, to say the least, one must distinguish between the religious valuation made by the experient and the metaphysical cause which supposedly evoked that valuation. In other words, from numinous or religious valuation we must not, nay, we cannot, infer as hastily as has been done, (a) that there is a numen, or religious object proper, and (b) that we have acquaintance-knowledge of it similar to that which we indubitably possess in sensory experience. So far, it seems, Tennant is again methodologically correct, for, given a certain effect, the nature of the cause is a subject for investigation.

And Tennant's caution is all the more warranted after an examination of the so-called religious datum. This object is certainly unlike the sensory object, for it has no specific quality. A sense-datum, such as blue, is irreducible, but what religious object is analogously irreducible in its specificity?

At this point Tennant's reader must pause and recall that, as a result of previous psychological analysis, Tennant had concluded that the primary data of the profane sciences are sensory perceptions, that "our percepts and their simpler relations are the sources of our ideas and universals, at least in the sense of being the occasions of our obtaining them." Hence, when one realizes that for Tennant "sense-givenness is the sole original certificate of actuality,"⁹ that for him even value is due not to the perception of a value-object but to feelings evoked by sensory and ideal data, he sees the theoretical basis for Tennant's skepticism about a specifically religious datum, and for his conclusion that "theology must be an outgrowth from ordinary knowledge of the world and man."¹⁰ But to imply, as some have done, that these logically prior conclusions are the basis for Tennant's blindness to or "dismissal" of unique religious knowledge is to overlook his lengthy examination of the proposals of his opponents. If some theologians are to set out from data equally objective and immediate, though of different species from the sensory, and equally provident of fresh knowledge-contact with the ontal, then it is for them to point out some specific and indubitable quality of a sensory or nonsensory nature.¹¹ But, as Tennant finds, some such unique quality is not forthcoming, because the numinous object is "characterized only by its agency, which is not an object of immediate apprehension, in causing or evoking a specific kind of valuation or subjective attitude."¹² If then God is present in religious experience, His presence is not "directly apprehended" but is inferred, as is any metaphysical (as opposed to phenomenal) being, or transcendent cause; and consequently His presence is not necessarily to be inferred, unless it can be shown that the subjective response cannot be caused or evoked by any other type of stimulus, imaginary or real. If the religious response has some common, unique factor in it, incapable of being reduced to the imaginal or any other source in human experience, then there would be grounds for supposing that this unique factor is evoked by a source of which the religious experience is an index (in the same way as the experience of blue is an index of the kind of thing the physical world can produce in a human being). How much could be ascribed on the basis of this factor alone to the independent

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

¹¹ To say as Thomas does, that it is obvious that experience of God can "never take the form of apprehension of a specific quale such as a color, for God is not a sensible quale nor indeed a quale of any kind" (*The Nature of Religious Experience*, p. 51), is to overlook what seems to be the necessary condition of all immediate cognition of the existent, as distinct from the subsistent or relational.

¹² Tennant, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

causal Being would, however, be still a question. Nor let it be forgotten, as Tennant observes further, that, if God *were* an object of direct acquaintance, there should be no error in the cognition of deity and no basis for the variety of religious opinion which has been characteristic of religious progress.

It is, in fact, his very search for this common factor or unique datum that Tennant is forced to pronounce fruitless. As he says, "It would seem that the numinous object, constitutive of religious experience, throughout its many stages of refinement, cannot be a quasi-perceptual datum, of the same order of underivedness as the sensory. Its vagueness and lack of quality, in virtue of which it can figure . . . in all kinds of religious experience, mystical or normal, bespeak its identity with the generic image or with the concept reached by abstraction or idealization, rather than its affinity with objects of firsthand apprehension or acquaintance."¹³ Again, "the numinous Real is indeterminate enough to enter equally well into a multitude of diverse mythologies and religions: . . . its abstractness, qualitylessness, commonness to a variety of phenomena, etcetera, render precarious and apparently groundless, the assertion that it is apprehended in the concrete and with immediacy."¹⁴

In all this, then, Tennant's attitude will be seen as less than dogmatic denial of religious experience; it is rather the hunger of a critical spirit for real knowledge. What is it, exactly, in religious experience which gives such knowledge? To say, with Thomas, that "prophets and poets are right in believing that intuition gives us an initial, if not a complete and infallible insight into moral and spiritual reality,"¹⁵ and that this "creative" intuition reveals "insights" which "can never be completely stated in philosophical terms,"¹⁶ and yet not indicate what that common element is in the psychological object of the intuition, is to turn Tennant down without an answer. For the objection still persists that such speech refers only to something indeterminate and abstract though fused with a highly emotional experience. To go on and add that "faith springs from need for a higher life," . . . "from an intuition of the existence of a spiritual nature struggling to realize itself

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

¹⁴ *Philosophical Theology*, Vol. I, p. 309. Knudson also states: "Indeed, the objectivity of religious experience is not only as dubious as that of sense experience; it is psychologically much less compelling. Our sense impressions, no matter how misleading they may be, usually carry conviction with them. As Zeno put it, they "take hold of one by the hairs of one's head and drag one to assent." This could hardly be said of ordinary religious experiences. The fact is that there are no concrete religious percepts such as we have in sense experience. Our religious impressions are as a rule vague in character and only dimly apprehend the more-than-human Object." *Validity of Religious Experience*, p. 90. Cf., also, pp. 31, 54, 99, 100.

¹⁵ Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

in our lives,"¹⁷ is certainly to be guilty both of the fallacy that the indeterminate or the abstract can be immediately given, and of the fallacy of specious immediacy (in the use of the word "intuition" for what seems clearly to be an interpretative process). Indeed, for Thomas to add: "Since this spiritual nature meets with resistance at whatever cost, we know that it is no mere ideal of our imagination, but a creative force rising out of the depths of our nature,"¹⁸ is clearly to indicate the inferential process involved in placing the causal agency. The problem still remains: What is given? Is it a value? If so, what value? Is it a spirit, and, if so, what are its reliable witnesses in our experience? To say: "For as the anguish of *inquiétude* or guilt betokens the alienation of the soul from its spiritual destiny, so joy bears witness to the presence of God, the fulfillment of religious longing,"¹⁹ is not to enlighten us, especially if we are seeking that touch of God in our experience which reveals unmistakably *His* nature, not ours.

Unable to discover any distinctive and controlling object in religious experience, Tennant is forced to conclude that religious valuation is not the product of a unique datum, but rather of "a derived and mediate image or conception which is interpretatively read into perceptual or ideal objects, as the case may be. It is *thought* to be there, or is suppositionally assigned as the *unapprehended* cause of mental states, such as emotions or sentiments, upliftings, and so forth, which are immediately apprehensible in introspection."²⁰ In religious experience, he insists, we are immediately aware of an interfusion of the emotional, imaginal, and conative, but not of a *sui generis* datum in itself revelatory of an extra-human realm. The experience, however, is so unusual, as *erlebt*, and in its consequences for our lives, that we are ready to explain it by inferring a cause independent of us. This latter tendency is understandable enough particularly in human beings who, having accustomed themselves to a certain tenor of life, naturally regard a singular break in this routine as externally and especially provoked by a Reality whose existence has, in fact, already been postulated critically or uncritically to explain other mundane experiences. Yet, however spontaneous such religious experience may be assumed to be, to establish its objectivity in any exact sense is a matter of more rigorous evidence than has been available. And it must be remembered that the burden of proof lies on the shoulders, not of

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

²⁰ *Philosophy of the Sciences*, p. 174.

Tennant, but of those who contend that God is immediately cognized in religious experience.

C. Thinkers who are not yet impressed with the force or plausibility of Tennant's contentions must bear in mind still another possibility which, if disregarded, leads to confusion and the loading of religious experience with elements really extraneous to it as such. The religious response, like any other experience of an affective or cognitive nature, "is undoubtedly *rappor*t with an object,"²¹ but this psychological objectivity is not to be accepted without further argument as an indication of the metaphysical existence of the Object or God. Furthermore, it is undoubtedly true that the person who believes that the object of his cognition is "the Holy" may well issue from that experience a changed man. Nevertheless, the presence of inspirational emotions or cognitive states is not enough to justify the inference of a casual metaphysical reality. For, Tennant reminds us, not only does the psychologically objective include the imaginal and the ideal (for example, "the centaur and the Euclidean line"²²), but these "when they are believed to be actual, can evoke feelings and sentiments as profound, intense, inspiring and practically fruitful, as those excited by perceptual or actual things: and imaginary persons count for quite as much as real ones in the lives of most people."²³ Hence, the conception of God which the individual uses for the interpretation of his experience, thereby constituting it "religious experience," may well determine the course of religious life, once it has been initiated. It may also be conceded that one might issue from such experience with a "hunch" or suggestion of a God to be corroborated by the rest of his experience. But a "hunch" remains only a "hunch" and a suggestion merely a suggestion and not knowledge. Nor is it denied that such emotional experiences have led men to make fruitful hypotheses about God (except that most men would be inclined dogmatically to assert the reality rather than philosophize about hypotheses, especially when deeply emotional experiences have been theirs). But from the content of religious experience alone, even the least critical cannot come to a full-orbed conception of God.²⁴

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 176.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

²⁴ It is for this reason and for the admitted fallibility of religious intuition that Thomas commends Tennant's teleological argument. "For religious experience and faith alone can never yield adequate knowledge of a God who has revealed Himself in the natural creation as well as in the spirit of man." (*Op. cit.*, p. 55.) Hence the title of his article: "A Reasoned Faith," and the conclusion that "while religious faith is intuitive in origin it must be developed and supported by philosophical analysis of nature and man." *Ibid.*, pp. 64, 65, and cf. p. 67.

D. The question as to whether there is a real "counterpart" to the objects indubitably present in religious experience now begs an answer. But curiously enough, according to our philosopher, "that question cannot be answered by religious experience itself."²⁵ If Tennant is correct as to there being no underived and peculiarly religious datum, it would seem that the uniqueness of religious experience can only be accounted for "by attributing it to the introduced interpretative idea of God, or of the numen."²⁶ It is this idea of God, derived not *from* the religious experience but from reasoning about the world and man, which "permeates the other data or analytica [of the experience], and it alone bestows upon them the capacity to evoke emotional response of a peculiar kind. Previously to the acquisition and the causal or interpretative use of this derived emotion, experiences such as were destined to become religious could not be religious: they could only be regarded as natural, not as super-natural—whether aesthetic, moral, or of other types."²⁷ The knowledge which, supposedly, we got *out* of religious experience is exactly what we brought to nonreligious experience, thereby constituting it religious. Certainly, ideas of God's unity, of His love, of His causality and creativity are not read off in religious experience! Would R. Otto, for example, have interpreted the numinous experience in terms of creature-feeling apart from his previous idea of God as creator? The very fact that the interpretation of the nature of God has kept step with moral and intellectual changes instead of surging ahead on the waves of religious experience as such is another fact with which critics must cope. Furthermore, for what reason should we be more able to obtain direct knowledge of God than we can of other persons?

Thus, it would seem that when the Christian asserts his immediate sense of the indwelling Christ, he is imposing a learned causal interpretation on immediately introspected experiences of peace or joy and strengthening of resolve, "and he would not be able to extract that dogmatic content out of his present experiences had it not been first interpretatively read into them."²⁸ To this Tennant adds, significantly: "This dogmatic content may of course be true, but it is not matter of direct experience in the sense that joy and peace are."²⁹

²⁵ Tennant, *The Philosophy of the Sciences*, p. 177.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 179, 180.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

E. The "religiousness of religious experience" is due, then, to the "saturation" of the experience by the idea of God otherwise derived. It is for this reason that Tennant does not include an appeal to religious experience as part of his cumulative teleological argument for God in the fourth chapter of *Philosophical Theology*, Vol. II. This omission has been interpreted by some perhaps to corroborate the contention that Tennant does not take adequate account of religious experience, but it is now intelligible and the contention correspondingly loses force.³⁰ For, as Tennant says, the psychology and epistemology of religious experience must be philosophically "atheous" (not "atheistic") as far as the constructive case *leading to* the probability of God is concerned. After the theistic position has been rendered more probable than others "by a more circuitous path than the short-cut of alleged immediacy" (that is, by inference from the nature of the world and its relation to man), then, and then only, can the strongest theoretical base be put under the religious experience as it is re-expounded. Tennant would not, of course, deny that the data of religious experience as uncritically interpreted provide phenomena with which the philosopher must deal "on the way up." Indeed, this is exactly why Tennant himself examined its claims in Chapter 12 of the first volume of *Philosophical Theology* which precedes the actual argument for theism in the second volume. But, if his own analysis is correct, the "intimations" of religious experience must, for the critical, indeed be meager sources of divine *information* and inspiration, unless the existence and attributes of God can be inferred from broader and more public data. Indeed, if God's existence can be rendered probable on other grounds, religious experience, not as a source of philosophical knowledge, but as a source of intellectual, moral, and aesthetic inspiration, may be a final confirmation of a total argument for God which finds its coping stone in the moral, and *its final affirmation* in the religious, experience. No one who has carefully read Tennant's work can say that Tennant's God is not immanent in natural process and in the life of man with all due respect for man's freedom of will. The

³⁰ A recent letter from Tennant, dated November 12, 1937, applies to this point. "As to the omission of reference to religious experience along with morality, etcetera, in my teleological argument, I may say that the only connection in which it could be mentioned is as indicating, along with human rationality and morality, the purpose or goal of the design exhibited in the cosmos; religious experience having been represented to be the outcome of rationality and morality, I did not feel it essential to emphasize it explicitly in that context, but rather supposed the reader would take it to be implied. Its place, in my exposition, can only be in the description of theism and its corollaries after theism has been arrived at." Speaking of his contention "that religious experience itself gives no proof of Deity because already presupposing such belief," he adds: "But this has no implication that religious experience has no value for life, or that it is illusory, provided other grounds for theism are sound."

bone of contention has been the evidential value of religious experience. And it would seem that the theologian cannot find a short-cut to knowledge of God *via* religious experience. To be sure, the mystic and the man of faith may be bored and left cold by a long series of arguments to prove the existence of God, and it may be as Ritschl and Troeltsch insisted, that "it is impossible to reach what faith designates as 'God' by the simple expedient of pushing scientific or metaphysical explanation a little further."³¹ It may also seem that "to transpose faith into the key of philosophy would change its very nature . . . bleed faith white and drain out the vital element of mystery since speculative constructions as such are hypothetical, whereas the hidden life of faith is certainty."³² But perhaps the task of the philosopher is to render the absolute commitment and the "spirit of trust"³³ which characterize religion as a living sentiment a reasonable thing (a reasonable irrational fact), if such it can be. In any case, to revert to our first point, Tennant is not denying personal convincedness and moral significance to the religious experience; he is testing its *evidential*, epistemological value as an argument *on the way* to God, especially as an independent approach indifferent to discoveries in other fields. It is only as the cosmos, including man in his moral struggle, suggests with great probability that it is ordered "for the realization of moral and other values" that we have a "reasonable guarantee" for belief in God which neither ethical nor religious experience "alone can provide."³⁴ Hence, the conclusion: "Theology explicates what the other departments and sciences suggest; and they supply it with a basis, in facts and in generalization, for a faith such as is but a further stage, in that venture to believe where we cannot rigidly prove, which we have found to be inevitable in all that we are wont to call knowledge of actuality."³⁵ Personal convincedness may therefore in a reasonable life be interfused with philosophical probability.

³¹ H. R. Mackintosh, *Types of Modern Theology*. New York: Scribner's, 1937, p. 193.

³² *Loc. cit.*

³³ Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

³⁴ Tennant, *The Philosophy of the Sciences*, p. 184.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

The Recovery of Preaching

JOSEPH R. SIZOO

THIS is the age of preaching. The sermon is coming into its own. The outstanding opportunity of the Christian minister in this generation is the ministry of preaching. For many years the common and current notion has prevailed that the minister must be a sort of glorified promoter or sublimated rotarian. He was expected to be a scintillating conversationalist, a clever athlete, a reviewer of the latest books, a leader of all manner of crusades, a lecturer and a reformer, an after-dinner speaker, not too saintly and with it all, terribly popular! Then the Church suddenly awakened to discover that something had gone out of the minister which they craved, but which they had given him no time to develop or keep. Their lamps had gone out because they were given no oil. That day is passing and today men are once more coming to church that they may hear the voice of a prophet who has been alone with God, who had meditated in the night watches with the Almighty that he may point them to the Keeper of the Lights. When John Chrysostom, perhaps the greatest preacher of the early Church, was banished from his beloved city of Constantinople by godless leaders who were stung by his sharp messages of judgment, the people of the city set aside days of mourning and penitence, saying, "Better that this city cease than that Chrysostom cease preaching." It is the voice of the prophet which the minister of Christ must recover if he is to stand before his generation.

It is great preaching which has ever moved men and brought in revivals of religion. It began in the Upper Room when by the unction of the Holy Ghost a company of men went back to preaching and spoke with new tongues, and ever since then, when the prophetic note has sounded in the Church, there have been released spiritual forces for the remaking of mankind. How can that be renewed? What are the elements of truly prophetic preaching that we may stand before this troubled world unashamed and unafraid?

I

The recovery of preaching will come with the recovery of a compassionate understanding of the world. The prophets had an enduring message for

their day and all days because they knew the needs of the world in which they preached. As one reads the stories of great preachers, from Paul and Chrysostom to Horace Bushnell and Phillips Brooks, there comes the impression that these men understood their times and therefore had a message for it. No man can preach to his age until he understands his age. As a physician cannot prescribe without a knowledge of the ailment, or a surgeon operate without a detailed diagnosis, so no preacher can make his gospel effective until he knows the hopes and fears, the faith and foibles of the world in which he lives. It is so easy to play the role of the Pharisee and pass by on the other side, saying, what a mess! But you never solve problems by calling people names. The world is waiting for the sunrise of those who can see the ten thousand heartaches of our day with its sordid shambles, dreadful dilemmas, pitiful disillusionments, devastating paganism, not in terms of unconcern, but understanding; not with callousness, but with compassion; not with arrogance, but with considerateness. Until we look with compassionate understanding upon our generation we shall never recover great preaching. And what is that world like?

We are living in a world which is on the march. Our generation has determined seemingly to set up a whole new scheme of things. We may not know where we are going, but we are on the way. New fires are playing in the heart of the earth and civilization is becoming molten again. New seeds are being planted in new furrows, destined to bring the world new harvests. New waters are gushing out of new springs, destined to make their way to new and undiscovered seas. There is upon mankind the quest for a fuller life. You may speak of it negatively in terms of revolt or revolution, rife everywhere in the world, a kicking against the pricks, and an unwillingness to live within the inevitable restraints of life. But it is much more honest to speak of it as the quest for a fuller and better life. You may affirm that these aspirations are contradictory and self-destroying, and will only further entangle life with deeper disillusionment. You may believe that if the aspirations of one are to be realized the aspirations of another must be defeated, what will bring gain to one will bring loss to another. But the fact stands that everywhere in the world there is this sense of aspiration.

It is never easy to live in such a world. When the frosts go out of the ground in springtime, rural roads are always most difficult to travel. It is then that ruts are easily formed, mud clings to the wheels and traveling is difficult. In a world at springtime there will have to be a lot of plowing and

harrowing. It is a very unrewarding and difficult time. We may never see the harvests of that sowing or toil. Indeed, already misgivings are coming to multitudes of people and the sense of hopelessness is compromised by the feeling of futility. We seem to be like people who walk on streets which have no foundation, who eat food which does not nourish, who live in houses which do not shelter. We seem to be like boats on muddy flats with never a white sail in sight. We seem to be like sailors climbing in the rigging of a sinking ship, always above the water line, but never far from destruction. We seem to be like sleepers, conscious of the dawn, but unable to awaken. Many people are becoming afraid lest a different world may not be a better world.

What dreadful unconcern there is toward religion today! So many, these days, have no interest in spiritual values. Religion means nothing. Faith is no vital force. God is so normal and natural a part of life that it is difficult to understand how people can live without Him. But they do. They think of religion in terms of you-may-take-it-or-leave-it policy. They will tell you: "Some people like museums; some do not. Some people like music; and some do not. Some people like rice pudding and some do not. So it is with religion." They no longer take religion into consideration in the settling of economic, political, social or personal problems. It is to them a fifth wheel.

And yet withal, there is a pitiful wistfulness about life today. Men feel they have been tricked, disillusioned and cheated by the things in which they put their hope, only to find them gossamer and evanescent. They are coming to see that materialism can no more satisfy the soul than can sawdust satisfy a jungle tiger or carrion a lamb. You can buy a house, but not a home; a poem, but not genius; a painting, but not the power of appreciation. The old cry of an ancient seeker is coming to the fore, "Oh that I knew where I might find Him." The prayer of the Brittany boatman is stealing into the hearts of men, "The sea is so large, our boats are so small, dear God, help us." He only has a message for mankind today who sees behind the skepticism, cynicism, and unbridled freedom, this restless searching of men after a God big enough to remake the world and good enough to make it Christian. Life is still as John Bunyan saw it three centuries ago: "A man standing in filthy rags, with his back upon his home, with a scroll under his arm, in the city of destruction, seeking the gate of the interpreter. Such is the world in which we preach. It is the only world we will ever know. There can be no great preaching till we recover that understanding.

II

Then too, the recovery of preaching will come with the recovery of the message we preach. There is no gospel quite so near to the life and ministry of Jesus as the Gospel of Mark. It was unquestionably the first story of the ministry of Jesus to be written. Everything in Luke and Matthew you will find in Mark; in the former there are only additions to the second gospel. Many times, as Peter grew old, he thought over again, in the quiet calm that comes with passing years, what Christ had come to do and what this new gospel was that He preached. Then he remembered the theme of those first sermons, "Jesus came into Galilee preaching the gospel of the kingdom of God." That sentence summarized what Jesus came to do, according to the judgment of those who heard Him most frequently and were with Him constantly. He went up and down the land interpreting God to the people. That was His compelling message. As He stood on the quiet hillside of Galilee that memorable day when He preached to multitudes the manifesto of the Christian faith, Jesus was forever talking about God. It was seeing God, knowing God, being like God that was the burden of His appeal.

So He sent out His disciples. They went everywhere preaching Jesus' way of life, putting God in the center. Men laughed at them, scorned their notions of other-worldliness. They had no program, offered no Eldorado, built no Utopia, and yet the world, broken in pieces, was made whole by them, society was cleansed, laws were changed, political disintegration gave way to world unity, economic injustice gave place to contentment, war gave place to peace. It gave them a new enthusiasm for righteousness, a new love for their fellow men, a new understanding of need, and a new ideal of kinship.

That is the one unending purpose—the one unfinished task of great preaching. Something more than material satisfaction is needed to rebuild the world and give mankind the fuller life. No one with any conscience can look at the misery of the world and remain undisturbed or undistracted. Man must have a heart of stone not to be moved by the agony and tragic dilemma of our generation. One sometimes wonders if Dostoyevsky did not write the truth, "The only contribution civilization has made is to increase our capacity for pain." We seemingly have built our world upon human suffering rather than upon human understanding. But if all the desires of men for the remaking of the world in terms of material satisfactions could be granted, life would still fall apart and leave mankind far from the goal of the abundant life. What Carlyle wrote still stands as a warning to our time, "A new splen-

dor of God must come to the heart of this industrial age." Not until we see the outstretched arms of God undergirding human life; not until we build a world on a moral and spiritual foundation; not until character is quickened to a new nobility can this new day come. You cannot purify the poisoned waters of a stream by planting rosebushes on the banks. If the heart is wrong, nothing can be permanently right; and if the heart is right, nothing can be ultimately wrong. If the center of life is sound the whole being will have health. That is the essence of the gospel Jesus came preaching and all other things lie on the circumference of that faith.

When we preach that gospel things will begin to happen to this world. Preaching the gospel of God after Jesus' way means making a world without pain, panic and disease; a world in which womanhood shall not be neglected nor old age forgotten; a world in which the ghetto, the slums and sweatshops shall never again be possible; a world in which greed and hate will never get a foothold, in which life shall be measured, not by getting, but by giving; not by the wine drunk, but by the wine poured forth; a world in which men shall be more important than machines and personality more sacred than profits; a world in which there shall be playgrounds for children, schools for the adolescent, hospitals for the weak and asylums for the aged; a world in which hate and hunger, arrogance and intolerance shall be unknown; a world in which all that ennobles, enriches and enlarges life shall find a place; a world in which we shall emphasize, not privilege, but responsibility; not acquisition, but service; a world in which war shall be outlawed and we shall substitute for national Pharisaism an appreciation of the contribution each nation is making to the sum total of human happiness. These are some changes which would come in our world if we began to preach the gospel of God.

III

Again, the recovery of preaching will come with the recovery of personal experience in preaching. The most striking characteristic of First Century Christianity was its contagion. For sheer romance it has no parallel. Socially outcast, politically disfranchised, economically enslaved, religiously exiled, the followers of Christ went with an adventurous good will into a world which hated them, until they had carried the gospel one thousand miles north and south, fifteen hundred miles east and west, and in three centuries placed a Christian emperor upon the throne in Rome.

What explains that? You cannot explain it on the basis of organization,

for there was no organized ecclesiasticism. You cannot explain it on the basis of a carefully prepared credal statement. That did not come until decades later. You cannot explain it on the basis of elaborate ritual. They cared nothing for conventional rubric. What explains it? They went into the world talking about the things they had heard and seen and felt. They did not get it out of a book, but out of life. It was not an opinion, but a conviction; not an echo, but a voice; not a tradition, but an experience. They went up and down the country saying, "I know in whom I have believed—the life I live I live by faith in the Son of God." The Magna Charta of the early Church was: "That which we have seen with our eyes and heard with our ears, we declare unto you." Such preaching brought a pentecost in the early Church and will again in this twentieth century. When the preacher can say with an early martyr, "I cannot but speak the things which I have seen and heard," he fills a need in the modern world. The acid test of experience which Jesus applied still stands, "Sayest thou this of myself or hath another told it thee of me?"

IV

May I make one more observation? The recovery of preaching will come with the recovery of the technique of preaching. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of infinite care. When you think of the issues that are at stake, the hopes with which the worshiper awaits the sermon, and the destinies which may be determined by one hour's preaching, too much stress can never be placed on the urgency and need of a painstaking preparation. It is true that occasionally a great truth flits through the mind, but he who waits for it at the last moment is apt to confuse inspiration with panic.

People come to church, if they come at all, sin-burdened, care-stricken, fear-bound. They come for some light upon the dilemmas of life, some hope in a bewildering experience, some courage for the dark tragedies of life. I believe that many of us do not take the preaching ministry seriously enough. Learn to work with a dictionary and thesaurus by your side. The style, the well-rounded sentences, the balanced thought, the logical development, have a much greater bearing upon the success of the sermon than we dream. Not that these technical things can convert the soul, but people will listen more attentively to the message that has been studied over, and planned, and dreamed out with painstaking care.

When a minister is in the chancel and the worshipers are in the pews, everything counts. The effectiveness of the sermon lies not only in the

conduct of the service, but in the conduct of the minister himself. How often, by all manner of announcements, a minister compromises the spiritual atmosphere created by the worship, into which his sermon fits as an emerald fits into a circle of diamonds. How can the worshiper or the minister have a receptive mind for the message if, prior to the sermon, he clutters up the worship with the thoughts of rummage sales, mothers' clubs and picnic parties? When a minister has nothing but a hyphen or hymn to separate these bits of crude advertising from the vision of a prophet, how can he expect both the notices and the vision to fulfill their purposes? Dr. T. R. Glover, in a word of counsel to a group of students beginning a mission in an English district said, "Gentlemen, as you go about these churches, do not sit on tables, lounge about, or allow yourself attitudes and postures that are uncomely. Remember the Incarnation." What a sentence that is, "Remember the Incarnation."

Every minister owes it to himself to make the best possible use of every God-given talent that shall lead to more effective preaching. No training or discipling of even remote gifts should be neglected. Demosthenes was a fumbler of words and a stutterer, but with pebbles in his mouth he would talk to the sea for hours. He grudged no labor which could make his work more perfect and he had become the world's foremost orator when he died, "sucking the poison from his pen when his life was sought by his enemies in the Temple Poseidon whither he had fled for refuge."

When the minister recovers these lost imperatives of preaching he may stand before the world unashamed and unafraid.

“An Iconoclast Without a Hammer”

ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT, JR.

I

“**I**N this resplendent summer it has been a luxury to draw the breath of life.” When a man is about to say something that will explode like a bomb under your feet, he does well to begin by talking about the weather. The hymn to creation which opens the “Address delivered before the Senior Class in Divinity College, Sunday evening, July 15, 1838,” gives no intimation of the iconoclastic sentiments that were to follow. Its melodious words, quietly delivered, came from the lips of a thirty-five-year-old ex-minister, Ralph Waldo Emerson. To associate with theological students came naturally to the speaker, for he was born in a parsonage, several of his forebears had been ministers, and he had lived in the dormitory and worshiped in the little chapel in which he was now addressing the senior class on the eve of their graduation. Six years before he had resigned the pastorate of the Second Church of Boston (Paul Revere’s Old North) primarily because of a reluctance to accept the restrictions of an institutional ministry of religion, and many of the sentiments expressed in the Address came to Emerson’s mind during his ministry. In it he spoke both for and against himself as a young preacher. In the interval he had eked out the income of a slender inheritance by delivering lectures on History, Art, Science, Religion, Society, Manners and other topics; and by filling the pulpits of ministerless churches as a supply preacher. According to his unpublished Preaching Record he preached on three Sundays out of every four during the four and one half years that had elapsed between his return from the European trip that followed his resignation from the Second Church and the occasion of the Divinity School Address. And when a Sunday came round on which he had no preaching engagement, he sat in his pew in church, returning home, like Samuel Pepys, to comment in his journal on what he had heard. By good preaching, he recorded, he “is touched and taken out of his numbness and unbelief and wishes to go out and speak and write all things.” But much of the preaching left him “ nettled and nervous” and feeling defrauded of time for thought. During this period he wrote few new sermons, for he had an ample stock of one hundred and seventy

left over from his ministry at the Second Church. These he was quite ready to deliver again and again, even though on occasion he might have to interrupt the reading of a manuscript he had not re-examined before delivery to say quietly to the congregation: "The sentence I have just read I do not now believe." Within a month he would dip into his barrel for a sermon on Duty. The time had not yet come when he should cease altogether to go to church and begin to walk and—if his journal is to be trusted—read Aristophanes and Rabelais in church hours.

The meticulously kept Preaching Record further indicates that Emerson often used one of his old sermons at the morning service and in the afternoon read one of his new lectures on such subjects as Peace, George Fox, Martin Luther, Temperance. Once in a while he "enlarged" a sermon by adding to it portions of a recently written lecture on Religion. But for the most part his fresh writing was done for the lecture platform alone. The newly organized movement for adult education, the Lyceum, was just getting under way and was becoming increasingly avid for competent instruction and inspiration. Emerson, divorced from the Church, and the Lyceum divorced from its original intention, which was to train schoolteachers, were destined to carry each other to joint heights of fame in the expanding culture of New England and the Middle West. Not that he found the platform of the Lyceum as free from restraint as it may have appeared to him when he had felt himself hemmed in by the conventions of the pulpit. Once he was invited to lecture at the Salem Lyceum on a subject discretionary with himself "provided no allusions are made to religious controversy or other exciting topics upon which the public mind is honestly divided." He replied: "I am really sorry that any person in Salem should think me capable of accepting an invitation so incumbered." Immediately below this comment in his *Journal* appears a quotation from the *Anecdotes of Lady Mary Montague*: "The motto on all palace gates is, *Hush.*"

Two months before he addressed the Divinity School, Emerson had informally discussed religion with the students there. According to the *Journal* entry for April 1, 1838, "The Divinity School youths wish to talk with me concerning theism. I went rather heavy-hearted, for I always find that my views chill or shock people at the first opening. But the conversation went well and I came away cheered. I told them that the preacher should be a poet smit with love of the harmonies of moral nature—and yet look at the Unitarian Association and see if its aspect is poetic. They all smiled No.

A minister nowadays is plainest prose, the prose of prose. He is a warming-pan, a night chair at sickbeds and rheumatic souls; and the fire of the minstrel's eye and the vivacity of his word are exchanged for intense, grumbling enunciation of the Cambridge sort, and for Scripture phraseology." So the students' second and more formal invitation found him ready to speak. The germinating thought of the Address he had recorded two weeks earlier. "There is no better subject for effective writing than the Clergy. I ought to sit and think, and then write a discourse to the American Clergy, showing them the ugliness and unprofitableness of theology and churches at this day, and the glory and sweetness of the moral nature out of whose pale they are almost wholly shut. Present Realism as the front face, and remind them of the fact that I shrink and wince as soon as the prayers begin, and am very glad if my tailor has given me a large velvet collar to my wrapper or cloak, the prayers are so bad." Though his audience consisted of a few students and their friends, he clearly had larger game in mind.

II

Emerson spoke out of a deep sense of the crisis that confronted the American churches: "The universal decay and now almost death of faith in society. . . . The Church seems to totter to its fall, almost all life extinct." Things had reached such a sorry pass that support of the Church was argued on sociological rather than theological grounds. "What was once a mere circumstance, that the best and the worst men in the parish, the poor and the rich, the learned and the ignorant, young and old, should meet one day as fellows in one house in sign of an equal right in the soul, has come to be a paramount motive for going thither."

The churches faced not only the crisis which external events, such as two severe wars, had forced upon them. They were suffering from an inner crisis as well. To an analysis of the causes of that inner crisis, Emerson devoted the initial sections of his Address.

His key word is "insulation." The Church is in trouble because it has insulated Jesus and because it has insulated its preaching. Emerson did not propose to attack the Christian religion. He could contemplate with no equanimity the loss of its worship and its faith. Its Scriptures, as he reminded the students, have been "bread of life to millions"; its institution of preaching and its hallowing of the Sabbath are "two inestimable advantages Chris-

tianity has given us." But there are what he called "errors in its administration," that he would endeavor to point out.

The first defect is the insulation of Jesus. "Do not degrade the life and dialogues of Christ out of the circle of this charm by insulation and peculiarity. Let them lie as they befell, alive and warm, part of human life and of the landscape and of the cheerful day." Jesus has been subjected to a twofold insulating process. His followers have detached Him from His message and separated Him from themselves. Two alternatives present themselves to those who separate Jesus from His message. They may listen to His message and neglect Him or they may overlook His message and make Him the immediate object of their devotion. In this perennial choice between personal leader and abstract principle or platform, Emerson took sides in his Address. He deprecated the "exaggeration of the personal." It distressed him to observe how Christian people surrounded Christ's name with expressions of love which became petrified into official titles and were substituted for a personal dedication to the ethical teachings of Jesus.

This was not the first time Emerson had taken sides in this issue. As a young preacher he had spoken to his congregation of the "absurd and mistaken manner" in which the early Christians had added to Jesus "titles of esteem and veneration till succeeding generations have been led, in the extravagance of love, in disregard of his own caution, to confound the dignity of him that was sent with the dignity of him who sent him." His preference for the impersonal rather than the personal he once put bluntly to the same congregation: "Christ is an abstract name for virtue." Equally curt is the sentence in the Address: "The soul knows no persons." Many of Emerson's interpreters have considered such a statement an accurate reflection of his temperament, a temperament which found expression in the youthful journal: "I was born cold." Nevertheless Emerson knew full well the hunger of the human heart for personal companions and the inspiration of personal leadership. By and large he took a biographical attitude toward life. The author of *Heroes and Hero Worship* was "one of his men." His own *Representative Men* fulfilled the vision of his youth that "A modern Plutarch is yet to be written;" Plutarch being one of his favorite authors. James Elliot Cabot, whose biography of Emerson still takes first place, in commenting upon his subject's lack of passion for the wilderness of nature, declared that "His landscapes are always landscapes with figures." Perhaps there was running in Cabot's mind a stray sentence from one of Emerson's

Christmas sermons: "As they say in the arts, that a landscape is imperfect, without animals and men; so, the infinite field of moral truth is but a wearisome and barren immensity till it is *peopled* with examples." In this sermon, first delivered on December 27, 1829, the young preacher pointed his theory toward Jesus: "The interest created by Jesus is of a *personal kind*. . . . An interest such as only attaches to *persons* was created in the truth which He taught. The more this is considered, the more important it will appear; and this in two ways; namely, that thus only can it become the object of the affections, and thus only can truth and virtue come to have the solidity of fact. How vague and cold is our regard for patriotism, courage, purity, honesty, compared with our attachment to these qualities in the person of a friend. They are dead possibilities till they live in a soul."

It might be maintained that Emerson changed his attitude in later life. Sentiments like those just quoted came from the pen of a young man not yet twenty-six years old. But years later he could still say that "the search after the great man is the dream of youth" not only, it is equally "the most serious occupation of manhood." Between the polarities of what may be called the personalistic mind and the principalistic mind, or between the seeing of life in terms of people and seeing life in terms of abstractions, the needle of Emerson's own attitude fluctuated but finally came to rest. His characteristic sentiment does not find expression in the Divinity School Address. Personality, not impersonality, is standard Emerson.

A second form of insulation, that of Jesus from other men, Emerson treated with less sharpness and vigor. He acknowledged that Christianity has correctly asserted the uniqueness of Jesus. "Alone in all history he estimated the greatness of man." But even so his followers must not subordinate their nature to Christ's nature. Here is a paradox. Jesus preached the incarnation of God in man. That means that everyone may find God in himself: "That which shows God in me, fortifies me. That which shows God out of me, makes me a wart and a wen." Yet Jesus is the only soul in history who has appreciated this worth of man. He thereby "names the world." The resolution of the dilemma, according to Emerson, takes place only in so far as people have "drunk so deeply of his (Jesus') sense as to see that only by coming again to themselves, or to God in themselves, can they grow forevermore." This is at once an acknowledgment that Christ is the door and that His followers are not to loiter in the doorway but go through and beyond Him.

III

The crisis in the Church had, according to Emerson, a second cause, the insularity of its preaching. Emerson's writings contain many sterling comments on preaching and preachers. It is reported of a famous doctor that on being invited to address a group of women about to be graduated from a nurses' training course, he berated them for having chosen that profession and urged them to abandon it. Nothing of the sort mars the Divinity School Address. In moments of private exasperation, to be sure, Emerson confided to his journals caustic deprecations of preaching. He wondered whether sermons ever penetrated farther than the ears. Preaching, he felt, is for able men a sickly employment. But the Address represents his dominant mood. Criticize its incumbents he may, but the office of the preacher "is the first in the world."

What is preaching? His definitions, like other golden sentences of his, have become familiar quotations. Preaching is the conversion of life into truth. "The true preacher can be known by this, that he deals out to the people his life—life passed through the fire of thought." This might be called the homiletical principle of localism. It was the merit of the preaching of Jesus. As Emerson put it in a youthful sermon on "Religion and Society," "His instruction is almost as local, as personal, as would be the teaching in one of our Sunday Schools." The Address puts it even more concretely: "Of the bad preacher, it could not be told from his sermon what age of the world he fell in—whether he was a freeholder or a pauper; whether he was a citizen or a countryman; or any other fact of his biography." The principle of localism might, of course, easily be misunderstood. Preachers are not to wear their hearts upon their sleeves. They are not to confide to their congregations anecdotes of domestic or vocational privacy. When Emerson himself, for instance, less than two weeks after the death of his six months' bride, Ellen Tucker, had ascended his pulpit to preach on "Consolation for the Mourner," he took care not to let his grief find its way directly into his sermon. In a few brief opening sentences he generalized his private bereavement, identifying himself with all the griefs of his congregation: "Let me give utterance, if I can, to some of those thoughts that crowd in succession into the heart of those who have seen the life that made their own life pleasant come to an end. Which of us has no interest in these consolations? Which of us has not needed them, or is not likely to need them?" That was all. The personal equation did not again find direct expression.

Had Emerson been speaking to laymen about preaching rather than to prospective ministers, he would hardly have passed over as lightly as he did the contribution which a congregation makes to the preacher's sermon: "There is a good ear, in some men, that draws supplies to virtue out of very indifferent nutriment." Fresh in his mind must have been some remarks he had made in this vein in a sermon on "Solitude and Society," which though first written in 1829 he had again delivered at the church in East Lexington just a year earlier: "We go to church and suffer ourselves to depend for the profit we get there upon the accident whether the services shall be administered with ability or not. The taste of the times is grown fastidious, and if the preacher does not gratify the imagination or enlarge our conceptions of God, we go away unedified, unsatisfied, and possibly chagrined. My brethren, if the preacher was in fault, so is the hearer. The mind that is in a religious frame, in a highly excited state, welcomes with delight every new truth which the reason or learning of the pulpit can bring to the cause of religion, but it does not depend on them for its devotion. It hath fire on its own altar. It brings to church such cogent arguments of God's providence, such warm love to Him, that it fills the house with fragrant piety, it gives fervor to prayer, enthusiasm to praise and sense to sermons." A later entry in the *Journals* corroborates this understanding he had of the two-sidedness of public speaking. "It were no bad thing for the preacher to urge the talent of hearing good sermons in their congregation."

Most superficial of Emerson's criticisms of contemporary preaching had to do with the vocabulary of the sermon. The "blessed words" of traditional usage should not be abandoned, he declared, but they should be used with discretion. He had already said as much to his former congregation in his inaugural sermon at the Second Church: "Our usage of preaching is too straightened. . . . It is much addicted to a few words; it holds on to phrases when the lapse of time has changed their meaning." A more cavalier attitude toward the ancient words of religion was called for, he felt. "The language and the images of Scripture . . . derive all their dignity from their association with divine truth; they belonged once to what was low and familiar; our Lord condescended to explain himself by allusions to every homely fact, to the boys in the market place, to the persons dropping into the custom offices, to the food on the board, to the civilities shown him by the hospitality of his entertainers." Emerson justified his own linguistic unconventionality on the further ground that fresh words kept readers' and listeners'

minds fresh. A friend to whom he showed the manuscript of the Address before printing it urged him to put a capital F in the phrase, "friend of man." But he declined, saying, "If I did so they would all go to sleep." When Theodore Parker followed Emerson's example and drew his words and his illustrations from "the most familiar things which are before all men's eyes, in the fields, the streets, the shop, the kitchen, parlor, nursery, or school," a way was opened which led to the secular language and anecdote of the modern sermon.

The real trouble with contemporary preaching—this was a hundred years ago, remember—lay deeper than the level of style and vocabulary. Preachers, according to Emerson, all too often preach "as books enable, as synods use, as the fashion guides." They babble; they do not preach out of the depths of personal conviction. Emerson here put his finger on one of the dilemmas of a young preacher: If he preach only his own convictions his preaching will be thin; if he preach anything else his preaching may be unconvincing. An able American religious leader not long since cogently presented this dilemma, together with his own solution, in his charge to a man who was about to be ordained to the Christian ministry. "For the interpretation of life you have human experience in all the ages to draw upon. Ministers are sometimes told in these modern days that they should speak only out of their own experience and proclaim only the truth they have tested and confirmed in their own lives. No advice could be more fatuous, encouraging morbid self-consciousness in the minister himself, tempting him to hasty verification, and defrauding his people by confining them to an all too meager spiritual diet. If such advice were sound where would be the place for a young minister, many of whose people are far richer in experience than he? No—it is your privilege and your opportunity to illumine the daily lives of men by the light of the gospel reflected from countless lives, both past and present." Emerson himself, as a young preacher, would not have considered fatuous the advice to speak only out of his own experience. Monotonous such spiritual fare might be, but at least it would be unadulterated and nourishing as far as it went. Indeed he rather boasted of his narrowness:

"I shall count it no defect," he announced to his congregation in a sermon preached on the first anniversary of his ordination to the ministry, "if I am reminded that my subjects have little variety. I count it the great object of my life to explore the nature of God!" His most ardent early disciple inside the Church followed him in this regard as in so many others. "After

preaching a few months in various places," Theodore Parker records in his *Experiences as a Minister*, "and feeling my way into the consciousness of men, I determined to preach nothing as religion which I had not inwardly experienced, and made my own, knowing it by heart. Thus not only the intellectual but also the religious part of my sermons would rest on facts that I was sure of, and not on the words of another."

Whether or not Emerson and Parker are correct in their judgment at this point is of small consequence. The question, rather, is, Why did they come to the conclusion that they must speak only that which they knew at firsthand? The reason, certainly in the case of Emerson, was that were he to speak at second hand he would have to say things that he had come to believe were false. The preacher's difficulty, if he went beyond his own experience, was not that he might seem to speak a truth that he had not himself tested; the difficulty was that in preaching the funded experience of earlier generations he was inevitably doomed to speak what he had ceased to believe was true. For the keynote of traditional theology was that God had revealed Himself once for all at a given point of time and space and in a given individual. "Revelation is somewhat long ago given and done, as if"—Emerson punctuated this sentence with the startling thrust—"as if God were dead." "'Tis an injury to faith," he continued in criticism, "throttles the preacher, and the goodliest of institutions becomes an uncertain and inarticulate voice."

IV

What was Emerson's solution for this "famine of our churches"? He proposed a theology suitable for the new day, a theology that should bring about a threefold recovery: the recovery of the emotional dimension neglected by rationalism, of the present tense disregarded by traditionalism, and of the moral passion stifled by pietistic ecclesiasticism. The Divinity School Address contains the three points of this new theology: the contemporaneous activity of a revealing God; the capacity of human beings to receive God's current revelations; the priority of the moral sentiment.

Had Emerson put these fundamental theses of his new religious philosophy in academic terms he would have referred to the doctrine of the immanence of God in man; and he would have defined his theory of religious knowledge as mysticism. But if he had thus insulated his thought by wrapping it in such terminology, we should probably never have heard of his

Address. Instead he coined fresh provocative phrases for his fresh religious insights:

God is, not was.

He speaketh, not spake.

If a man is at heart just, then in so far is he God.

Here we have the religious formulation of the Romantic movement, to use a moot designation, which was sweeping across European and American culture at the beginning of the nineteenth century as a reaction to the rationalism of the period of the Enlightenment. Clarion notes like these of the young Emerson, emancipated the Western mind for moral adventure, for high feeling and for the individuation of man.

These were the teachings which Emerson proposed as the prophetic preaching of his ideal church. For church he would have. Though he could not himself fit into an institutionalized religion he declined to contemplate the abandonment of the institutions of religion. He might be the prophet of individualism but he was not its victim. Reform rather than destruction was his aim. The specific nature and sequence of the reforms that would have to be undertaken he did not clearly see. "Nothing shows more plainly the bad state of society," he remarked to himself in his journal, "than the difficulty or impossibility of representing to the mind any fit church or *cultus*." Of one thing he was sure, however. It was vain to think of establishing a cultus with new rites and forms. Not new bottles but new wine he called for. The remedy for the reform of the forms already existing is "first soul, and second soul, and evermore soul."

The attentive reader of the journals will readily discern the outlines of Emerson's ideal church. In such a church the endeavor would constantly be made to see "whether the distinction between a spiritual and a traditional religion could not be made apparent to an ordinary congregation." In this church of the future the quaint grotesques of theology would disappear, for the minds of the worshipers would have fallen away from theology to morals. No attempt would be made laboriously to reanimate an historical religion. Not the elucidation of texts but the study of the moral constitution of man would be the occupation of the teacher-preacher. He would preach human life, not thought; he would never exhort. His attitude would be one of wonder and gratitude and much watching of marvels. He would persuade men to listen to their interior convictions. Instead of groping to get exactly

the old threads of relation to bind him to the people, that bound his venerable predecessors, he would quit all leather and twine and so highly and gladly entertain his most poetic and exhilarating office as to cast the nonsense of false expectation and driveling Chinese secondariness behind him and acquaint them at first hand with Deity. He would scorn trifles. He would desert tradition and speak a spontaneous thought—without fanaticism. Feeble routine and mere verbal learning and ritual virtue would find no place in such a church. The people would not go to it for amusement, and one service on Sunday would be enough.

Although he was no longer a minister, Emerson was still at heart and in hope a churchman.

How far within the range of possibility the creation and maintenance of churches of this sort may be, is a matter on which the reader of these Emersonian dreams must judge for himself on the basis of his own experience. Certainly it is the hope of establishing churches like this that holds many a modern minister to stand by the churches as they now are. And it was such a hope held out by one who could not himself directly promote it that nevertheless kept Divinity School students, faced by a "rugged crisis" of a century ago, from abandoning the profession of the ministry and in spite of "fashion, custom, authority, pleasure and money," to "cheer the waiting, fainting hearts of men with new hope and revelation."

V

Emerson was right in his forecast that his discourse would "shock the religious ear of the people." The Address provoked immediate and widespread criticism. Harvard Alumni formed an association to furnish "successive counterblasts to such utterances as the graduating classes might invite." Details of that controversy need not be rehearsed. Youth participated in it against age; patriotism against the importations of European thought. Liberals who had once exiled themselves from orthodoxy now turned against this radical who had separated himself from religious liberalism, turned against him with greater heat because orthodox leaders were saying, We told you so; we said that if you once let down the bars of authoritarian belief you would be unable to hold your half-way positions. Soon you would find yourselves slipping into some unchristian extreme position; transcendentalism is the expected descensus Averni.

Caught between two fires as they were, the earlier proponents of a liberal

theology, the first generation of Unitarians, that is to say, vigorously disassociated themselves from the views expressed in the Divinity School Address. In the war of pamphlets that followed Andrews Norton succeeded in stating the issue with the utmost precision. Norton was the earlier religious liberalism's most ardent defender and champion. Father of Charles Eliot Norton, of later eminence, and of three delightful daughters who were known as Norton's "Evidences of Christianity," he had given impetus to the scientific study of the Bible and to the overthrow of the strongholds of a petrifying orthodoxy. No member of the older generation more opposite to Emerson could have been found. Theodore Parker called him a pope. President Walker, of Harvard, a member of Doctor Norton's first class in the Divinity School, thinking of his old teacher in the retrospect of the years, said that he "never knew a man who built his faith more entirely on authority, making not only all certainty in religion, but well-grounded trust and hope, even his trust in providence and his hope of another life, to depend on Christianity, accepted as a miraculous dispensation." A. P. Peabody, another of his former students, struck the same note in his analysis of Norton's attitude, referring to him as "the most skeptical mind that he was ever acquainted with."

Thus it was that the rationalistic mind and the mind of the mystic collided in the persons of the older and once radical conservative and the younger innovator. Each was a representative man. Each symbolized a variety of religious experience and culture. Why did Norton describe Emerson's Address as "the latest form of infidelity"? Because to him, Emerson seemed to have failed to meet the demand for certainty which lies at the heart of the religious quest: Emerson could offer by way of assurance nothing more substantial than his own intuitions. It was not a question in Norton's mind whether Emerson's intuitions were sound. Norton was not asking Pilate's question, What is truth? He was raising the previous question, How can you recognize truth when you encounter it? What are its tests? If intuitions are ways of knowing, as Emerson claimed, then why is it, enquired his rationalistic critics, that the intuitions vary so widely in their content. How it would have pleased Norton had he been able to quote in derision a self-characterization Emerson had jotted down in his journal: "I must spin my thread from my own bowels." A kind of spider-philosophy, forsooth, this transcendentalism! Intuitive self-reliance amounts to nothing more than defiance of all sound methods of determining the truth in the field of religion.

So sharp a raising of the problem of authority in any area, most of all in that of religion, sets men to exploring the possibility of solution by compromise. George Ripley, who was later to pass from the communal experiment of Brook Farm to the editorial desk of the New York *Tribune*, showed himself the most outstanding of the self-appointed mediators. Norton and Emerson, according to Ripley, each had hold of a half-truth. There can be no certainty in religious faith which is founded on historical testimony. The best history can offer is probability. The Incarnation is the raw material of faith, not the faith itself. But, on the other hand, without history, religious faith, or rather Christian faith, has no event to respond to, no principles to grasp, no object to adore. Lacking such an objective, historic basis religious faith, like the White Knight in Alice in Wonderland, will keep tumbling out of its saddle, having no ballast heavier than a "thing of its own invention."

The controversial search for a pathway to certainty set in motion by Norton and Emerson maintained a high level of decorum and showed a keen nose for the living issues. Nothing was finally settled, to be sure. Extremists and middlemen continued to advocate their own tests and measurements of truth. But the theological thunderstorm cleared the air. Thereafter people could see the problem more clearly and take their own side with greater understanding of the method and amount of authority which they needed for their own assurance. Ambrose White Vernon once hinted at the meaning and goal of such theological controversy when he said, "The fundamental problems of religion are rarely, if ever, solved; we labor rather for what they can do for us, than for what we can do for them."

VI

Pigeonhole the Divinity School Address as a half-truth or as no truth at all, if the controversialists would, for Emerson himself it expressed the whole truth, for it was the only truth he knew. "These things look thus to me," he averred. Challenged to give account of himself, he fell back on the mystical position which so exasperates the rationalistic mind. "I could not possibly give you," he wrote to his former colleague at the Second Church, "one of the arguments you cruelly hint at on which any doctrine of mine stands. I delight in telling what I think, but if you ask me how I dare to think so or why it is so, I am the most helpless of mortal men." He was not trying to dodge. It was only that, in the meekness of his mind, he understood that one cannot argue first principles. So he clung to the opinion he had expressed

to his congregation several years before: "Great mischief comes of controversy." All he could say to the friendliest of his remonstrants was, "I feel no disposition to depart from my habitual contentment that you should say your thought, whilst I say mine." It seemed to matter little to him that he saw himself, as he put it in another of his letters to Ware, "suddenly raised into the importance of a heretic." He felt none of the blows of the malleus haereticorum, the hammer of heretics, that descended upon him. Undoubtedly he took comfort in a quotation from his favorite Milton he had once shared with the people of the Second Church, "The Christian religion was once a schism." At any rate, he declined to retaliate in kind. His friend, Oliver Wendell Holmes, understood him: "Here was an iconoclast without a hammer."

By introducing his Address to the Divinity School with a paean to nature, Emerson seems to have intended to declare that there was something elemental, permanent, fertile and forever fresh in the doctrines he was about to set forth. Tonic at the least, and divinely inspiring at the most, his critical and constructive words have proved to be, not only to his own generation but to successive generations in so far as they have suffocated under philosophic and scientific and institutional blankets. As in the Concord and Cambridge of a century ago, so still in our own day "the grass grows, the buds burst, the meadow is spotted with fire and gold in the tint of the flowers." And still today, not in Concord and Cambridge alone, "The seer is a sayer." What he sees and what he says, quoting again from the Address, is: "The test of the true faith certainly should be its power to charm and command the soul, as the laws of nature control the activity of the hands—so commanding that we find pleasure and honor in obeying."

Stations on Parnassus

GORHAM MUNSON

I

A FEATURE of our time is an acute prejudice against the idea of a poetic hierarchy, and attempts at an objective classification of verse and poetry are in disfavor. In its impressionism and crude relativity of judgment our time is as wrong as was, to take the opposite extreme, any "Age of Rules" when a pedantic interpretation of the doctrine of imitation held sway.

To keep criticism healthy we must make crises of taste and judgment, and it is the great merit of critics who expound objective standards that they provoke real and important crises. When Coleridge refers to "fixed canons of criticism," he awakes the reader to thought. When the late Irving Babitt held with the Spanish proverb that "there are tastes which deserve the cudgel," he forced an issue, forced his reader to take a definite position. The challenge of the perfectionist, of critics whose cult is the best, not the relative, is sorely needed today when "he who is of the populace," as Nietzsche said, "his thoughts go back to his grandfather—with his grandfather, however, doth time cease."

Perhaps the most brilliant exponent our time has seen of the thesis that a literary critic should achieve an exact table of values was A. R. Orage, by profession an editor and journalist but within his lifetime legendary, like Doctor Johnson and Coleridge, for his inspired table talk. Eulogized at his death by AE, declared by T. S. Eliot to be the finest critical intelligence of his day, praised for courage by Ezra Pound, called a desperado of genius by Shaw, who had partly subsidized Orage's paper, Orage achieved at last the public recognition due him—when he lay in his coffin in the crowded little Hampstead church in November, 1934.

He never wrote a formal essay on the kinds and degrees of verse and poetry, but to audiences of professional writers in New York he gave several talks on the subject during the years he was residing in America, and the scheme which follows for arranging poets in an ascending series on the slopes of Parnassus is based upon these talks.

II

We ought to remind ourselves that as behind prose there looms an image of a speaker, so behind poetry looms the figure of a singer. (One might add that behind what is variously called "hybrid prose-poetry" or "stave-prose poetry," the free verse of the school of Whitman, there stands the chanter.) These are images that clarify our thought when the subject of prose or poetry becomes intricate; they stabilize our minds and restrain them from the fabrication of theories of excessive complexity, a result certain to occur when some basic fact has been overlooked. The writer of prose is an artful substitute for a man speaking to us; we are interested in the speaker as well as in the speech and wish him to convey himself in his speaking. With the singer it is different. Here it is the song alone that matters; we are supremely indifferent to the personality of the maker of song while we listen.

Poetry is associated with music. The association points to the fact that poetry pivots on emotion. In contrast to the writer of prose who should, we feel, be self-collected, should write with a cool mind even though his heart be burning, should give us a kind of icy fire, the composer of poetry is possessed. So possessed is he, so filled with the Dionysian spirit, that trammels are necessary; a strictness of form is needed if his feeling is to be contained at all and its energy not dissipated in a thousand directions. Dionysus requires some taming by Apollo if the mighty spirit is to be channeled.

The terms, verse and poetry, are often used interchangeably by careless writers; yet these writers when questioned will invariably declare that they are aware of at least a vague distinction between verse and poetry. They will affirm that in some way poetry is higher than verse, but in just what way they are not clear. Likewise they frequently use the terms, minor poetry or major poetry, but here again there is neither consistency nor defined content in the usage. Our first task, then, is merely to assemble the terms that everybody finds it necessary to employ. They are verse and poetry; verse being subdivided into minor verse and major verse, and poetry being subdivided into minor poetry and major poetry. This gives us an ascending series of terms, minor verse, major verse, minor poetry and major poetry, but the list is not complete. Below minor verse there is doggerel, and it is the hardest of all to define satisfactorily. A similar difficulty exists in defining the lowest form of prose, journalism. The difficulties are caused by the fact that there is excellent journalism and there can be very good doggerel. Doggerel is intended to be used in a descriptive sense without the opprobrium usually con-

nected with the term, but this purely descriptive usage violates our habits of association, and so we may be helped if we coin a term to take its place. Would not infra-verse be better? It denotes an excellence below minor verse and at the same time has not acquired contemptuous associations.

Infra-verse covers writing which fails in its intention to become one or another of the forms of verse or poetry, a failure produced by ineptitude and other great faults in the treatment or by a kind of baseness in the theme or by inadequacy of feeling. Infra-verse lacks nobility of conception, of emotion, of expression. It is often pleasant in spite of the banality with which it is cursed. If we name Longfellow as one of the finest writers of infra-verse or doggerel, we should get rid of our ordinary notion that infra-verse is simply bad verse. For Longfellow, as we all recognize, was metrically expert. He was dedicated to verse and tried to serve it. He failed, but his failure was relatively high. Infra-verse, we might offer, is failed verse; it often is positively bad, but, very frequently, good infra-verse such as Longfellow wrote copiously impresses us more by failure to excite than by faults that jar.

To read,

“I see the lights of the village
Gleam through the rain and the mist,
And a feeling of sadness comes o'er me
That my soul cannot resist.”

or to read,

“I breathed a song into the air,
It fell to earth, I knew not where;
For who has sight so keen and strong,
That it can follow the flight of song?”

is to have a very mild experience, not unpleasant, but devoid of excitement. Infra-verse fails to move us in any way worth noting.

Naturally a great deal of what is printed as verse and poetry by our contemporaries is infra-verse, smoothly written and smoothly forgotten. The reader will not lack for numerous specimens if he turns over the last three hundred pages of Mr. Alfred Kreymborg's ample anthology, *Lyric America*. Among so many it may seem invidious to single out only one; nevertheless, the example of Mr. David Morton and his sonnet, “Fields at Evening,” is pat. He has precisely that facility and continuous lack of distinction that characterize the best of the infra-versifiers, and he has been so prolific in sonnets that some example of his writing has probably been encountered by all my readers, who are therefore able to test this classification.

We rise now to the regions of verse and poetry, and here judgment at a glance is no longer sufficient. We must be very watchful of two things, the appeal to our emotions and the appeal to the inner ear, for the hierarchy is constructed upon a higher and higher appeal to feeling and a more and more refined and subtle delighting of the inner ear. What is meant by higher emotions will soon be evident; later I shall present a justification of this ranking of emotions. The workings of the inner ear seem a more mysterious matter, however, and are certainly elusive. One can be fairly concrete about heard melodies; they are sweet, and technical criticism can be very convincing and verifiable in its account of them. But Keats enunciated a truth that carries us beyond them when he wrote that unheard melodies are far sweeter; the pleasing of the outer ear is obligatory but it is the pleasing of the inner ear that is decisive in our estimation of the best verse and poetry. A finer, more elusive music is demanded than technical exegesis can ever explain. For very often, listening to a passage of poetry which is richly caressing of the inner ear, one finds that it is apparently very simple in technique. Yet in some indefinable way it makes one hear overtones and harmonies which the voice alone cannot express. There is a sensory rhythm, but there are also rhythms set up in the mind and in the emotions which defy analysis, which most move one at the very time they escape one's efforts to seize them.

Minor verse is personal and frequently intimate in character. One might call it the singing of the personal sentiments. It is predominantly lyrical. The characteristic effect is that the reader is bathed in sentiment. For a pure example of this sentimental laving, consider Ben Jonson's song, "To Celia," which has the remarkable power of compelling even the tone-deaf to rise to their feet and enthusiastically attempt to sing, "Drink to me only with thine eyes." The *Oxford Book of English Verse* abounds in examples (minor verse is of course the most populous region on Parnassus) and the reader will require only a few for the sake of illustrating the rest; he can easily expand the list. I shall name Sir Thomas Wyatt's "The Appeal": An Earnest Suit to his Unkind Mistress, not to Forsake him, Sir Philip Sidney's "The Bargain," Thomas Lodge's "Rosalind's Madrigal," and Lord Byron's "When We Two Parted." To come to the moderns, there is William Butler Yeats's "The Lake Isle of Innisfree," from which, well known though it is, I shall quote two stanzas to bring on to my page just that delicious outflow of intimate sentiment I spoke of previously as drenching the reader.

"I will arise and go now, and go to Innisfree,
 And a small cabin build there, of clay and wattles made;
 Nine bean rows will I have there, a hive for the honey bee,
 And live alone in the bee-loud glade.

"And I shall have some peace there, for peace comes dropping slow,
 Dropping from the veils of the morning to where the cricket sings;
 There midnight's all a glimmer, and noon a purple glow,
 And evening full of the linnet's wings."

America, of course, does not lack for fine writers of sentimental lyrics, foremost among the living being Miss Edna St. Vincent Millay.

The next category consists of verse embodying reflective emotion, and this is called major verse. In it emotion is associated with reflection. It is a direct consequence of the mind's interest in the questions of philosophy, the quickening and enlargement of the feelings that come from revolving the eternal topics and mysteries of birth, death, the destiny of man, the strangeness of time, the meaning of the universe, and kindred enigmatic problems. In major verse we get powerfully felt reflection; the movement of the mind has set up a much greater movement in the emotions, so that we get not philosophy but a different thing, philosophical emotion. Who would be representative writers of major verse?

Surely Matthew Arnold is one with his verses of religious doubt; "Dover Beach" is a perfect example. And a certain amount of Shelley is in this category. "The Hymn to Intellectual Beauty" is too long for quotation, but "Mutability" will do well as a touchstone for major verse:

"We are as clouds that veil the midnight moon;
 How restlessly they speed, and gleam, and quiver
 Streaking the darkness radiantly!—yet soon
 Night closes round, and they are lost for ever.

"Or like forgotten lyres, whose dissonant strings
 Give various response to each varying blast,
 To whose frail frame no second motion brings
 One mood or modulation like the last.

"We rest—a dream has power to poison sleep;
 We rise—one wandering thought pollutes the day;
 We feel, conceive or reason, laugh or weep;
 Embrace fond woe, or cast our cares away:

"It is the same!—For, be it joy or sorrow,
 The path of its departure still is free;
 Man's yesterday may ne'er be like his morrow;
 Naught may endure but Mutability."

It will be noticed that major verse provokes thought. The reader's feelings are stirred, but in such a way as to induce reflection upon the theme, and this reflection *tends* to be broad and impersonal. Recent verstifiers are shy of reflective emotion, but among Americans two practicers of major verse can instantly be named—E. A. Robinson and George Santayana.

It is evident that we are following with a difference the touchstone method of Matthew Arnold in his famous essay, "The Study of Poetry"; it is primarily purity, not pre-eminence, that we desire in our examples. Our categories are broad and permit of great variation within them. There are gradations and impurities. What we need, therefore, is a pure example, a specimen of the category taken out of its very center, regardless whether it is the highest example of verse or poetry to be found in that category. In this connection it is interesting to note that a considerable quantity of pretentious "modern verse" exists in a kind of mid-region between minor verse (the personal sentiment) and major verse (the relatively impersonal reflective emotion). In some of this verse, which has been highly praised, you have a stratum of rather special, idiosyncratic, personal sentiment and a stratum of rationalism or, better said perhaps, intellectualism. Such a "modern" thinks rather than reflects, and his emotions do not correspond in tone and weight to the intellectual elements. Other "modern" versifiers appear to me to fall into this mid-region by mingling imagism and abstract thought in an undesirable way. In reading such versifiers I am often reminded, while straining to understand their works, of the point Coleridge made several times in commenting on obscurity in poetry, but nowhere better than when he criticized his earlier work: "Satisfied that the thoughts, such as they were, could not have been expressed otherwise, or at least more perspicuously, I forgot to inquire, whether the thoughts themselves did not demand a degree of attention unsuitable to the nature and objects of poetry." Coleridge further observed that "our faulty elder poets sacrificed the passion and passionate flow of poetry to the subtleties of intellect and to the stars of wit; the moderns to the glare and glitter of a perpetual, yet broken and heterogeneous imagery, or rather to an amphibious something, made up, half of image and half of abstract meaning." Lack "the passion and passionate flow of poetry" our "moderns" often do, and very often their content is truly "an amphibious something."

This is by the way. The main object is to make the principles of classification clear by brief exposition and by a few examples selected for their purity. A grasp of principles comes first; after that tact in applying them can

be cultivated. Without tact pedantry will be the result; here, as elsewhere, when principles are inflexibly applied, fine discriminations are impossible.

We are now about to cross the dividing ridge between verse and poetry and climb into the rarer air and the rarer company. Verse is distinguished by its humanity; it is the song of Man as we know him, his familiar griefs and joys, his familiar doubts and intuitions about the nature of life. In reading verse we are among human beings. But cross the ridge and we are in a select company far removed from ordinary humanity. These are the poets of the race, and they fall into two groups; one astonishing us by what can only be called its nonhumanity and the other, dwelling on the highest slope of Parnassus, intoxicating us by what seem to be the piercing notes of a superhumanity. The first group, the changelings, the makers of minor poetry, includes such poets as Keats (at times), Poe (again at times), and William Allingham. Turn if you will to Allingham's "The Fairies" in the *Oxford Book of Verse* and read it to catch the mood of the strange world of our minor poets, a world that seems to exist on another planet. Dryden called this "the Fairy Way of Writing" and Addison wrote an essay upon it. "There is a kind of Writing," the latter declared, "wherein the Poet quite loses sight of Nature, and entertains his Reader's Imagination with the Characters and Actions of such Persons as have many of them no Existence, but what he bestows on them. Such as Fairies, Witches, Magicians, Demons, and departed Spirits. . . . (the poet must make his Fairies talk) like other Sets of Beings, who converse with different Objects, and think in a different manner from that of Mankind."

For further illustration the reader can be referred to Poe's moonscape and the moonstruck emotions in "Annabel Lee" and to Coleridge's fragmentary "Kubla Khan." But the master is Shakespeare, as Addison proclaimed. "There is something so wild and yet so solemn in the Speeches of his Ghosts, Fairies, Witches and the like Imaginary Persons, that we cannot forbear thinking them natural, tho' we have no Rule by which to judge of them, and must confess, if there are such Beings in the World, it looks highly probable they should talk and act as he has represented them."

Perhaps the best way to characterize minor poetry for modern readers, who do not like such phrases as "the Fairy Way of Writing," is to say that it conveys a sentiment of *impersonal delight*. There is delight, but it is infinitely removed from us; it has none of the warmth of ordinary humanity and no sympathy with our leaden states; the minor poet appears to be singing

impersonally from some bright point far above our daily occupations. The minor poet is Ariel.

One cannot help asking if there are in this sense any minor poets today. The depressing truth is that there is scarcely a trace of the pure elfin spirit in us and we have indeed become all-too-human. But a vestige of Ariel still survives, most purely, it seems to me, in certain elvish poems by the contemporary English poet, Ruth Pitter, praised by Hilaire Belloc and John Masefield.

It remains to hint at the nature of major poetry. As sublimity is the mark of the highest prose, so ecstasy is the mark of the highest poetry. We are raised, exalted, into superhuman regions. Here there is that greatest richness for the inner ear, a richness that has been increasing as we ascended "the stream-bright side of the poetic mount." Here we find few but mighty singers, with Pindar perhaps the loftiest of all, although attempts at ranking of poets within the categories are being deliberately eschewed. It is a hierarchy of poetry, not of poets, we are establishing, and for that only clear examples of the category are needed, not a weighing of the claims of rivals for pre-eminence. Our examples of major poetry will be the "Song of Bacchus" by the Indian Maid in Keats's "Endymion," and the Choruses in Swinburne's "Atalanta in Calydon," those Choruses beginning, "When the hounds of spring are on winter's traces" and "We have seen thee, O Love, thou art fair; thou art goodly, O Love." There has been lately much justifiable adverse criticism of Swinburne's way with language, and he has rather fallen in favor. But no criticism of his foamy rush of words can take away the laurel that belongs to him at his best, his ecstatic moments.

As a rule, major poetry, so high is the flight, is only shortly sustained, and it has been asserted that in all English poetry there are but about four hundred lines that deserve the title. In any case, the number of lines is comparatively small, and I think we may claim as the chief glory of American poetry in recent years that it has added a few more lines to the precious treasury. I am thinking of the Chorale in R. Ellsworth Larsson's "O City, Cities!" and of the short third section in Robert Hillyer's "The Gates of the Compass." Most confidently do I assert that Ruth Pitter in England has composed major poetry, and adduce in support an ode which has received magazine publication since her book, *First and Second Poems*, appeared. Let Miss Pitter's music from the remote heights conclude the schematic portion of this essay.

SILENCE

"Here where the cold pure air is filled with darkness,
graced but by Hesper and a comet streaming,
censed by the slight smoke from a herdsman's hearthstone
I stand with silence,

"void of desire, but full of contemplation
both of these herds and of the gods above them;
mindful of these, and offering submission
to those immortal.

"Older than they, the frosty air about me
speaks to the flocks like careful age, like winter,
saying, Seek shelter: to the gods, I know ye:
and to me nothing

"Save but that silence is the truth; the silent
stars affirm nothing, and the lovely comet
silent impending, like a nymph translated,
abides in heaven.

"Shall not I also stand and worship silence
till the cold enter, and the heart, the housewife,
spin no more, but sit down silent in the presence
of the eternal?"

III

The whole tradition of objective criticism is a subject too unwieldy for the proportions allotted in this essay. A kind of critical synecdoche ought therefore to be pardoned; we shall take only one strand of it, the strand that starts with Joseph Addison, runs through Edmund Burke and S. T. Coleridge, and is well represented in the late nineteenth century by Viscount Morley, and let this strand stand for the total tradition.

In a series of *Spectator* papers Addison discourses on the Pleasures of the Imagination, finding in sight the most perfect of our senses, situating the pleasure of the imagination between the grosser ones of sense and the more laborious and abstract ones of the understanding, speculating on the final causes of imaginative pleasure, why we enjoy what is great, uncommon or beautiful, and so on. These papers make a pleasant if mild introduction to the type of thinking which loves to hierarchize. Edmund Burke's *A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas on the Sublime and Beautiful* is a much stronger presentation of the hierarchic view, as would be expected

from a man of Burke's stamp; his work greatly impressed Lessing. John Morley summarized both Burke and Addison when, in 1879, he commented on this early work of Burke's as follows, after first pointing out its faults. "But at least one signal merit remains to the *Inquiry*. It was a vigorous enlargement of the principle which Addison had not long before timidly illustrated, that critics of art seek its principles in the wrong place, so long as they limit their search to poems, pictures, engravings, statues, and buildings, instead of first arranging the sentiments and faculties in man to which art makes its appeal. Addison's treatment was slight and merely literary; Burke dealt boldly with his subject on the base of the most scientific psychology that was then within his reach. To approach it on the psychological side at all was to make a distinct and remarkable advance in the method of the inquiry which he had taken in hand."

But on critical aim and method the most uncompromising authority is Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who tells us in the *Biographia Literaria* that he "labored at a solid foundation, on which permanently to ground my opinions, in the component faculties of the human mind itself, and their comparative dignity and importance. According to the faculty or source, from which the pleasure given by any poem or passage was derived, I estimated the merit of such poem or passage." And again, in words that can have an uncomfortably close application to contemporary criticism, Coleridge says: "Till in the place of arbitrary dictation and petulant sneers, the reviewers support their decisions by reference to fixed canons of criticism, previously established and deduced from the nature of man; reflecting minds will pronounce it arrogance in them thus to announce themselves to men of letters, as the guides of their taste and judgment."

When, by whom or by what forces, has the issue raised by Coleridge been settled in favor of other critical aims and principles? Yet there has been a change. It is commonly felt, as I have said, that there are no fixed canons of criticism and that it is better not to try to deduce them from the nature of man. It is felt that pure criticism finds its principles entirely in the work of art, and that the psychology of the beholder and the creator involves us in nonaesthetic considerations. But this is merely an example of change; the older tradition, one can say, has not been honestly confronted and honestly destroyed; it has merely been superseded. We have not today a better grounded school of critics but only a more fashionable school. Critical theory has changed; the nature of man, the component faculties of the mind itself,

and their comparative dignity and importance remain what they have always been. If we base our criticism on them, we shall be superior to fashion in all the ages.

We have been contemplating whole orders of verse and poetry, discriminating among them according to an ascending series of emotional states: lyric sentimentalism, reflective emotion, impersonal delight, ecstasy—it being assumed that each state receives noble expression. Why is this spoken of as an ascending series? The most general answer is that verse springs from interested emotions (the lyric sentiment, the reflective feeling), and poetry from the disinterested or impartial emotions (nonhuman delight, superhuman ecstasy). This is the ultimate psychological division between the versewriter and the poet: the versewriter is identified with his humanity, he is identified with his personal sentiments, his reflective emotions; whereas the poet is non-identified with his ordinary humanity, he has reached a region outside humanity or a plane above humanity. The poet is disinterested (not uninterested, but without a personal stake or bias in his song) and the versewriter is interested, is attached at all points to mundane existence. Our stations begin with the very human and culminate in the godlike.

But why is it that we esteem, that the age-long wisdom of the race, the common sense of mankind, the consensus of experience, esteem the disinterested emotions above the interested ones? We are actually partial beings, creatures of prejudice, viewing life from a narrow personal angle. But there is diffused and lambent throughout mankind a fundamental discontent with this state, and this discontent is begotten of the intuition that man has the potentiality of becoming impartial, of freeing himself from bias, of taking the broad, disinterested view and experiencing the high emotions associated with it. All our honored virtues, like justice, depend upon the attainment of disinterestedness; we know that we approach nearer to truth as we approximate the disinterested state. So we have verse as representative of actual man and poetry as the strains emanating from potential man as he actualizes himself more fully.

The case may be expressed still more strikingly. Disinterestedness is the outcome of a harmonizing and perfecting of our various faculties, latent as well as actual. It increases, in fact, as consciousness increases. The more self-knowledge, the more self-development we achieve, then the more consciousness we have and the more disinterestedness. In a word, we have more life if we increase our consciousness and with it our ability to be impartial.

In the ultimate analysis, it is the maximum amount of life which major poetry possesses that makes us value it more than the other orders.

It is possible now to apply this criterion of life (quantitatively and qualitatively considered) to the subdivisions of the grand divisions, verse and poetry. There are degrees of interestedness, and in minor verse the degree is highest. The minor versewriter is completely identified with his jealousy or his sorrow or his joy; he is confined to a relatively small circle of pure personal feeling. But the reflective versewriter enlarges the circle; he adds a term, thought, which enriches and generalizes his emotion, weakens his identification with passing personal states and enables him to address more of his reader, to appeal to his thoughtful side as well as his feeling side.

Passing to minor poetry, we must observe that there are also degrees of disinterestedness. The minor poet feels life as though he were an extra-terrestrial being, a dweller on a very different planet where life is more marvelous than on earth, but his view though detached is special and not comprehensive. Above these beings are the gods who partake in the whole life of the cosmos and who experience cosmic emotions. Akin to them is the major poet, for he has tasted of the ecstasy of the emotional understanding of the cosmos and transmits to us its strange taste.

My language has taken on a mythological tinge, and nowadays we feel embarrassed when that happens. The important thing is that literary criticism should resume its former major interest in the nature of man and bring its literary findings into some kind of harmony with that nature. One may entertain moderate hopes that it will do so, that it will repudiate the pseudo-scientific flummery of the day and ground itself again on the solid stratum of human nature and common sense. There are even little publicized forces today in the field of psychology that can enormously further such a return and give it a true scientific backing.

A Causerie on Recent Books

R. BIRCH HOYLE

I HAVE been forestalled. It was my intention to say something about Jacques Maritain's book, *Humanisme Integral* and Anders Nygren's *Agape and Eros* this time. But W. M. Horton has "made a jump" ahead by his *Contemporary Continental Theology*, which has had a good reception in England. Maritain's book has been translated into English, under the title, *True Humanism* (Bles, London), while Nygren's second volume, Part Two, has in part been issued in English. "In part," for the history of the Christian idea of Love is to appear in two volumes; the first of which is now out (S.P.C.K., translated by P. S. Watson). Doctor Horton has given a good outline of these two books to which readers are referred (pp. 59-61: 163-168).

Nygren's book is severely handled in last year's Hulsean Lectures, by Mr. John Burnaby in "a study of Saint Augustine's teaching on the Love of God as the Motive of Christian life." The title of Burnaby's book is *Amor Dei* (Hodder & Stoughton, London). Nygren's contention is that the two Greek words for love, which form the title of his book, are opposites and not complements to one another. Eros is the love of desire, man's selfish desire for his own pleasure and self-satisfaction; egocentric and not theocentric. This word does not occur in the New Testament, whose word for love is Agape. The latter is God's love for man, not motivated by any merit or excellence in man: as the hymn well states it:

". . . unmerited and free
Delights our evil to remove,
And help our misery."

Eros, he says, is motivated with desire, not primarily for God, but for its own satisfaction, the "*summum bonum*": it uses God for its own ends. So Nygren says the two words "are by nature totally antithetic"; they are "two opposite attitudes to life," are "rivals or enemies." In tracing the "history of the Christian idea of love" Nygren shows how the two were kept distinct by the early Christian Fathers, and then fatally combined by Augustine.

Mr. Burnaby seeks to refute that charge against Augustine. In doing

so he gives a valuable study of the development of Augustine's religion: he translates long passages from Augustine's works, especially the *Tractatus on Saint John*, and *Expositions on the Psalms*, of which he says that "if all the works of Augustine were lost but these, we should still possess all we needed for a reconstruction of his personal religion." Further, Augustine's debts to Plato, Plotinus, Aristotle, are well brought out; indeed one chapter is headed, "The Platonist's Christianity," in which the author boldly affirms that "the message of Christ is the message of Plato." In a word, Platonism is seen to be a "praeparatio evangelica," being "the foundation upon which all his (Augustine's) thinking is built." Consequently, Mr. Burnaby has to attack "the 'social gospel' and the 'theology of Crisis,' the distinctive 'heresies' of English-speaking and German-speaking Christianity at the present time;" the chief exponents being John Macmurray and Emil Brunner, Nygren's "background" being Barthian.

So the book is important as reaction against Crisis-Theology; features seen also in Principal Cairns' severe criticism of Kraemer's *The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World* (cf. January *International Review of Missions*). It is important too for the rich material drawn from Augustine on Love's Meaning, Order; the Love of God; Sin and Punishment; Grace and Reward; and especially the doctrine of Pure Love as taught by Saint Bernard, Thomas Aquinas, Luther, Francis de Sales, Fénelon and Bishop Butler.

By a strange coincidence, Augustine's teaching is prominent in Barth's study of *The Holy Ghost and the Christian Life* (F. Muller, London). He shows how "the Holy Spirit . . . is not identical with . . . our own created spirit"; that at times Augustine recognized this—and then forgot it! "He attempted to find the uncreated Spirit in continuity with man's created spirit," and failed to "realize that righteousness by works was contained in this idea of God." "This continuity cannot belong to the creature itself—as an original endowment in his make-up—but only to the Creator in His relation to the creature. . . . It can only be taken as a second marvel of God's love; as the inconceivable, undeserved, divine bestowal on His creature"—exactly Nygren's thesis! And against the Platonist view, espoused by Burnaby and Doctor Inge, Doctor Barth says bluntly, "The Spirit of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, or even the Spirit of Love, or the Spirit of Goodness married to Holiness, in which man has a share more or less, is certainly the Evil Spirit when taken as a substitute for the Holy Spirit. To make that other

spirit the conqueror over sin is to put a fox in charge of geese!" The three great sections of Barth's small but important work, *The Holy Ghost as Creator, as Reconciler, as Redeemer*, are well worth study by those wanting more and true "Religion in Life."

A longer work by Barth, the Gifford Lectures for 1937-8, is entitled *The Knowledge of God and the Service of God* (Hodder & Stoughton, London). This is an exposition of the Reformation teaching as given in John Knox's Scots Confession of 1560. It is impossible to summarize these twenty lectures within the space at our disposal. It was a surprise to find Barth, of all men, as Gifford lecturer. For the terms of the Gifford Foundation required the lecturers "to treat their subject as a strictly natural science . . . without reference to or reliance upon any supposed special, exceptional or so-called miraculous revelation." Barth, the sworn foe of Natural Theology, refused at first, but later accepted, provided that he be allowed to state, dialectically, what the deistic view of Lord Gifford opposed. In *The Knowledge of God*, Barth states his theory of revelation under cover of Knox's words: in *The Service of God*, we have the Christian ethic that issues from that revealed knowledge. Here is valuable material on the meaning of Church and Worship, and, particularly, on the relation of the State's Service of God—germane to present affairs in Germany. Cannon Kenneth Mozley of Saint Paul's has said of the theology: "It is indeed theology—only a man of trivial mind could fail to appreciate the majesty of his faith in God, and the confidence, never arrogant but completely without reserve, that the knowledge of God is, in the fullest sense, knowledge of reality" (*The Spectator*, Jan. 5, 1939). The words of so competent a judge should send readers to this book.

Those who can read German should not miss Barth's new pamphlet on *The Church and the Political Problem of Today*—to wit: Nazism (Zollikon Buchhandlung). It peals like a prophet's trumpet to all Christendom to pray and work—and if need be, fight—to pull down and remove Nazism, as a menace to Christianity, "a new Turkish invasion," and to righteous and lawful State government. "Whoso rejects and persecutes Jews," he says, "rejects and persecutes Him who died, first of all for the sins of the Jews, and then for our sins. A man who is a Jew-hater is a hater of Christ. Anti-Semitism is sin against the Holy Ghost, for Anti-Semitism means rejection of God's Grace."

Mention of Jews calls attention to the valuable books on Jewish religion now issuing from the press. *A Rabbinic Anthology* (Macmillan) collected

by the late Mr. Montefiore and the present Reader in Rabbinics at Cambridge (England)—Mr. Loewe—presents in 1661 extracts every aspect of theology and ethics given in the Midrashim and Talmudic teachings of the Rabbis.

The third volume of a series on Judaism and Christianity is out. *Law and Religion* is its title (Sheldon Press, London). The first dealt with "The Age of Transition," the second, "The Contact of Pharisaism and other Cultures," lectures on which were delivered by eminent Jewish and Christian scholars. In this third volume of lectures, given in Manchester (England) University, Jews, Roman Catholics and Protestants deal with the relation of law to religion, in primitive times, in Babylonia and Assyria, in Israel (this is by Dr. Wheeler Robinson), among Samaritans, in Islam, Medieval Judaism and in Thomas Aquinas. Very valuable is Professor Mauson's lecture on "Jesus, Paul, and the Law," in which their attitude toward Pharisaism is shown to be the same. As Archbishop Temple shows in his Foreword, this book is very timely, for the relation of Law to Religion is challenged. "This fundamental doctrine (that is, that justice has relation to personality and that a person has just rights against the State) is challenged. On no such theory of justice can the treatment of the Jews in Germany and Austria be upheld or even tolerated. And indeed that whole theory of justice is avowedly abandoned alike in Germany and in Russia."

Young men of mark to watch are Professors C. H. Dodd and H. H. Farmer. Both are known in America: the former lectured last year at Cambridge (Massachusetts), Union Seminary, New York City, and Andover-Newton Seminary. His theme was *History and the Gospel* (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York). The five chapters deal with "Christianity as an Historical Religion," "The Historical Tradition in the New Testament," "Historical Criticism of the Gospels," "The Gospel Story," "The Church in History." What "the Gospel" is; how it is "a divine intervention in history"; how "history, as a process of redemption and revelation, has a beginning and an end, both in God"; how "the Church is always a disturbing factor," "bringing a crisis" both "to individuals and to communities and civilizations": these things are lucidly explained.

Professor Farmer's volume of sermons, *The Healing Cross* (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York), is of exceptional value for its searching analysis of the human heart when confronted by the sovereign claims of God's righteousness and mercy, as seen in Christ's death.

Ministerial Ethics

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE

PRACTICAL codes of ethics are the darkest mystery in the Protestant ministry. Men and women of the laity learn only by chance that an elaborate etiquette of professional conduct exists. That is, they learn only by chance unless they are pedantic in spirit and curious by nature—men and women who have unusual opportunities or who are intrigued by the world about them and insistent upon knowing the details of its operation.

It remains a fact that there are thousands of Christian laymen, faithful participants in the work of the church, who are altogether unaware that their pastors consider themselves governed by ethical rules in their relations with fellow clergymen, members of the congregation, members of other churches, and non-church citizens in the community. There are thousands more who are vaguely conscious that there *are* rules of pastoral conduct, but who are confused and uncertain when there arise occasions to respect them. How many American laymen, whatever their activity in the church, know exactly the attitude of their pastors toward marriage of the divorced, toward fees for funerals, toward solicitation of new members of the congregation, or even toward visitation of the sick? The present writer confesses, in proper humiliation, that after many years of consistent lay activity in a number of churches he too was still among the ignorant; and, while on vacation from professional duties in a university, only a chance conversation with a pastor brought an awakening to the problems of the much-shared predicament.

Indeed, by the development of a strange and almost unbelievable reticence, it has become in many ministerial circles unethical to talk about professional ethics—particularly to the laity. If a minister assumes a new pastorate, he does not mention his personal convictions upon the ethics of clerical practice lest he be suspected of affectation. If a man has long been pastor of a church, he does not discuss ethics lest he wound or offend those in his congregation who have unwittingly transgressed his views of the fit and the proper.

This is not an occasion to point out the lack of uniformity of professional conduct in the ministry. It need not be said, perhaps, that in almost every clerical relation ministers differ in their practices and not infrequently hold

radically contrasting opinions. In respect to weddings, a few in the clergy refuse to marry any person divorced, no matter what the extenuating circumstances; some frankly marry any couple who come with a license; others marry only a member of the congregation or perform the ceremony only after investigation of probable compatibility; and there is even a growing sentiment among ministers to marry only after giving instruction in marital relationships. In regard to funerals, a few clergymen serve only their own parishioners; others conduct a service whenever requested; still others decline to serve members of another congregation save in the absence of the pastor. Many accept speaking invitations whenever they are extended, whether the audience be civic or religious; a few speak only in religious services and never in another church except by invitation of its pastor; perhaps most are careful to exercise discrimination. Probably a majority of ministers will not visit the sick in another congregation except by request, but there are many who make sweeping exceptions. Everywhere the clergyman is beset by problems of conduct, whether his personal code be rigid or flexible; and the problems are not made simpler by the inevitable conflicts which arise from the extreme diversity of professional opinion and practice.

Deplorable it may be that uniformity of ethical conduct does not exist, and it is also a matter of frequent lament that nothing effective has been done toward standardization. Even in seminaries, instruction in ministerial ethics is treated with a casualness which invites both laxity and diversity of observance; and certainly there has been no encouragement for instruction of the laity. But education of the laity is an easier matter than agreement upon uniform principles of ministerial practice, although achievement of the latter would simplify the problem of teaching.

Lay ignorance of clerical practice, particularly of the code of the resident pastor, is more than an inconvenience. Undoubtedly embarrassment results from uncertainty whether a specific request should or should not be made of a pastor. The difficulty of this dilemma tempts the perplexed layman to ignore the minister and to lose the benefit of his counsel and help. Unfortunate, too, is the unpleasantness, often unexpressed, brought about when a minister feels that he must decline. Friction is likely to follow any refusal, whether or not it is accompanied by an explanation of ethical objections; and too often an explanation is itself incomplete, because the layman has little or no familiarity with the very existence of ethical codes. Unconvinced that a refusal is based upon honor rather than upon petulance, the lay mind is prone

to harbor resentment which condemns the minister and perchance even the clergy itself.

Instruction in ministerial ethics should be given a place in the program of the church school. If such instruction is to be most useful, however, it must include the viewpoint of the congregation's pastor; and the most simple expedient is tactful and sympathetic pastoral participation in education. If the minister is willing to take the initiative, instruction may still remain indirect if he will take into his confidence leaders in the congregation. Most clergymen, it is true, welcome the suggestion of lay initiation in the practices of professional ethics; but they are none the less reluctant to risk indiscretion by inaugurating a program of lessons. Initiative, if it is ever to be forthcoming, is thus likely to be forced into lay lands. Whatever the source, the movement should be under way. Ignorance is inconsistent with Protestant tenets and, like spiritual darkness, is productive only of injury and misunderstanding.

Book Reviews

England Before and After Wesley.

By J. WESLEY BREADY. New York:
Harper & Brothers. \$3.50.

THIS book is a veritable treasure house of information about the times in which Wesley lived. An enormous, almost an appalling, amount of research has gone into the preparation of the work. Others have told us of general movements working on a wide scale through the eighteenth century, but Doctor Bready is the only one who has given us such a mass of concrete detail, thoroughly authenticated, well arranged, and interestingly and even vividly set before us. It may be possible to urge, in criticism of the book, that it pictures many forms of evil in Wesley's time of which Wesley was not himself aware, as for example, the reference to the brutal sport of fastening an owl to a duck's back and watching the distress of the owl as the duck pulled him under water. Aberrations like this can be found at almost any time if one searches carefully enough with the proverbial fine-tooth comb. Whether Wesley himself saw all the things recorded in this book, however, is not quite the question. The spirit of evil which showed itself in such freakish cruelty was a part of the controlling wickedness of the age. It was against the general spirit of the time that Wesley fought so valiantly and with such far-reaching results for good as those described in the later chapters of the book. To get a realistic picture of forces against which Wesley had to contend and of the actual changes which he wrought, the reader will find Doctor Bready's work of incalculable helpfulness.

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Jesus and His Church. By R. NEWTON FLEW. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

ONE of the inevitable results of the ecumenical conferences of 1937 is a deepened interest in the Church of Christ as the instrument of God's eternal purpose of redemption. It was made plain at these conferences that in the ideological conflict which is now being waged between supporters of the doctrine of the totalitarian State and believers in the Christian religion, the issues will largely be determined by the ability of Christians to overcome the weakness of disunion and to present a united front of opposition to the common enemy. This does not necessarily imply the achievement of organic unity in the near future. It does imply the recovery of the essential idea of the New Testament Ecclesia, that of a universal Church on earth to which all Christians belong in virtue of their personal relationship to Christ who is its Head.

For Protestants, such a conception must be based upon the authority of the Scriptures. Here the first question to be confronted is whether there is room for the idea of the Ecclesia in the teaching of Jesus Himself, who has everything to say about the Kingly Rule of God on earth and little, if anything, about the Church as an instrument to promote it—in common with most New Testament scholars, Doctor Flew finds Matthew 16. 17-19 insufficient ground on which to build the great edifice. But what is not expressly stated may be implied, and in implications of the teaching and the acts of Jesus the author finds the answer to his question and the solution of his prob-

lem. Although our Lord did not lay down a constitution or ordain a graduated hierarchy of officials who were to govern the community, the choice of twelve men in itself implies the beginning of an organization, and the teaching of a particular prayer is the beginning of a distinctive worship. His very conception of Messiahship implies the gathering of a new community; the conception of the "Word" or "Gospel" is constitutive of this new community; His preaching and His ethical teaching is directed to it, and its Mission is declared when Jesus sends forth disciples. (In this connection, even greater stress might have been laid upon Luke 10. 17-20, which describes what has been termed "the most crucial moment in the history of the world." "Jesus was no longer alone in His use of the Kingdom's power; the missionaries had it also and could communicate it to others, and they to still others indefinitely" (B. S. Easton).

To these decisive "moments" in the action of Jesus in constituting the Ecclesia another is added: at the Last Supper He instituted the new covenant with His disciples as representing the new people of God.

Other parts of the New Testament afford a wealth of evidence that it was the universal conviction of the early Christians that the Church was the true Israel. In tracing this conviction to Jesus Himself, Doctor Flew has proceeded with care, patience, and scrupulous regard for the character of the evidence, thereby making his book a notable contribution in a field of ecumenical interest and importance, which led prolonged attention in the Second World Conference on Faith and Order at Edinburgh in 1937.

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Doctrines of the Creed. By OLIVER C. QUICK. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.75.

ONE of the interesting theological signs of the times is the renewed interest in creeds and confessions. Karl Barth's *Credo* and his more recent Gifford Lectures on the Scottish Confession of 1560 are two outstanding examples. In our own country within the last two or three years several writers, namely, Earl L. Douglass, T. Gouwens, J. M. Vandermeulen, and others, have dealt explicitly with the Apostles' Creed. In Canon Quick's book we have a British contribution to this growing literature. As early as 1916 Oliver Chase Quick, now Canon of Durham Cathedral and Professor of Divinity in the University of Durham, was battling for the doctrines of the Creed in his *Essays in Orthodoxy*. This present volume comprises his university lectures, but although it suggests at times the atmosphere of the classroom it is not too technical in its treatment for the intelligent layman.

The Canon distinguishes in the Preface between dogmatic theology which asks the question, "What does the Church teach as *de fide?*" and systematic theology which asks, "How can we best understand and interpret as a coherent whole the doctrinal tradition of our Church?" Whether or not this distinction is valid or valuable, it is interesting to note that Canon Quick chooses to call his book "an essay in systematic theology"—interesting because a compatriot, Nathaniel Micklem, takes the "dogmatic" approach in his *What is the Faith?* and seeks to point out regardless of his own convictions just what the faith of the Church is.

Canon Quick uses the Apostles' Creed as a framework in which the content of the Christian faith may be placed and examined (cf. Calvin's *Institutes*), and in this sense he seems to regard the Creed as

a minimum rather than a maximum confession of faith (cf. Barth's *Credo*). He makes occasion, for example, to deal with the theories of the atonement though no mention of the atonement is explicitly made in the Creed. One wonders, however, by the same token, why he did not consider it necessary to deal adequately with the doctrines of revelation, man, and sin.

Aside from the Canon's lucid language and enviable powers of analysis and definition, his book is to be praised and recommended because of the conviction, which he puts to practice throughout, that "the interpretation of doctrine must always be based upon the interpretation of Scripture." It is with this Biblical basis in mind, no doubt, that his *Doctrines of the Creed* bears the sub-title, "Their basis in Scripture and their meaning today."

HUGH THOMSON KERR, JR.
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The First Five Centuries of the Church. By JAMES MOFFATT.
Nashville: The Cokesbury Press.
\$2.00.

In *The First Five Centuries of the Church*, Professor Moffatt has made a distinguished contribution to an already distinguished series of books entitled "The London Theological Library."

Those of us who were brought up on Professor Moffatt's *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament* have learned to expect from all his works sound scholarship and encyclopedic knowledge. This work is no exception to the rule, and is an important contribution to an understanding of the really formative years of the Christian Church without an understanding of which its subsequent development would be unintelligible.

Doctor Moffatt has written a chapter

on each of the first five centuries of the Church, and has briefly indicated the main points of development in each century. The book is rather unique in the fact that at the beginning of each chapter there is a fairly exhaustive "Secular Chronology" of the century on the left-hand page, and a "Church Chronology" on the right-hand page—often extending for ten pages. This feature, coupled with a fifty-one page bibliography at the end, makes *The First Five Centuries of the Church* a valuable book of reference for those who desire to learn where to go for the primary sources.

Doctor Moffatt is to be congratulated on this contribution to the field in which he is such a master.

GEOFFREY WARDLE STAFFORD.
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Latin America: Its Place in World Life. By SAMUEL GUY INMAN.
Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company. \$3.75.

In a book of ample proportions a master in this field expounds the economic, social and political developments in Latin America, as related to the world situation, and clarifies the issues.

The recent attempt of European nations to get at least an economic, if not a political, foothold in South and Central America has served to call attention in the United States to the questions involved. A definite indication of decreasing suspicion of the United States is to be found in many quarters in Latin America, and a consequent increase in willingness to unite in the common interest. But beneath this scene is a shifting, hot political magma which threatens many undesirable possibilities. Latin America, in several respects, is different from North America. First, it was

threatened by North American imperialism and commercialism; now it is threatened by European Communism and Fascism. A languor and primitiveness about much of the life there is both difficult and exasperating for the North American. Due, in part, to different standards of education and social development, many of the nations of Latin America have never achieved any real democracy, but are at the mercy of a dictator.

Indian, Iberian, and African racial strains have their influence, and of course the early Spanish and Portuguese influences remain potent. Ideas from Europe, quarrels of classes, and the economic situation caused revolutions in some quarters. The Church had its great influence upon both economics and politics, making the road to democracy both long and hard, while the interference of foreign nations contributed to the situation.

In detail Doctor Inman studies the backgrounds of the chief nations, and instead of giving merely the historical data, interprets the issues as well in an account which is both clear and thorough. His bibliographies at the end of each section are notable aids also. After his surveys he is not ready to make any hard-and-fast predictions, but shows how revolutions have developed, and dictators come and gone, while the road to democracy still is untraveled by many nations. The social and political situation has been kept so turbulent that no other situation could be expected. The increased Pan-American unity may be a stabilizing force. So many facts and questions are touched upon in this comprehensive volume, that it really defies adequate review. It unfortunately does not consider a number of questions of international law and conference agreements and questions that would help additionally, it would seem, to clarify the position of the various nations, but within its scope it is a solid, painstaking, and re-

liable volume, a serious and valued contribution to the literature on Latin America in the world today.

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Record and Revelation. Essays on the Old Testament by Members of the Society for Old Testament Study. Edited by H. WHEELER ROBINSON. New York: Oxford University Press. \$4.00.

WHEN asked, What is the status of present-day Old Testament study? one of the most effective answers would be to point to this volume. A number of outstanding Old Testament scholars, representing Great Britain, the United States, and Germany, Christian and Jewish, have contributed essays, each as a specialist in his field, to record what research during the last fifteen years has brought to the understanding of the Old Testament. The book is the product of a society, founded in 1917, which comprises in its membership the foremost Old Testament scholarship in the world. A similar book was edited for the society by the late Professor A. S. Peake in 1925, *The People and the Book* (Clarendon Press).

An immense sweep and vast horizon characterize the treatment of subjects. It includes the new sources of knowledge; the literature of Israel, including its forms, contents, and modern criticism; the history of Israel, as affected by its imperial backgrounds, crises, and political and economic conditions; the religion of Israel, its origins, prophecy, worship, and ethics; the theology of the Old Testament—the philosophy of revelation and characteristic doctrines; archaeology and the Old Testament; the language of the Old Testament; the exegesis of the Old

Testament; the Old Testament and Judaism; the Old Testament and Christianity. The only important subject omitted in the treatment is textual criticism, being too vast to be here included.

It is to be expected that with such extensive and varied material and number of contributors, differences of judgment on certain points should appear. But the agreements outweigh the differences. All the contributors agree in the validity of the modern method and critical approach to the study of the Old Testament, and its value and meaning as the "Word of God." It is of no small moment that the object of the society and this publication is not merely scholastic, but to promote the general interests of international friendship and understanding.

The value of this publication to the general body of teachers of Bible and religion is obvious. It is impossible for the individual instructor to be up-to-date in all the literature of his field: he needs the aid of periodical surveys of the progress made by the contributions of special researches. This book is such a survey; it is not just for a casual reading; it is a handbook to supplement the standard textbooks on the Old Testament. And the ten-page bibliography, arranged by essays, is a guidebook.

ISMAR J. PERITZ.

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Bible and Religion.

Purity of Heart. By SOREN KIERKEGAARD. Translated from the Danish, with an Introductory Essay by Douglas V. Steere. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$2.00.

HERE is a title which in itself suggests the polemic with which the air is filled whenever Soren Kierkegaard sees fit to draw one of his repeated contrasts between conventional and official Christian-

ity and the real thing. The whole title in Professor Steere's translation reads, *Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing*. It is a powerful inquiry into the nature of what is called in modern religious phraseology, commitment. It analyzes, then carefully examines the parts or phases as they appear. The study is penetrating and remorseless. The intention is to leave a man so convinced and beaten in an argument that foresees every contingency that at the end he will not even try to enter upon any counterdialectic. Purity of heart is absolute single-mindedness and this, says the author, is the one and only way in which a man may serve God. And he had better not play any tricks, try any escapes or contrive any half-measures. It is "either-or." The only way to serve God is to do it completely. To say, "I will serve God and make money," "I will serve God and win fame," "I will serve God and win public approval," is all folly. Somewhere the divided mind will bring disaster, and the pleasant personal end which we desire will climb into first place and the doing of God's will be evaded or postponed. The kingdom of God must be sought first, it cannot be sought otherwise, and that implies the absolute necessity for purity of heart. The only desire that can be pure, simple, single, is the desire to do God's will; all other desires are dual or multiple or confused. The only steadfast mind is the one that rests in Him.

The alternatives are not merely ridden over, they are noted and argued singly and successively. Purity of heart in the service of God is set over against the impure compounds which contain desire for reward, the fear of punishment, the desire for personal victory, the withholding of complete surrender. The price of this absolute purity of mind is stated in terms both uncompromising and convincing. Kierkegaard gives us the essence of

the same argument used so effectively in the familiar opening chapters of Law's *Serious Call*, to the effect that we fail as disciples of Christ simply for want of serious intention. But the painfulness of self-examination induced by Soren Kierkegaard goes beyond anything to which William Law prompts us.

The translation is excellent. Professor Steere seems to have eased some difficult passages by devising shorter sentences and by breaking the text into sections and chapters with explanatory headings. This volume alone is enough to justify all the pains and cost of presenting Kierkegaard's work in English. No minister of the gospel can afford to ignore this man. As for the present volume, it should be made required reading in every rectory, parsonage and manse in America. It has been no easy task to review a book by Soren Kierkegaard. The reviewer so easily fancies that the author may be looking on with an expression of ironic amusement. He indeed looks disconcertingly satisfied, as if he were witnessing one more proof of his lifelong conviction that nobody understood or was willing to take the pains necessary to understand what he was talking about. Yet there was never a writer more intensely in earnest or who more heartily desired to be understood.

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What Is the Purpose of Life? By
LINDSAY DEWAR. London: Rich
& Cowan, Ltd. 3/6.

LEARNED in content, lucid in style, this is a wise and winsome volume. Reading it brings to mind some words of J. Middleton Murry: "It takes most men a lifetime to know what they really want, and the vast majority of human beings have not learned it on their deathbeds."

It is a book for the intellectually perplexed and the morally bewildered.

To the very practical question, What am I to do with my life? Doctor Dewar devotes highly illuminating chapters to the mutually exclusive or, at least, quite antithetical, attitudes which he designates "Utility" and "Appreciation." He says, "It must be clearly understood that there are two, and only two, fundamental attitudes to life. One is the appreciative attitude; the other is the utilitarian. Every person must decide, and in fact does decide, which of these two he is going to adopt. If appreciation is made primary, we have what is essentially a religious attitude to life (even though it be idolatrous); if utility is made primary, we have a state of mind which is essentially irreligious." True as his diagnosis is, Doctor Dewar seems to overlook the fact that ours is not an irreligious generation. Nor is it a religionless generation. It is a generation of passionate but perverted religions.

The final chapter is particularly helpful. It deals with what Saint Francis called Brother Ass. There are four attitudes which it is possible to take toward the body: we can ignore it; we can repress it; we can become a slave to it; and we can utilize it. Needless to say, it is for the latter that the learned author pleads—asking that the thinker in man become master of the eater in man—and for this he appeals in behalf of spiritual discipline, by which he means serious, systematic personal prayer and devotion.

Life is, indeed, worth living; but it is, to make no mistake about it, the plain man's business to see the ends and values for which he must live. Those ends and values are not always easily seen, and never are they easily won; they are, however, what give life its meaning, its basis and significance. And these ends and values are permanent and beyond the de-

structive reach of mortal tragedy. The book is mentally stimulating, cumulative in its argument, catholic in its quotations, and, homiletically, richly suggestive. It contains a helpful index.

HOBART D. McKEEHN.

The Abbey Church,
Huntingdon, Pennsylvania.

A Religion for Democracy. By RUSSELL HENRY STAFFORD. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00.

THE pulpit of Old South Church still has the flavor of Gordon's clear and independent thinking. In this book the present pastor of that historic church seeks to clarify our political thinking in this day of clamorous and martial oppugnance of divergent theories of the State. Democracies and the various forms of political organization based on economic ideology are in a life-and-death struggle for possession of the Western mind. If democracy is to survive, it must find a broader base than economic necessity.

Doctor Stafford begins with the recognition that democracy is more than a theory of the State. He defines it as an ideal of social living that seeks to dominate all human relationships. Very obviously such a concept of social life must either come to terms with religion, which also seeks expression in every form of social activity, or else, it must dismiss religion altogether as an outmoded element in modern life. This adjustment the author endeavors to make from the side of religion by subjecting all the chief intellectual conceptions of Christianity to a rapid and comprehensive restatement from the viewpoints of liberalism in thought and democracy in social theory. In doing this he is inclined like all the liberals of the last seventy-five years, to make "science" the arbiter between any conflicting claims of the political theory

and the Christian religion. "For no amount of wishful thinking," he says (p. 37), "could persuade us really to believe in Jesus' word if it departed from the truth as we read it (italics ours), in the bulkier book of the universe." We have read a great many things *into* the book of the universe that fuller knowledge has repudiated. If liberalism is "the habit of an open and inquiring mind, susceptible of control only by persuasion, and of persuasion only by reason and justice," then liberalism must be open-minded in its "science" as in its theology.

On the whole, the examination of religion in behalf of democracy is here well-done, barring a few minor divagations, for example, the diatribe against the "mass-emotion" evoked by Peter, "the well-meaning blunderer," upon the Day of Pentecost, and the reduction of Paul's "natural man" to the dull ineptitude of the "average man."

This work is, to paraphrase Walter Lippmann's title, "A Preface to a Religion for Democracy," and a valuable one.

Now we need a further study of the social aspects of Christianity. Up to now, we have regarded the social applications of Jesus' teaching as a mere transfer of individual conscience to the social sphere. Manifestly it is not so simple a thing as that. The State as a social unit cannot be subject to the same duties as the individual. The one is an artificial person; the other is a natural person. Perhaps that is the reason why Jesus never appealed to "conscience" as the basis of moral action, but made the broader appeal to "love." Love is the attitude which seeks the well-being of every individual. Here is the real basis of national duty, economic duty, social duty of every sort.

EDMUND JAMES KULP.
Grand Avenue Temple,
Kansas City, Mo.

It Began in Galilee. By REGINALD J. BARKER. Nashville: The Cokesbury Press. \$2.50.

THIS is an exceedingly suggestive book, replete with sermon material.

The author says the book "had to be written." That shows his earnestness. Its basic claim is that there is no sound cleavage between the social and the individual gospel, between the material and the spiritual, and he writes with enthusiasm, passion and wide understanding to "close the gap between the social and the evangelical." He "does not believe that the kingdoms of this world will ever be won for Christ until that synthesis is achieved." The book is an excellent illustration of the wide scope of popular British scholarship. It unites the social and evangelical approach into a new community of which Jesus is the vital center. The new man and the new community find their standards in Jesus. In this contention the author becomes a resourceful evangelist and also a forceful prophetic preacher.

The term "revolutionary" in the subtitle seems a bit unfortunate because it may discourage many from mining the pure gold in these pages. By "revolutionary" the author merely means "uncompromising." He feels that through the years the Christian position has yielded too much to the contemporary scene. The book seems no more revolutionary than does the Lord's Prayer or the Sermon on the Mount. Another of the author's basic contentions is that the gospel is estopped by the widespread belief that it is "impracticable"—ideal, but without value in the present world turmoil. This explains his desire to relate the teachings of Jesus to the problem areas of modern life. The book is rich in suggestions for implementing the New Testament in present-day experience. It is a tract for the times in that it calls upon all Christians to rebuild

society upon a principle of common kinship, making a synthesis of personal and social religion, and removing the barriers which keep men apart. It is a book for the layman who needs to widen his social vision. It contains an appealing interpretation of the spiritual compulsion in the New Testament for social action and urges with eloquence the necessity for the new community.

The discussion opens with a review of the neglected unity of life which has caused so many divisions in recent years. This is followed by four chapters dealing with the principles of the new community. The second part reviews eleven areas of living against the standards of Jesus as follows—Jesus as our example, Jesus and His Family, the Children, the Women, the Sick, the Poor, the Rich, the Foreigners, the Rulers, His Friends, concluding with a remarkable chapter on "Jesus and His Father," in which the reader will find a succinct review of the temptations of Jesus and the power of prayer in the earthly life of our Lord. It is, all in all, the work of a scholar who is also an interesting interpreter.

The outline of the book makes it easily adaptable for discussion groups, classes, midweek studies, or a series of sermons. A thoughtful perusal of this volume will enrich the life of the reader, and give to his ministry new seriousness and greater directness.

KARL QUIMBY.
Ridgewood, New Jersey.

A Theology for Christian Missions.
By HUGH VERNON WHITE. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company. \$2.00.

IF a copy of this vigorous book had been placed in the hands of each of the distinguished members of the Commission of Appraisal of the Laymen's Foreign Mission Inquiry before the writing of

Rethinking Missions, it is probable that their "Principal Conclusions" (page 325ff.) would have been less tentative and critical.

For it is no uncertain note that White sounds when he calls for the great advance of Christian Missions, not under outmoded theological phrases, nor under denominational shibboleths, nor even under a benevolent humanitarianism, but under the banner of the imperial convictions about God, Christ, Man and Love.

With the theological motif returning in renewed power to religious thought, one is pleased to find so worthy an "attempt to ground evangelical Christianity in beliefs about God, Christ and the nature of the spiritual life." "It is my strong conviction," he frankly states, "that the Christian mission must have an explicit theology to sustain it." Faith in God and faithfulness to Him and to men; repentance and forgiveness, and dynamic love and enthusiasm are among the chief features of "The Christian Life Pattern," which ought everywhere to be the goal and the result of the gracious conquest of the world in the name of Jesus Christ.

Because of the very remarkable success they have had, and due to changed conditions, Protestant missions have come to the end of an era. The old methods, however successful they may have been in former decades, must be altered, while a new strategy adequate to this dynamic age must be perfected. The two methods he most highly commends are "witness and friendship, by which the nature of Christianity is truly revealed and expressed."

No one could appreciate more keenly than does White the vast humanitarian achievements and opportunities of Christian Missions. He grounds the power of the urge to altruism in theology. Theology that is realistic inevitably expresses itself in loving service. It is no accident that he makes his closing chapter, perhaps

his best, "The Conquest of Selfishness."

The other chapters of this most readable book offer a balanced and comprehensive picture of the chief trends and movements in missionary thinking as viewed by a living theology. Of interest to minister and layman alike, they are "The Method of Missions," "The Eternal Gospel and the Relatives of Culture," "What Is Central in Christian Missions?" "The Basis of a New Apologetic," "Three Ways of Salvation," and "The Christian Life Pattern."

A fair sample of the clear and easy directness he employs in describing movements is found in these sentences: "In the main, the Orient has moved in the direction of some form of social solidarity, and the Occident has emphasized the freedom and right of the individual. Today we behold the curious spectacle of Asia being stirred by the Western spirit of individualism, while Europe is turning violently to the doctrine of solidarity. If only East could take warning from West and West from East, both parts of the world might be spared the disillusionment that is bound to follow from both courses."

White says a great many worthwhile things about the living issues which face Christian Missions, and says them well.

WELDON F. CROSSLAND.
Asbury-First Methodist Episcopal
Church, Rochester, N. Y.

The Meaning of the Humanities.

Five Essays by RALPH BARTON PERRY, AUGUST CHARLES KREY, ERWIN PANOFSKY, ROBERT LOWRY CALHOUN, GILBERT CHINARD; with a preface by ROBERT KILBURN Root; edited with an introduction by THEODORE MEYER GREENE. Princeton: Princeton University Press. \$2.50.

A GROUP of soundly learned and genuinely cultivated gentlemen are seen in

this volume about the task of examining the humane tradition as it becomes a discipline working upon contemporary knowledge and seeking to meet contemporary needs. Dr. Theodore M. Greene, Professor of Philosophy at Princeton, is all for a humanistic tradition where "older insights are not lost in the enthusiasm for new discoveries and creations" and where "man's earlier achievements are continually revitalized by new experiences and fresh perspectives." He reminds us that "creation wholly undisciplined by critical analysis and evaluation runs riot and issues in mere ebullient novelty, while criticism which is not vitalized by the creative imagination and which is not concerned with man's creative products feeds on itself and ends in sterility."

Professor Ralph Barton Perry of Harvard puts freedom at the very center of the humanistic tradition. "By freedom," he says, "I mean enlightened choice." He appreciates the necessity of appropriating the best which has been thought and done in the world, but he is sometimes gregarious in his mental hospitality. He deals with noble distinctions and says many wise things. Sometimes he is too casual and he is not quite secure in the insight that freedom leads only to futility unless it leads to noble choice. Its finest service is when it leads to the right choice in the light of permanent standards.

Professor August Charles Krey of the University of Minnesota sees the humanities in the light of the unfolding of the processes of learning through the centuries. He is intrigued by a type of mental life in which "there is no longer objection to the theologian's interest in the humanities, or the humanist's interest in theology, or the interest of either in natural phenomena." He sees the weakness in the historical writing where "only facts which could be expressed quantitatively,

analyzed statistically, and charted graphically seemed to matter."

Professor Erwin Panofsky, now of the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study, quotes Marsilio Ficino's definition of man as "a rational soul participating in the intellect of God, but operating in a body." He insists that "while science endeavors to transform the chaotic variety of natural phenomena into a cosmos of nature, the humanities endeavor to transform the variety of human records into what may be called a cosmos of culture." A work of art is a "man-made object demanding to be experienced aesthetically."

Professor Robert Lowry Calhoun of Yale reminds us that "a man is neither a plant nor a God." He defends theology as relevant to human need. He emphasizes the significance of the self-disclosure of God for the life of man. Theology attempts to hold the finite and the infinite together in one whole.

Professor Gilbert Chinard of Princeton regrets the fashion in which the study of literature has been dehumanized. He is sure that literature "penetrates further and deeper than any sociological investigation." He declares that we must "frankly and squarely ask the question whether our modern society is willing and ready deliberately to throw overboard the ballast of the ship and to ride the wild waves in an empty hull." Without the humanistic disciplines, clearly he feels that we would do just that.

The reader of this volume misses the sure-footed thought and the commanding powers of expression of those masters of humanism, Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More. But on a lower level there is much good thought in these essays. The right questions are asked and even when the thought is not coherent, it is provocative and significant.

LYNN HAROLD HOUGH.
Drew University.

A Working Faith for the World.

By HUGH VERNON WHITE.
New York: Harper & Brothers.
\$2.00.

GREAT abuse would be done Doctor White's exposition to say that it is an apologetic for Christian missions alone. It is that and much more. The missionary drive is one of the first fruits of the working faith which he considers definitive of Christianity in its widest implications.

What is that working faith? It is an individual's supreme loyalty to Reality, which loyalty (or faith) registers in spontaneous good will, the cornerstone of the kingdom of God. Doctor White's is an interesting synthesis of the "radically religious" orthodoxy of the Continental theologians and American activism. Both poles of his synthesis he explicitly rejects, "the overemphasis of the Barthians upon the sovereign will of God," which Doctor White maintains obscures the basically Christian doctrine of Personality, and, on the other hand, the dabbling in relatives which marks the efforts of the reformer.

In three penetrating chapters, Doctor White defines the goals of Christianity in history: Christian truth, personality, and community. Each of the goals is itself a universal; thus, Christianity is by its definition never particular, never parochial, but always world-embracing. This is what Doctor White means by liberal Christianity, the fulfillment of Judeo-Christianity, Roman Catholicism, Lutheran Protestantism, and Calvinism. It is basically evangelical, registering in good works.

Doctor White approaches his study from the standpoint of the need of a world faith in these troubled times, the role of the historic religions, some reflections upon the role of Christianity in the world and recommended methods of pro-

cedure for the dissemination of the universal faith, and the threefold description of universal Christianity as stated above.

Doctor White, in a study such as this, cannot sidestep the field of comparative religions. He does not try, but treats them clearly and with detachment. However, one wonders why he has ignored the commanding, new politico-religious movements which are actually dissipations of all religion, but none the less real and threatening. Hindu India, for instance, Shinto Japan, and Buddhist-Confucianist China are as challenged by universal Communism as is Christendom. Communism is more than a symptom of man's need; it is a direct challenge to all religions which seek to fill that need. As such, it deserves more attention than Doctor White gives it. What is true of Communism is likewise true of Fascism which, though it particularizes itself in national outlines, is rapidly and alarmingly becoming a movement of universal proportions. These politico-religious movements, of course, like Comtism, stand in an inferior relation to true religion, because they are relatives and can brook no judgment which transcends them.

A study of faiths is always beset with the difficulty of finding a place to stand while judging. One is inextricably a part of one of the cultures which stand under his judgment, and his criteria, while they may aim at dispassionateness, are always reflections of his own ego. A critic in comparative religions should admit this. Indeed, if one believes his religion to be true, then that truth has consumed his whole being to such an extent that his judgments are marked with the intolerance of all truth toward error. Surely Doctor White recognizes this. Yet he seems to overlook questions which must have been asked him many times in his travels among younger churches, questions like: If Christianity is a universal

faith, why does it blend so easily with imperialism? Why does it openly segregate races? Why does it sanctify a status quo which has no respect for the universal tenets which it espouses? Here, say the younger churches, is Christianity as it works.

No book which purports to show the effects of the historic religions upon the cultures to which they belong should neglect to see some of the hypocrisies which have grown up in a professing Christian civilization. Our younger churches are seeing this hypocrisy and surpassing their elders in prophetic judgment, a delightfully refreshing practice and one which should excite the admiration of Doctor White who believes so passionately in the universality and ultimate assertion of the kingdom of God through Christ on earth.

RICHARD T. BAKER.
Author and Traveler.

Honesty. By RICHARD C. CABOT. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$2.50.

WITH life as complex as it is today, when confusion as to ultimate values is universal, when people are bewildered by the new interpretations of truth that demand frequent readjustment of mental attitude, one sometimes hesitates even to attempt to lay down a hard and fast rule of conduct. And so it is both refreshing and stimulating to discover Doctor Cabot defending an inflexible rule in the area of veracity. This is especially interesting when one considers that here is essentially a controversial question. "There are few subjects," says Doctor Cabot, "on which we are more muddled than on this subject of honesty. 'Is it ever right to lie?' will draw a heated debate in almost any group of people."

In the first section of the book Doctor Cabot attempts to clarify our thinking on

the exact meaning of the group ideas related to truthfulness. Mistakes must not be confused with lies, or inaccuracy with lack of veracity. Nor may the absence of a proper reserve be mistaken for truthfulness.

Especially interesting is the author's treatment of selective problems in honesty and dishonesty as he expresses his views concerning detectives and spies, where deceit is used for a "good" end. The insidious results in the character of the individual employed, as well as the results in humanity when the idea is employed to an exaggerated degree, as in Germany, resulting in a people whose "souls are in prison though physically free," bring Doctor Cabot to the conclusion that the entire detective and spy system should be abolished.

Detailed examples are given of the extent to which lying and deceit have invaded modern living in the temptation of the scientist to deviate from facts to prove a desired theory, in the ease with which even statistics are misused, and the use of deceit as a deliberate method in medicine. Should a doctor lie to a patient even to save a life?

Less frequently do we consider the matter of self-deceit. As Doctor Cabot shows how one may be self-deceived even unintentionally, and how this tendency to deceive runs through the whole fabric of life, one begins to doubt the reliability of the word, not only of his physician, teacher, business associate and government, but every person upon the street. And then, having discovered that one may be deceiving even himself, he begins to feel like a helpless soul in a world of deception, where no one, not even himself, is trustworthy.

If, as the author suggests, "honesty is a life preserver," then one grasps hopefully at the unequivocal statement of Doctor Cabot that lying is actually never neces-

sary, that the utilitarian is wrong, and that honesty may become automatic. That the route that he outlines for us is not easy he readily admits. Laziness he repeatedly declares is the "excuse for not making a fine art out of speaking the truth," of taking the easy way out of an embarrassing situation. But in the group the reliability of our human environment is essential to our existence. Therefore veracity and permanence which are essential must be achieved.

One of the most stimulating chapters is that on "Creative Honesty," in which we discover that we may not be content when we have merely achieved the ability to react correctly to any temptation to dishonesty. We must go farther; we must act to change the wrongs. "Aggressive honesty, positive honesty, bids us remake the world department by department."

ALBERT E. BEEBE.

First Methodist Church,
Bridgeport, Conn.

True Humanism. By JACQUES MARITAIN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.50.

THE writings of Jacques Maritain are sure to attract attention in our changing Christian thought. Anyone who has shared his insights in *Freedom in the Modern World* will welcome this later volume, *True Humanism*. In following the arguments of this penetrating Christian philosopher, many who are not steeped in the theology of Saint Thomas will be puzzled a bit concerning the essential content of his teaching.

Maritain is first of all a thoroughgoing Thomist. One feels his mental labor in trying to reconcile this system of thought, rooted as it is in the dogmas of medieval Christianity, and the "new Christendom" (pp. 86, 126), which he sees rising out of the present world. Of the present world,

returned to paganism, he says "modern civilization is a worn-out vesture" (p. 201). His own motive in the book evidently is to combat Communism and the liberal Protestantism. He sees in Puritanism, with its religion of church services and a naturalism for secular affairs (p. 71), the "bourgeois man who has taught their atheism to his pupils and heirs, the Communists" (p. 72).

He announces his own position: "I hold the theology of Saint Thomas will govern that of the new Christendom." Thomism, therefore, becomes the framework into which his thinking is bent. But in studying concrete situations he wanders far from Thomism and penetrates with convincing insights the weakness and strength of vast human trends. Then he seems to check up on himself and drag all he has said under the shelter of this medieval system of thought. His interpretation of the kingdom of God as "outside time—in the new world of the resurrection of the dead" (p. 93), and his effort to reconcile human freedom with the transcendent grace of God (pp. 12, 68, etcetera), tends to put much of his more concrete thinking into a strait jacket of abstract dogma. But it is interesting as bringing the historical findings of theology into present-day confused thinking and living.

Maritain's distinction between "anthropocentric humanism" (p. 19) and "theocentric humanism" (p. 62), is the center of his book. And it is great teaching for our day. His attacks upon the over-emphasis of "immanentalism" which ultimately leads to atheism possess a needed antidote for our age. His efforts at explaining transcendentalism are not so convincing, either in his very inadequate discussion of Protestantism (pp. 9-12), or his interpretation of Barth (p. 62), or in his somewhat doubtful optimism that by the workings of divine grace "Russia may achieve before other nations

the shaping of a new Christendom" (p. 62). He sees clearly the impotence of any mechanical humanism in changing man for the better (p. 65). But on the whole his interpretation of divine grace is not inherent in human affairs, but something apart.

Once the framework of Maritain's thinking is understood the reader will find him a truly great teacher. At times he will wish he had done more of his thinking apart from the dogmas of medievalism and had penetrated other expressions of Christian thought with a freer mind. But in the main he speaks for universal Christian thought and points toward the only sound future in which humanity can hope.

LOUIS C. WRIGHT.

President,
Baldwin-Wallace College.

The Methodists Are One People. By

PAUL NEFF GARBER. Nashville:
The Cokesbury Press. \$1.00.

THE title of Professor Garber's timely volume comes from the last letter which Wesley addressed to his American followers. A few days before his death the venerable founder exhorted them to "Lose no opportunity of declaring to all men that the Methodists are one people in all the world." Had he lived another half century he would have been horrified by their backsliding. The first census of American religious bodies revealed at least a dozen churches claiming descent from Wesley. In fact, the parent stock has been fissiparous to an unusual degree. Professor Garber does not explain why Wesley's "one people" have been so prone to separate; but he does devote his first three chapters to the circumstances leading to the more important separatist movements. He writes from thorough knowledge and with conscientious impartiality. Since the union now nearing consummation in the

Methodist Church brings together three large bodies, he very properly gives with much detail the history of their reasons for setting up for themselves. This is done with a competent historian's sense of the integrity of facts—even when the recital of those facts may cause pain to some readers—and with a minimum of partisan coloring. Indeed, it will be an exceptionally sensitive person—whether Northerner or Southerner, Episcopal or Protestant Methodist—who will detect any disturbing tint or shade of intentional coloring matter in the narrative. To say that the recital of these events, especially those covered by Chapter Four—"The Dark Era: 1844-1870," dealing with the period of the bitter and long-drawn property litigation, the stormy years of political reconstruction, and the aggressive and resented penetration of Southern territory by the Northern church—is almost as free from bias as if the writer were a Scotch Presbyterian instead of a Southern Methodist, is only a merited tribute to the sincerity of his purpose to present the truth in the cold, clear light of history, even at the risk of embarrassing one side or the other.

There exists in many quarters an unmistakable trend toward the reunion of other divided churches. Men are saying to themselves, and to one another, "If the Methodists can be one people, why not the Baptists and the Presbyterians?" Many will turn to this book in quest of the cure for their own denominational divisions. From its veracious record of the sixty years of the Methodist Unification Movement they may discover how difficult it is to start the process, by what slow steps it advances, how frequently it is halted, at times apparently how hopeless. Yet Doctor Garber's narrative—full, clear and fair—will also reveal for their encouragement how mutual understanding and mutual trust tend to increase among

Christian men, though they approach a problem with different prepossessions; how the basic factors of a common origin and a common faith exert their magnetism; how, first the negotiators themselves, long before their tardy constituents, learn to disregard the things which have divided them and to emphasize those which make for unity, until, after a century of schism which at times seemed beyond remedy, they can again declare in Wesley's phrase, "*The Methodists are one people!*"

JAMES R. JOY.

Methodist Historical Library,
New York City.

The Nazi Primer. Translated by
HARWOOD L. CHILDS. New York:
Harper & Brothers. \$1.25.

The Nazi Primer is a unique and frank thesis of political-religious-educational propaganda, translated by Professor Childs of Princeton, and with a commentary by William E. Dodd, our former ambassador to Germany. Although it is not indexed, its table of contents gives an excellent summary of the topics treated.

This is intended to be the bible of a political church, and it is superficially convincing and plausible enough to persuade most persons whose reading is limited and whose credulity is that of the normal citizen. However, its inconsistencies, suppressions, and perversions of logic and of history are so extreme as to make it unlikely that it will be of more than transitory service to the Nazi purpose. A people economically bankrupt and smarting under a sense of international injustices is ripe for radical if effective policies, but even a regimented citizenry will not long continue to be fooled by even welcome phrases which are so obviously partisan and insincere.

Such propaganda may have temporary and perhaps terrible successes, but the German people are not to be deceived by it although they may be willing for a time to be led thereby.

Though there is much that is absurd, we should be careful to distinguish between misstatements, malicious suppressions or intolerance, and mere expressions of healthy, universal (though rather childish) pride of race. Inferiority complexes are not desirable and one is not a paranoiac with delusions of grandeur simply because he feels a sense of destiny associating him particularly with the people he knows best and among whom, by accidents of birth and early associations, his lot was cast. Love of homeland is deep-rooted. Others, besides the Germans, believe that theirs is God's country, and there is much power for good in the belief that we are God's people—provided we are both tolerant and mindful that God has other peoples, though perhaps they have or have had less national advantages than we enjoy.

The Nazi Primer professes to recognize the spirit of tolerance. They break down or divide up their native Reich community in six Nordic variants of physique and temperament and exclude other races, not as of inferior quality but because of differences of kind. Certain of the Mendelian laws or observations are stretched to support arguments which they really disprove, for surely Mendel's patient observations taught us first and foremost that the behavior of one specie was no sure guide to another, even among vegetables, and that neither animals nor men bred or cross-inherited according to the characteristics of flowering plants. It would be interesting to ascertain whether the author of the important race formation chapters is a scholar or merely a phrase-borrowing propagandist.

Certainly only the most partisan German will be impressed with the *Primer's* arguments demanding colonies to take care of crowding population, while reporting rich farm lands as being abandoned to Slavic aliens and calling for a higher birth rate. Perhaps Germany should have some colonial outlet, but the residence of 4,701 Germans in climatically favorable German East Africa hardly seems to be a worthwhile international argument, with the million and a quarter who are reported to have returned to Germany from other European lands after the war and the hundreds of thousands permanently domiciled in many scattered cultural centers but spoken of as compact German "settlements" or "branches." A nation which regrets having lost such large bands in the seventeenth and eighteenth century "due to religious and political suppression and the narrow-mindedness of its policies," might well hesitate before resorting to force to impose experimental forms on its present communities.

HALLAM M. RICHARDSON.
Brooklyn, N. Y.

Fairest Lord Jesus. By J. V. MOLDENHAWER. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.75.

THE biggest thing about such a book as this is, and ought to be, the Christian devotion of its writer, and here are illustrated yet again those strange compulsions of Jesus which men as widely apart in opinions as Ernest Renan, Cardinal Newman and Doctor Moldenhawer have felt. One must be grateful for every new manifestation of it.

Fairest Lord Jesus is described as "meditations" on the New Testament story of the Master, though the style is rather advocacy, one finds. A fifteen-

page preface on "the rediscovery of orthodoxy" almost prepares one for material that doesn't arrive, and he is likely to be disappointed, as he reads on, in not finding more justification for the "rediscovery." Very little of this is offered, not for one who has really felt the problems raised.

Those whose tastes run toward a discussion of Christian doctrine in somewhat the older mood and style will enjoy this book, and will be conducted speedily through questions of the authority of scripture, the divine personality, the person of Christ, the atonement, miracles, the resurrection, and others.

The reflection is provoked in this reviewer that congregations are not experts in theology, but that they have their prejudices, strong ones often, and frequently when examined these are found to have nothing more substantial than a nostalgic origin and ground. Preachers are much in peril of them. The real judgment to be met by preachers when they write books, however, is beyond the local group, out where men, some of them accustomed to the braw winds of critical research and forthright challenge, desire to know just how far the pulpit is continuing to avail itself of its protections, or how far it is beginning to develop toughness of mind. A very serious responsibility is here. "I suspect that it is high time to cease being afraid of the word reactionary. Let us pluck up courage enough to declare our independence now and forever of all the modern pundits and dictators." But one can't eject new stars from the sky simply by disowning them. I have a feeling that the attempt only tends to weaken our case in the very camps where it is already felt to be weak.

Toward a book of such appealing devotion one hates to raise even one de-

murrer. But when the beloved minister of the First Presbyterian Church of New York promises us something on miracles, but confines himself to the healings, leaves the raisings of the dead and the "nature miracles," the real problems, nowhere referred to, and settles the whole matter by saying in effect that, inasmuch as the miracles are so much a part of the narrative that one cannot reject them and preserve the narrative, therefore they must be true, it is possible only to experience a little regret. Happily, a wiser generation can see that Wesley's "Give up witchcraft and give up the Bible" is not the choice.

There is a considerable company of people unhappy with "fundamentalism" on the one hand, and not understanding nor ready for "liberalism" on the other, to whom this book will be a real contribution. These require relief from the constructions customarily placed on scripture and doctrine by the verbal inspirationists, and such relief will be found here. Without being asked to give up as much as a liberal would demand, they will be eased into something not too literal and yet not too free for them, and in the process they will not be made afraid because they will recognize in Doctor Moldenhawer's book an authentic love and loyalty to the great Master. Personally, I am of the opinion that real fidelity to Jesus requires a more courageously complete extrication of Him from His reporters, particularly from the Latinized interpretations of Him that for some sixteen hundred years have ruled Christendom, coming in such depressing measure into Protestantism from Saint Augustine and his fellow Romans. However this may be, those of us who realize that, take Him as one will, Jesus still represents for men the noblest thing in life, will recognize something far

greater than all the schools in this author's exclamation as he prepares to close: "My own heart is filled to overflowing at the thought of the triumphs of Christ."

Oswald W. S. McCall.

First Congregational Church,
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Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. By GORDON W. ALLPORT. New York: Henry Holt & Company. \$3.50.

The Achievement of Personality in the Light of Psychology and Religion. By GRACE STUART. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$1.75.

An Introduction to a Christian Psycho-Therapy. By J. A. C. MURRAY. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.00.

The Rediscovery of Man. By HENRY C. LINK. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$1.75.

Pastoral Psychiatry. By JOHN SUTHERLAND BONNELL. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$2.50.

PROFESSOR ALLPORT of Harvard gave seventeen years to the preparation of his book on *Personality*. His concern is with personality itself and not the factors which shape it. In refusing to ally himself with any one school of psychology, he discloses the narrowness of those who do. His thoroughness is indicated in that he occupies a chapter on the discussion of the nature of personality and arrives at the definition—"Personality is the dynamic organization within the individual of those psycho-physical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment." His common sense and the simplicity of greatness appear when he construes his definition thus: "Psychologically considered, personality is what a man really is."

To the criticism that he ignores religion, the reply may be made that his form of treatment does not embrace religion and his references, as on pages 226 and 230, are always respectful. This is an example of his intriguing style:

"The individual, striving ever for his own integrity, has existed under many forms of social life—forms as varied as the nomadic, feudal and capitalistic. Man struggles on, even under oppression, always hoping and planning for a more perfect democracy, where the dignity and growth of each personality will be prized above all else."

Competent thinkers have declared this to be the most important work on psychology by any American since that of William James.

Grace Stuart studies the individual from the standpoint of his fundamental needs, which are for love, significance and security. The fight for those constitutes the meaning and worth of the battle. Without reservation, she advocates the discovery and appropriation of the God of our Lord Jesus Christ.

The distinction of *An Introduction to a Christian Psycho-Therapy* is its earnest Christian flavor. Its central statements are—Man is of value, man is incomplete. Mental disorders and nervous tensions were never more frequent than they are today and the remedy for them is not to be found in those who ignore the religious instincts and the spiritual powers of the mind. The only psychotherapists to be approved, however much their medical learning, are godly men, well trained in psychology, with Christian experience, and certitude regarding the efficacy of Jesus Christ.

He adopts more of the hypotheses of Freud than are now approved. To him the unconscious mind holds the record of all that has ever happened to the indi-

vidual; it is the home of the instincts, the seat of energy, the storehouse of racial experience. He has outmoded ideas of instincts which he calls mental reflexes comparable to the motor reflexes of the muscular system. With all his emphasis on healing, he holds loyally to the proposition that if Jesus Christ is not apprehended as the Revelation of God, He is not, from the New Testament point of view, apprehended at all.

The Rediscovery of Man, praised by William Lyon Phelps as one of the twenty significant books of the year, is, in my opinion, pleasant rather than profound reading. Doctor Link's definitions of psychology and psychoanalysis and psychiatry are interesting but unconvincing. He holds that the latter two destroy the foundations of character and personality. Psychology has discovered personality, its nature, importance and process of development. The most interesting achievement of psychology is its rediscovery of man, and the powers of which he is capable when his mind has been freed from the prevailing fallacies about himself.

His psychology veers too much toward behaviorism. The word soul has no scientific standing, mind is the capacity for making habits and skills. Personality is the extent to which the individual has developed habits and skills which interest and serve other people. Bad habits are not the result of repressed morbid complexes, rather the complexes are due to the bad habits.

Strangely enough, he thinks that religion has become too much an exercise of the higher thought centers at the expense of energy spent with and for other people. His idea of a sermon is something that will make him feel ashamed of himself, stir him into action, compel him to do things for other people at the expense of his private pleasures and comfort. He thinks maybe the times are ripe for the

appearance of another great prophet like Jesus who can give the world an up-to-date moral code.

His social outlook is conservative and he holds that the New Deal policies, born of educated confusion and subsidized chaos, have made for the most wholesale degradation of character and personality that the world has ever seen.

Doctor Bonnell is becoming famous for the clinics he conducts in his Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church. He teaches the subject in Princeton Seminary, is invited to address the doctors, staff and patients of the leading psychopathic hospitals, and has even achieved discussion by the "New Yorker." In all these associations, the usual comment is that Doctor Bonnell is a very understanding minister.

Psychiatry, he holds, pertains primarily to the soul and secondarily to the mind, its primary meaning being the healing of the soul of man. Fellowship with God and sympathy with man, he takes to be the marks of a true ministry, and he finds no more fascinating study than the varieties of human nature.

Much of the book is autobiographical. He pays a beautiful tribute to his father, who had charge of a Mental Hospital in Canada. Many fascinating life-stories are told, at times apparently a little drawn out, but details are significant in disclosing character. All are portrayed in the simplest language, indeed there is an avoidance of technical phraseology throughout the book.

The best chapters are "Humiliation and Pride" and "The Confession and Forgiveness of Sins." He pronounces the ideal of human character to be the humble man who is neither overwhelmed with humiliation nor exalted with pride. He extols trust, which when it disappears, everything else worthwhile goes with it. The book blends spirituality and practical helpfulness admirably, and has its chief

value in the persuasion that there are divine resources which can be laid hold upon to sufficiency.

JOHN W. LANGDALE.

Book Editor of the
Methodist Episcopal Church.

City and Church in Transition. By

MURRAY H. LEIFFER. Chicago:
Willett, Clark & Company. \$2.50.

The American City and Its Church.

By SAMUEL C. KINCHELOE. New
York: Friendship Press. \$1.00,
cloth; 60 c., paper.

THIS is the year in which home missionary interest is centered on the city church, and well it may be. No more critical problem faces Protestantism. While in other countries the Church faces a vicious frontal attack, the city church in America suffers from disintegration, lack of plan, want of a central authority and from a general inability to cope with sociological, political, and racial problems. It is faced with a mobility and fluidity of population which it little understands and has no plan to meet. These two books are an excellent attempt to bring to the attention of the Church the immensity of the problem before it is too late.

Professor Leiffer limits his book to a study of the city of 50,000-150,000, for which he coins a new name—Mediopolis. In Part One he sets forth, from a sociological viewpoint, the development of Mediopolis as a commercial city, industrial city, industrial suburb and residential suburb. Part Two pictures the Church growing up with the city and portrays its patterns and problems in each type of Mediopolis. In reality the book is a study of 40 middle-sized cities and draws on the data furnished by 363 ministers of 9 denominations. As such it is more an analytical study than a comprehensive picture. It sets forth clearly the present

condition of churches in medium-sized cities, but purposely fails to answer the burning question of what the function and policy of the Church must be to increase its service to and improve its position in this most rapidly changing frontier of American life—the medium-sized city.

In Professor Kincheloe's book one finds less analysis but gains more of a sense of direction. Sociological problems are not less scientifically set forth, but more stress is placed upon the purpose, function and program of the Church. He opens his book by looking at the city, its physical structure, its population, composition and its state of mind. The place of the family in the city and the problems city people meet form a clear picture of how city dwellers live and work. In the chapters on "What Cities Do to Churches" and "What Churches Do for Cities" the book makes its best contribution. They form a concise statement of the character and service of city churches. From downtown to suburban churches the list is complete and the picture adequate.

One lays aside the two books with a sigh, wishing that somewhere in Protestantism there might be found a force powerful enough to unify our attempt to Christianize the American city. From New York to San Francisco Protestantism has millions and millions of dollars invested in church property, but has no central authority to make this investment produce efficiently. Over mortgaged cathedrals, where congregations must pay in-

terest before producing programs; edifices crumbling into obsolescence where the former population has moved away and left a dying congregation; congested and underprivileged areas where crime and disease flourish, but where limited missionary funds reduce the programs year by year; great Negro areas where the most religious people of our land are being weaned away by new isms promising spiritual and social security; traditional programs being repeated week after week for dwindling congregations, while city-dwellers everywhere yearn for spiritual nourishment; a ministry striving against overwhelming odds to strengthen the waning spiritual stamina of the nation; populations in flux and flow moving so rapidly from community to community that they lose their church connection; industry and commerce changing the face of the city and driving the populace further and further to the suburbs; communities growing within communities until the church becomes baffled as to its constituency; apartments, penthouses, tenements, slums, traffic, suburbs, disease, crime, unemployment, race, industry, delinquency, immorality, politics, leisure time—these are the problems of the city church set forth so clearly in two excellent books. God give us sense to meet these many and varied problems with authority and vision in a united Protestantism.

FREDERICK B. NEWELL.
Executive Secretary of
The New York City Society.

Bookish Brevities

The article by Professor Brunner was delivered in substance before the Presbyterian Synod of New Jersey.

In the Autumn issue of 1938 of *RELIGION IN LIFE* appears one of its most regretted mistakes. A member of the Editorial Board warmly commended a skeleton article by H. Richard Niebuhr of Yale Divinity School. Professor Niebuhr consented to the publication of the article after revision and elaboration. Several months later the article was read with fresh appreciation and by oversight was forwarded for immediate publication. In its unfinished form it was unauthorized. Indeed, Professor Niebuhr was about to send in the article rewritten in the light of criticism and further reflection. Our real apology is that anything which comes from the gifted pen of Professor Niebuhr is so informed and finished that no thought of the need of revision would ever suggest itself.

When the Library of Congress was erected forty-three years ago, it was announced that its facilities would be adequate for a century and a half. Now an annex has been opened to provide the additional shelving which has long been urgently needed. The annex has twenty acres of floor space with room for ten million volumes, as compared with five millions in the main building. For consultation purposes, the Library is regarded as unequalled anywhere.

The seven books of 1938 which have

received the preponderant approval of the literary critics are:

Benjamin Franklin, by Carl Van Doren.

Fanny Kemble, a Passionate Victorian, by Margaret Armstrong.

The Fifth Column, and the First 49 Stories, by Ernest Hemingway.

The Hidden Lincoln, edited from the letters and papers of William H. Herndon, by Emanuel Hertz.

The Letters of Henry Adams, 1892-1918, edited by Worthington C. Ford.

The Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci, edited by Edward McCurdy.

A Southerner Discovers the South, by Jonathan Daniels.

Remembering that these books have not yet had time to get into wide circulation, it is interesting to compare the seven most popular books in 1938 as disclosed by the Gallup American Institute of Public Opinion. These are: *The Bible*, *Gone With the Wind*, *Anthony Adverse*, *The Citadel*, *How to Win Friends and Influence People*, *The Good Earth*, *Ben Hur*. The influence of the screen is only too apparent in some of these appraisals.

The American Library Association has notified President Roosevelt that the frontiers of knowledge have been advanced and the bonds of democracy strengthened by his reduction of the postal rates on books, thus making the great riches to be found in print more easily accessible to readers.

RELIGION IN LIFE

As beautiful as truthful is the tribute paid by Eve Curie to her mother in her inspiring book, *Madame Curie*:

"I hope that the reader may constantly feel, across the ephemeral movement of one existence, what in Marie Curie was even more rare than her work or her life: the immovable structure of a character; the stubborn effort of an intelligence; the free immolation of a being that could give all and take nothing, could even receive nothing; and above all the quality of a soul in which neither fame nor adversity could change the exceptional purity."

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The identity of spirit in all devout Christians is finely illustrated by John A. Duffy, Catholic Bishop of Buffalo, as he writes in the *Evening News* of that city:

"The breach between the Protestant mind and the Catholic mind is indeed profound. But the gulf is not in personal love for the Saviour, not in what the Master is to man. It lies rather in what man should be and do to reach the Master. Each of us appropriates the Saviour, as far as grace gives us power. We may not accuse each other of a defective view of Christ, as long as each clings to Him in personal love.

"On the basis of this love rests the hope of a better world. . . . However we may differ in name, we can unite to apply His teachings to ourselves and to society at large. The reconstruction of the social order is in the hands of Christian men and women who, living themselves under the laws of justice and charity, will not rest until the Christ-ideal becomes the formula for world peace."

Each year the friends of Robert Norwood commemorate his birthday, March 27. The occasion is always cheerful and courageous as befitteth the eager, vibrant soul whose ministry drew throngs to Saint Bartholomew's Church and whose comradeship was charm and inspiration. Doctor Norwood's spirit shines through his lines:

"There's a voice among the voices of the throbbing, restless world,
There's a thunder deeper, vaster, than from heaven ever hurled,
And you and I have heard it. Listen, still it seems to say,
I have freely given to you. Give, for yours is the today.

"There's a light upon the mountains and it shines to you and me.
There's a mystery, there's a magic, there's a lifting ecstasy;
And you and I have seen it in the wonder of the Cross,
Let us follow, let us follow, counting selfish gain as loss.

"There's a shaking of the nations and a rending of the veil,
Mountains flowing down like rivers, forests flattened by the gale;
For the wind is on our faces, and the Spirit is abroad,
Urging you and me to enter the adventure of our God.

"Lo, the fields are white to harvest; let us strip to bind the grain
Till the fields of golden stubble laugh like flowers after rain;
And everywhere one master is accepted and adored,
In a new earth filled with gladness and the knowledge of the Lord."